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This dissertation takes a new approach to the basic problem of literary 
criticism, the move from form to meaning, by rethinking the category 
of form through German Idealism and Chomskyan linguistics. My 
central methodological thesis is that we cannot develop a framework a 
priori and then apply it to particular cases, since such a procedure 
fails to read literary works in their particularity (and hence as literary), 
and I therefore approach issues in poetics and metaphysics from 
within interpretations of particular works, interpretations that do not 
form a unified narrative but rather a web of negative relations. 
  Chapter 1, on Hardy’s The Workbox, traces the shift from Plato’s 
alignment of form with the universal to Aristotle’s alignment of form 
with the particular. The Workbox traces the inverse trajectory in 
matter, revealing the convergence of universality and opacity in death. 
Chapter 2, on Keats’s To Autumn, focuses on the metaphysics of 
particularity and the particularity of literature, and introduces 
synthetic constructions as a way of understanding poetic 
ungrammaticality. To Autumn is concerned with the relation between a 
universal nature divinity and her particular manifestations, 
culminating in an inhuman pagan theodicy. Chapter 3, on Keats’s Ode 
to a Nightingale, presents a new theory of literary metaphors as 
synthetic constructions, in order to show that the ode deploys such constructions to think the experience of what is beyond experience. 
Chapter 4, on Browning’s ‘Childe Roland’, argues that Hegel’s 
speculative transformation of Kant’s conception of objectivity has a 
terrifying underside that ‘Roland’  explores, forcing us to re-think 
collectivity as requiring not only the mediation of the subject by 
objects but also by a (negatively) divine third term. Chapter 5, on 
Browning’s My Last Duchess, discusses the relationship between the 
verse line and syntax to show how the poem exploits the artifice of 
lineation to become a negative love poem, while Chapter 6 shows how 
Browning’s  Karshish uses the negativity of lineation to rethink the 
theological, in line with Adorno’s Negative Dialektik, as neither a 
transcendent Absolute nor a pantheistic immanence, but rather as the 
immanence of the negative through which immanence exceeds itself. 
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Nicht sind die Fragen gelöst, nicht einmal ihre Unlösbarkeit bewiesen. 
Sie sind vergessen, und wo man sie beredet, werden sie nur desto 
tiefer in ihren schlimmen Schlaf gesungen. 
 
[The questions have not been solved, nor has their insolubility even 
been demonstrated. They have been forgotten, and where they are 
talked of they are only sung the more deeply into their bad sleep.] 
 
Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik 
 
 1 
Introduction 
The Future of Formalism 
 
The aim of this dissertation as a whole is to present a substantially 
new method for literary criticism. Each individual study, however, only 
accomplishes this larger aim incidentally, in the course of engaging 
specific problems in poetics and metaphysics through the 
interpretation of particular poems. From the perspective of the 
dissertation, each portion of the main text is a chapter, one part of a 
larger whole, whereas from its own perspective each portion is an 
essay, both in the sense of a necessarily partial inquiry and in the 
sense of an experiment.1 The aim of this introduction is therefore to 
give voice to the aims of the whole text by explaining just what I take 
literary criticism to be and what my fundamental methodological 
claims are. Having done so, it should be apparent why it would undo 
what I have attempted to accomplish in the essays that follow if I were 
to render their substantive contents in summary, since the aim of the 
essays is to get at the very things that a summary necessarily leaves 
out. 
  I don’t want to suggest, however, that an introduction has no 
place, or that it is impossible to find a beginning. We cannot, it is true, 
sweep the board clean and begin as if so many centuries of literary 
inquiry had not already been conducted, but we can begin, in proper 
dialectical fashion, right where we are, in medias res. Since most 
                                       
1 See Adorno’s “The Essay as Form” in NL for a detailed discussion with which I am 
largely in agreement. 2 
literary criticism is devoted to the interpretation of literary texts, it 
makes sense to suppose that interpretation is the primary task of 
literary criticism. If criticism is properly just a name for reflection, then 
literary criticism must be made up of the reflections to which we are 
spurred by literary texts. There are three broad questions we might 
ask when confronted with a literary text, each of which constitutes one 
of the domains in which our reflections fall:  
1.  What is it? (the question of the theories of literature and 
language) 
2.  What does it mean? (the question of interpretation) 
3.  Is it true? (the question of philosophy, including politics, ethics, 
metaphysics)2 
Much of contemporary theory, to the extent that it concerns itself with 
literature at all, focuses on the first question (e.g., Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy’s The Literary Absolute). And much of criticism proper’s 
avowed interest is in the third question, where its concern with the 
political in particular often seems to serve as an alibi for a slightly 
embarrassed interest in the literary, in interpretation. We cannot, of 
course, interpret a text at all without assuming, however 
unconsciously, certain answers to the first question, but the 
engagement with the first question is in this way merely a means to 
the second. And since the truth of the object just is the truth of its 
meaning, the question of truth cannot be thought independently of the 
question of interpretation (though interpretation, by contrast, can be 
                                       
2 The three elements of my title correspond to these three interrogative domains: 
“Syntax” to the first question, “Nineteenth Century Lyric” to the second, and 
“Metaphysics” to the third.  3 
thought without invoking the question of truth—which is not to say 
that it ought to be thought in that way). Interpretation is thus the 
heart of the matter, and the question of interpretation is what gives 
descriptive discourse and veridical discourse purpose and substance, 
respectively. The aim of this dissertation is to show concretely that the 
work of meaning and the work of truth transpire at the (seemingly only 
descriptive) level of linguistic form, which is just to say, syntax. In 
order to see why it makes sense to take up this task, we will need to 
consider description, interpretation and truth in more detail. 
The central task of literary criticism is interpretation. But the initial 
question we face in thinking about interpretation is what we must 
necessarily presuppose in undertaking it. Anyone who is a partisan of 
a particular method or theoretical framework will naturally rely on the 
presuppositions of that framework: to be a bit reductive, the historicist 
critic will presuppose Foucault, the psychoanalytic critic will 
presuppose Freud, the Marxist critic will presuppose, well, Marx. But 
before we can assess those sophisticated presuppositions, we should 
attempt to grasp the basic presuppositions that all of these 
approaches share, the presuppositions that any possible approach to 
literary interpretation would necessarily have to adopt. In practical 
terms, we might say that one can hardly sit down to interpret a poem 
written in a language one does not know.3 This, among many other 
practicalities, must be in place before one can interpret a poem, but 
it’s not clear that practical presuppositions have any substantive 
                                       
3 If one is reading a poem in translation, then one must at least know the language 
the translation is written in (and it seems fair to say that in that case one’s 
interpretation is an interpretation of the translation, not of the original). 4 
consequences for critical method as such.4 We must also, however, 
necessarily adopt two sets of theoretical presuppositions if we are to 
interpret a work of literature: (1) a theory of literature, and (2) a theory 
of language. We must have both theories before we can answer our 
first question about the object, “What is it?” 
  By “a theory of literature” I do not mean anything more exotic 
than a descriptive account of what makes a work of literature a work 
of literature rather than something else. This might be understood as a 
problem of definition: if we are to interpret a work of literature (rather 
than interpreting whatever happens to be in front of us), then we must 
interpret it as a work of literature, with appropriate attention to the 
specificity of its kind. This does not mean that we need presuppose a 
fully elaborated account of literature that would exhaustively cover, 
say, all of the significant topics of philosophical aesthetics. All we need 
presuppose, however unconsciously, is a basic descriptive account of 
literature: just enough of an account that our claim to be interpreting 
a work of literature has content, a threshold account. Needless to say, 
the fact that we must necessarily presuppose such an account is no 
guarantee that our account is the correct one, or even that it meets 
rudimentary conditions of plausibility. But since we must necessarily 
presuppose at least a threshold theory of literature, it makes sense to 
adopt the best theory we can. Ideally, such a theory would not conflict 
with any commitments we might have to specific theoretical 
                                       
4 There is, of course, a sociopolitical dimension to the question of knowing (especially 
the “standard” dialect of), say, English, and politically motivated approaches to 
criticism would have good reason to pay attention to this issue. But it would not 
necessarily have consequences for any possible method, and so I am bracketing it for 
the time being in order to focus on more basic and unavoidable issues. 5 
frameworks or approaches (historicism, say) since, as an account only 
of what we must necessarily presuppose, it would equally be 
presupposed by any approach we might wish to take.5 
  Similarly, we cannot engage in the interpretation of a work of 
literature without presupposing a theory of language, however ad hoc 
the theory is and however unconsciously we presuppose it. When we 
sit down to merely read a text, we deploy our knowledge of language6 
(partly innate, partly determined by experience) quite unconsciously. 
But when we start making claims about what particular portions of 
the text mean, then we do more than simply use our knowledge of 
language; we thereby appeal to our knowledge of language as an 
objective basis for our claims and as an objective standard against 
which they are to be measured. A sequence of thoughts need not have 
any inferential or systematic relationship, but we do not write critical 
essays in a stream of consciousness. We make arguments, and to the 
extent we are in the business of making arguments our arguments 
about the meanings of texts, regardless of our approach, will depend 
upon claims about language—we must be able to call a verb a verb 
and know what we mean. Here also it makes sense for us to seek the 
best account of language we can find. In the case of the theory of 
literature, we need have little recourse to anything outside our own 
                                       
5 There are, of course, limits to what approaches are intelligible. For example, an 
approach to literary interpretation that presupposed that there is no such thing as 
literature would be internally contradictory and impossible to salvage except by 
removing its claim to being an approach to literary interpretation. 
6 This phrase is intended to invoke Chomsky’s terminology in Knowledge of 
Language, the first two chapters of which (apart from a few technical points that 
have since changed) are a reliable and accessible introduction to the outlines of the 
theory of language in current linguistics. Adger’s Core Syntax is a good introductory 
textbook; Hornstein, et al., is a good intermediate textbook. 6 
field, as long as we’re allowed to poach on the field of philosophical 
aesthetics—which should be no problem since its proper owner has, in 
this country, largely let it go to seed. But in the case of the theory of 
language we have the good fortune of having on hand an entire 
academic discipline devoted to exactly the questions we need answered 
in order to have a theory of language, and we are thus able to draw 
heavily on the work of specialists in that field, namely linguistics.  
Unfortunately, the work that has been done in linguistics 
departments in the last half century or so is not well known in 
literature departments. Historical linguistics (philology) has long been 
intimately connected to literary study, particularly since the 19th 
century, and its integration into literary study seems now to arouse 
little controversy. The Russian Formalists and their structuralist 
successors are responsible for the more controversial early 20th 
century attempts to bring linguistics to bear on literary study.7 The 
various proposals associated with structuralism in particular have 
probably had the largest impact on literary study of any form of 
linguistics, as is evident from the fact that in literature departments 
linguistics often just means structuralism, despite the latter’s demise 
in linguistics departments. In the decade after Chomsky began 
publishing in the late 1950s,8 some literary scholars attempted to 
                                       
7 The most important figure connecting Russian Formalism with structuralism is 
Roman Jakobson, since he was involved with both the Moscow Linguistic Circle and 
then the Prague Linguistic Circle (see his Language in Literature for his most 
influential essays).  
8 His first published book was Syntactic Structures (1957), but this was a much 
reduced version of arguments he had worked out more systematically two years 
before in a then-unpublishable manuscript titled The Logical Structure of Linguistic 
Theory. The latter was eventually published two decades later, despite the fact that it 
was quite dated by that time, because, thanks to the circulation of mimeographed 7 
assimilate the new developments associated with transformational-
generative grammar into literary study. But before literary study had 
enough time to absorb the new developments, and while literary 
linguistics was still closely tied to structuralism,9 literary 
structuralism began to decline due in part to its failure to bear out its 
large claims in satisfactory, concrete ways. As Derrida’s work began to 
filter into the English-speaking world in the 1970s, his critique of 
structuralism seemed from the vantage point of literature departments 
to be a serious blow to linguistics, even though, by that time, the lay of 
the land in linguistics had changed entirely. The decline of 
structuralism, along with its displacement by deconstruction (or 
identity politics and other kinds of politically-informed approaches), 
thus took all criticism informed by linguistics down with it. Apart from 
a handful of very promising essays10 and a single book-length study 
(Timothy R. Austin’s Language Crafted), comparatively little to date 
has been published that has seriously attempted to employ the 
insights of current syntactic theory in literary study.  
In the meantime, things in linguistics had gotten increasingly 
interesting. When Chomsky first mounted arguments for the 
‘innateness hypothesis,’ against the behaviorist orthodoxy, he caused 
considerable controversy. The ensuing flurry of empirical research over 
                                                                                                              
copies, it was often cited even though many scholars did not have access to it. All of 
which is just to say that the most substantial treatment of Chomsky’s initial ideas is 
to be found in LSLT not in SS. 
9 The classic treatment of the structuralist program for literary study is Jonathan 
Culler’s Structuralist Poetics (1975), a book that is so deftly argued and wide-ranging 
that it remains illuminating. 
10 One the most influential collections in the development of stylistics is Chatman 
and Levin’s Essays on the Language of Literature (1967). 8 
the next couple of decades dramatically vindicated many of the claims 
that, when he originally asserted them, were thought outlandish, so 
that the transformational-generative approach eventually claimed a 
central position in linguistics. The dominant theory of language in the 
19th century emerged from the subfield of historical linguistics, and 
many of the most important insights of structural linguistics derived 
from phonetics and phonology (Ferdinand de Saussure is most well-
known in linguistics departments not for the Cours de linguistique 
générale but for his work on laryngeals). But with the emergence of 
modern syntactic theory, a quite different conception of human 
language emerged. Many of the ideas in this new conception were 
actually, as Chomsky has often emphasized, not really new at all but 
rather were formalizations of conceptions of language dating from at 
least the 17th century that had lain fallow during the first half of the 
20th (see his Cartesian Linguistics). These traditional lines of thinking 
included the idea that all human languages must have underlying 
similarities that can be formalized as rules (a ‘Universal Grammar’) 
and that human language use, rather than being merely imitative, is 
fundamentally creative (in the sense that speakers have an unbounded 
capacity to produce new constructions that are not related by any 
process of induction or analogy to constructions they have heard). The 
so-called ‘Chomskyan Revolution’ was thus really just an updated 
version of one kind of traditional approach, synthesized with 
theoretical developments in the formal sciences. The general 
framework underwent an even more dramatic shift when Chomsky 
published his Lectures on Government and Binding (1981), a work that, 9 
synthesizing a large body of research by many different linguists 
working in the field, inaugurated an approach that was historically 
unprecedented, the ‘Principles and Parameters’ approach. As Chomsky 
describes it,  
The P&P approach held that languages have no rules in 
anything like the familiar sense, and no theoretically 
significant grammatical constructions except as taxonomic 
artifacts. There are universal principles [that are identical 
across all human languages] and a finite array of options 
as to how they apply (parameters), but no language-
particular rules and no grammatical constructions of the 
traditional sort within or across languages. (MP 5-6) 
The current line of thinking today is known as ‘minimalism,’ an 
approach, heavily influenced by Luigi Rizzi’s Relativized Minimality 
(1990) and Chomsky’s The Minimalist Program (1995), that is similar to 
the P&P model in many respects but (as the name suggests) aims to 
dramatically simplify the theoretical apparatus.  
One particularly important aspect of current linguistic theory 
that has been made increasingly explicit as it has developed is its 
internalist  orientation. The behaviorist approach construed the 
linguist’s object of inquiry, language, as a set of learned behaviors or a 
set of learned rules; the structuralist approach construed the object of 
inquiry as a set of sentences, a set of paired sounds and meanings, or 
a system of signs. Both of these approaches encountered serious 
problems: the empirical predictions of the behaviorist approach were 
not borne out by the facts, and the structuralist approach was so 
abstract that it was difficult to see what empirical predictions it could 
make (a ‘science of signs’ very quickly becomes a science of 
everything). The current approach is to construe the object of inquiry 10 
as the human faculty for language itself—that is, one module of the 
human mind, a real thing in the world. Linguistics so conceived is a 
naturalistic inquiry like any other,11 and can thus be held to the 
stringent standards of the natural sciences rather than falling 
awkwardly in the interstices between the robustly humanistic and the 
robustly naturalistic.12 This does not mean that linguistics can provide 
an automatic descriptive procedure, or that it can make literary study 
itself scientific (in any sense), but just that linguistics has a somewhat 
more clearly defined domain of inquiry than it once did. Literature 
departments have, sadly, not taken much notice of these 
developments, and, since linguists are often wary of some kinds of 
literary theory,13 and since current research in linguistics displays a 
level of technical complexity that is truly daunting to the untrained, 
the obstacles to remedying this situation are not inconsiderable. One 
of the main aims of this dissertation is therefore to present some of the 
findings of current linguistics, particularly within syntactic theory, and 
                                       
11 Chomsky has even gone so far as to suggest that speaking of language ‘learning’ is 
misleading and that we should rather speak of language ‘growth,’ because the 
language faculty develops in a way identical to any other organ: it has a genetically 
pre-determined course whose unfolding is only affected by environmental factors 
within certain narrow bounds (New Horizons 120).  
12 See Chomsky’s New Horizons (106-34) for a more detailed discussion of what it 
means for linguistics to be a naturalistic inquiry.  
13 Austin, for example, who is clearly a quite capable linguist, makes the rather 
strange claim that “The whole enterprise of modern linguistic science, together with 
its many interdisciplinary applications, is, after all, in serious trouble if the 
suspicions of the Derrideans turn out to be justified” (4). Austin seems unaware both 
that Derrida is not professing a simplistic radical skepticism of the nothing-means-
anything variety (which would, after all, be a silly position for a trained philosopher 
to hold), and that Derrida’s critiques of linguistics are almost entirely directed at 
structural linguistics (and when Derrida does discuss Chomsky, it’s fairly clear that 
he has only limited acquaintance with the scholarly literature in syntax). 
Deconstruction is no more a threat to linguistics than it is a threat to physics. 11 
to show in practice how these findings may be applied to specific 
problems of literary interpretation.  
This dissertation also aims to present and defend a theory of 
literature. The test of such a theory must be how well it squares with 
what happens when one concretely engages with a particular text, and 
so I have attempted as much as possible to weave interpretation and 
theoretical argumentation together, thereby to hold my theoretical 
arguments to the strictest standard I could manage. This is, however, 
an unorthodox strategy; an introduction such as this is usually 
devoted largely to an argument on behalf of the method to be employed 
in the main text and its theoretical presuppositions, whereas I will not 
present all of those arguments here since they are part of the subject 
matter of the main text. As an aid to those who wish to put my theory 
of literature together as a whole, given that it is distributed throughout 
the body text, and as a stimulus to the memory for those who have 
already worked through the arguments in the main text, I have 
included as Appendix A a summary of the whole theory including 
many of the arguments in its defense. The appendix is intended to aid 
to the reader in considering the arguments as they appear in the body 
of the dissertation, not to replace those arguments. 
For the present, I will briefly discuss two main aspects of my 
theory of literature that have significant consequences for my method 
in these essays and, I think, for literary criticism generally. The two 
claims I wish to discuss are that artworks are (1) immanently 
autotelic, and that they are (2) inherently particular. To say that 
artworks are immanently autotelic is to say that, considered in 12 
themselves, they are not instrumental (i.e., they do not have an 
external end). Artworks contrast, in this respect, with non-aesthetic 
man-made objects, like hammers, that are immanently exotelic. If I hit 
a nail with a hammer, I am using the hammer as a hammer, and being 
used to whack things is part of what it means to be a hammer. I can, 
of course, hit a nail with a volume of verse, but then I am not using 
the poems as poems—I am using them as a hammer. It would make 
little sense to say that being used to whack things is necessarily part 
of what it means to be a poem, since a poem performed aloud could 
hardly be turned to that purpose (whereas a hammer made of air 
would be no hammer at all). Artworks, then, are immanently autotelic: 
considered in themselves, they are their own end. 
It is important to distinguish this view from the stronger claim 
sometimes identified as the claim of ‘aesthetic autonomy,’ namely that 
artworks are both immanently and transcendently autotelic, as when 
Oscar Wilde, in the preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray, asserts that 
“All art is quite useless” (4).14 Whenever an artwork spurs us to 
                                       
14 Oddly, this view is often attributed to the New Critics, who thought no such thing. 
See Wellek’s chapter on the New Criticism in vol. 6 of A History of Modern Criticism. 
As he points out, the usual complaints against the New Critics “can be so 
convincingly refuted by an appeal to the texts that I wonder whether current 
commentators have ever actually read the writings of the New Critics” (144). Often, it 
seems to me, the New Critics (Wimsatt and Brooks especially) were asking the right 
questions, even if they did not frame those questions rigorously enough or answer 
them in a satisfactory way. The only element of the New Critical paradigm that I 
would reject wholesale (and it was really only central to Brooks’ position) is the view 
(ultimately derived from Romantic organicism) that the poem reconciles opposites or, 
in one way or another, achieves unity. We do not need the notion of unity as long as 
we can speak of a text as a coherent object by appeal to the linguistic facts that 
constitute it (and by its temporal constitution, for which see Appendix A), and we 
cannot know in advance whether a poem will resolve the problems it produces (in my 
experience, poems never do, and this is surely part of what makes them enigmas 
rather than riddles, q.v. Adorno AT). My main sympathy with the New Critics is the 
emphasis on close reading, though I aim to make close reading a dramatically more 
demanding procedure. 13 
reflection, it is serving an external end (namely, to make us think in a 
particular way), and so for us the artwork does have an external end 
and is not quite useless. Artworks are, therefore, immanently autotelic, 
but they are also transcendently exotelic. The latter is not part of what 
makes the artwork an artwork (a painting is still a painting if no-one is 
looking at it), which is why it is a merely transcendent feature of the 
object (a feature that the object has insofar as it is considered from a 
perspective outside of itself—that is, from our perspective).15 When we 
write an interpretation of a work of literature, we are putting the work 
to use, just as we would be putting it to use if we gave it to a child in 
the hopes that it would amuse them, or even morally improve them, 
where the external end of the work from the perspective of the child is 
the child’s pleasure or the child’s emboldened virtue. But 
interpretation is a unique use to which literature can be put because it 
claims to be an interpretation of the text, to return to the immanence 
of the work, rather than simply leaving the work behind after one has 
taken one’s pleasure from it. To put it another way, if we use the work 
for our amusement, then we reduce the work to a mere occasion for 
our own self-reflection; and if we use the work to make a political 
point, then we reduce the work to a mere instrument of propaganda; 
whereas if we make an interpretation of the work, then we become the 
                                       
15 In this context, I am using the word transcendent in its etymological sense of that 
which exceeds the boundaries of the object (e.g., in this case, the world of readers 
and the various uses to which they put literature), rather than its Kantian sense, or 
any other sense. When I say that artworks are transcendently exotelic, the word 
transcendently should not be taken to imply, for example, that it is part of the 
essential nature of artworks to be exotelic, or that they are exotelic in some kind of 
mystical or religious way. In other words, the boundary the crossing of which 
transcendent is supposed to designate is just the boundary of the immanence of the 
object itself. 14 
mere occasion, the domain in which the artwork’s self-reflection can 
transpire. Among all of the uses to which literature may be put, only 
interpretation does not betray the dialectic of the work by bringing it to 
rest. Only interpretation preserves the artwork as an artwork, rather 
than exploiting it for alien ends. 
This merely descriptive feature of the artwork (that it is 
immanently autotelic but transcendently exotelic) thus has definite 
implications for our interpretive practice. The implications just 
mentioned are admittedly abstract, but they do give us some sense of 
what interpretation ought to be: the self-reflection of the object 
mediated by the critic, rather than the critic’s vain self-reflection 
mediated by the object. This does not necessarily prevent our adopting 
any of the familiar frameworks for interpretation, but it obliges us to 
approach the application of those frameworks in a less cavalier 
manner than we might otherwise be inclined. But these descriptive 
facts also have, I believe, further consequences. If, for example, 
artworks are by nature not instrumental in themselves, and if 
communicative language, by contrast, is by nature instrumental in 
itself, then it follows that artworks made of language (works of 
literature) are not instances of communicative language.16 This in turn 
entails that the aim of interpretation cannot be to recover the 
                                       
16 See ch. 3 for further discussion of this point. I am in sympathy here, to an extent, 
with the Russian Formalists, who also distinguished between “practical” and literary 
language (Eichenbaum 108). My arguments in support of this point, however, differ 
considerably from theirs, in much the same way that, although I also invoke 
linguistics as a necessary feature of literary study, the linguistics I am invoking is 
quite different (i.e., not structuralist or proto-structuralist) and my view of its place 
in literary study is different (they sought to understand “literariness” rather than to 
interpret individual texts). 15 
intentions of the author, because the immanent telos of the artwork 
cannot be to communicate an intention, which means that the 
author’s views about the meaning of his or her work (or about 
anything else, for that matter) are no more relevant to the 
interpretation of the text than anyone else’s views are. The fact that 
works of literature are not communicative also entails that theories of 
the communicative use of language (e.g., speech act theory) will be 
qualitatively incompatible with literary study. 
The second main feature of my theory of literature that I’d like to 
mention here is the claim that artworks are intrinsically particular.17 
We find a similar notion in a sentence from Aristotle’s Poetics (a 
sentence to which I will often return in the following essays): “Poetry is 
something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since 
poetry rather speaks universally [katholou], whereas history speaks 
the particular [hekaston]” (1451b5-7, my trans.). Aristotle’s point is 
that, although the matter of poetry and history are the same (the 
particular), poetry speaks in a distinctive manner  (universally). The 
universality of poetry’s mode of speaking is still not the pure 
universality of philosophy (which is why it is “more philosophic” than 
history, not just equivalent to philosophy). The universal manner of 
poetry transpires within the particularity of its matter. A history of 
Thebes might contain an account of Oedipus the Tyrant, but, although 
the particular details might be exactly the same, Sophocles’ Oedipus 
Tyrannus nevertheless gives voice to what is universal in the story of 
Oedipus, though without going over into making general 
                                       
17 See Chapter 2 for further discussion of this issue. 16 
pronouncements. The universality of Oedipus Tyrannus is not, for 
example, reducible to the universal statements made by individual 
characters; if those statements are removed from the play and taken 
out of the mouths of literary characters, they become simply 
philosophical claims. The universality of Oedipus Tyrannus resides 
exactly in what cannot be wrested free from its particular substance. 
Even an allegory does not simply discuss abstract concepts, but 
embodies them; the gesture of embodiment is just what makes an 
allegory an allegory rather than a moral treatise. Even the novel of 
ideas feels the need to provide a particular persona to give its ideas a 
voice. Works of literature, then, are intrinsically particular, but 
(transcendently) they aim beyond the mere recording of facts towards 
the universality of meaning, a universality mediated by particularity. 
One important consequence of the inherent particularity of 
literature is that interpretation cannot proceed by attempting to 
convert the particulars of the text into universals, because in doing so 
we would leave out precisely what makes the text a work of literature, 
its particularity. Our aim cannot be just to reduce a poem to a plain 
prose statement (which usually just leaves us with a plain prose 
platitude anyway). And we also cannot reduce the text to a mere 
instantiation of some larger, universal phenomenon like literariness, 
ideology, resistance or subversion. To do so is not just to misread the 
text, it is to fail to read the text at all—that is, to read it as literature. 
But we also don’t want to fall into the view that the text has no 
relation to the world at all, since that leaves us only with the discourse 
of appreciation, which, in attempting to praise the artwork, only 17 
slanders it by imputing to it no real importance whatever. Our Scylla 
and Charybdis are Dogmatism and Belletrism.18  
Artworks do have a relation to the world, but it is a negative 
relation. Insofar as an artwork comes into being as something 
immanently autotelic and inherently particular (that is, insofar as it is 
an artwork at all), it can only come into being through its determinate 
repudiation of a world that is, after all, wholly mastered by the 
reduction of people to mere means and the elevation of abstractions 
over human lives. If anything has a claim to being hermetic, it is the 
world, whose bloated totality is punctured by the sharp corners of art’s 
negativity. As Adorno says, “Art’s asociality is the determinate negation 
of a determinate society” (AT 226). The particularity of artworks is a 
crucial element of their negativity. This means that we must consider 
artworks in themselves, not because of their independence from the 
social but precisely because of their intimacy with the social. Artworks 
become less relevant to human concerns, not more relevant, when we 
attempt to bolster their political credentials with an injection of 
extrinsic historical or conceptual material. Dogmatism and Belletrism 
end up converging in their disdain for the artwork. For the belletrist, 
the artwork is at best a source of private joy (in the midst of universal 
horror) that reconciles us to our fate, rather than allowing us to see 
how what was humanly made can be humanly unmade. The dogmatist 
has the same conception of the artwork, but responds with loathing 
for art’s depraved failure to act when action seems demanded, 
combined with guilt for taking an interest in art in the first place—and 
                                       
18 On the latter, see Williams, “The New Belletrism.” 18 
so the dogmatist attempts to undo art’s autonomy in order to save it, 
like a child trying to restore flight to an injured bird by tossing it off of 
a tall building.  
The intrinsic particularity of art, then, demands not larger, 
bolder, broader theses and less nitpicky close reading, but more close 
reading, a close reading far closer than anyone has ever even 
attempted. I have made some very partial and preliminary attempts 
along these lines in the essays that follow in the hopes of showing not 
only that such an approach has positive results but also that an 
enormous amount of work remains to be done, even with the most 
well-known poems. Minute attention to detail and subtle 
discriminations often provoke the complaint that one is ‘over-reading,’ 
but this complaint presents one with a false choice between an 
unseemly excess and a restraint that keeps one in the well-worn 
grooves. The only question is whether or not an argument in support 
of an interpretation has demonstrated its truth on the basis of textual 
evidence. Either the argument proves its claims or it doesn’t. Neither 
indulging in technical detail nor ascetically eschewing it will immunize 
us against error. 
The inherent particularity of art also entails that one ought not 
construct a book-length project in which a series of studies of 
individual poems are subordinated to a larger interpretive argument. If 
one succeeds at integrating multiple individual works into the same 
argument then one will be certain to have missed everything particular 
to each individual work, and hence will have missed what makes them 
works of literature entirely. The truth of the matter, of course, is that 19 
most academic books—even extremely good ones like Auerbach’s 
Mimesis—are really just collections of essays anyway, nested in a set 
of claims so ambitious that no book could ever possibly make good on 
them. Such concessions to the vagaries of academic publishing are a 
positive hindrance in inquiries of this kind. But if we take the opposite 
approach and only write articles about individual poems we end up 
replicating in our own work the errors of the hermetic theory of art, 
behaving as if the artwork’s particularity is a product of indifference 
rather than negativity. What this dissertation attempts to do, then, is 
to construct a book length project in which the individual chapters are 
deliberately disjunctive, in which the individual readings relate to one 
another in such a way that they create further tensions and 
difficulties, rather than using one interpretation to prop up the sagging 
corners of the other in the hopes that the whole ramshackle edifice will 
amount to something. The essays that follow are to be taken one by 
one, to successively construct a legible constellation, a web of 
suspended difficulties. 
The theories of language and of literature that I’ve presented are 
doubtless imperfect, but they do at least demarcate the boundaries of 
a coherent space within which to carry out the inquiries I have in 
mind. As I’ve said, these inquiries, however much they may involve 
discussions of literary theory, poetics or philosophy, are primarily 
interpretive. At this point, having disposed of the necessary 
presuppositions of interpretation at least for the nonce, and thus 
leaving the domain of description, I ought to give some account of my 
method of interpretation proper. But, from the account of the inherent 20 
particularity of artworks that I have provided above, it follows 
necessarily that no method for interpretation is in fact possible. If the 
aim is to interpret the object in its particularity (since this is the only 
way to interpret it as literature), then one can hardly expect to know in 
advance of reading it what it will mean. Similarly, if the aim is to 
interpret the object immanently, without importing extrinsic material, 
then one cannot approach the text with the external material of a 
positive method. But if one is not to arrive at the text with a method 
(apart from the purely negative conditions imposed on interpretation 
by the nature of literature and language), this does not mean that one 
must do without a method entirely, proceeding arbitrarily rather than 
methodically. Rather, the aim should be to develop one’s interpretive 
method out of the text itself. Instead of arriving at the poem with an 
interpretive toolkit, one wrests a way of thinking about the poem from 
the poem’s own resources. This does not, of course, prevent one from 
employing, for example, the technical apparatus of linguistics, because 
then a merely descriptive claim is at issue: using linguistics can give 
you a very precise way of characterizing particular linguistic facts 
about the text. By the same token, those merely descriptive 
observations do not themselves constitute interpretations, so rather 
than linguistics solving interpretive problems it actually does just the 
opposite, making apparently simple problems more exigent and 
revealing entirely new problems to spur inquiry.  
Most of the following essays begin with discussions of issues in 
philosophy or poetics and then proceed to discussing the text of the 
poem. One should not be misled by this format into inferring that the 21 
text is to be treated as a mere example of the theoretical claims (the 
alternative format, which would give theory the last word, seemed to 
me the worse evil).19 The theoretical discourse is purely instrumental 
to the interpretation of the poem, to the unfolding of its immanent 
truth. In principle one could always provide the same account of the 
poem without appeal to such topics as Aristotle’s views on form, and I 
discuss extrinsic material only (1) in order draw out the philosophical 
issues that are already  in the poem, and (2) to do so in the most 
perspicuous, accessible and economical way possible. That is not to 
say that the essays that follow do not make philosophical claims, but 
just that each essay (if I have done my job) shows that the poem 
makes (or determinately demands that we make) those philosophical 
claims. I found while writing these essays that, even if I had wanted to 
reduce the poems to mere illustrations, it would have been impossible 
for me to do so. Even poems that I had read hundreds of times, 
committed to memory and examined closely, would surprise me every 
time I sat down to work with them—obstructing my attempts to predict 
where the argument would go with surprising frequency. The 
interpretations in each essay thus frequently stray from the frame in 
which I have placed them, as will necessarily happen whenever one 
takes the particularity of the work seriously. 
It should, however, be said that despite the absence of any 
positive interpretive method, there are thematic regularities among the 
                                       
19 Sometimes I have attempted a slightly more dialectical progression by beginning 
with the poem in order to set up the problem, turning to the theoretical issues to give 
a richer account of the problem, and then returning to the poem in order that it may 
agitate and contradict the theoretical account. This has not, however, always been 
practicable, particularly in chapters whose primary focus is poetics. 22 
interpretations these essays produce, not least in that they are all 
concerned, in some way, with the ways in which the poems engage 
with the metaphysics of form. I begin with the relation between form 
and matter (chapter 1), the problem at the origin of metaphysics itself; 
if form is construed as a universal (as in Plato), the problem of the 
universal and the particular (chapter 2) results; if form is construed as 
perceptible shape, then form becomes a problem of experience (chapter 
3); if forms are universals and universals are concepts that the mind 
applies to the world, then the problem is one of subject and object 
(chapter 4); if nature is the mere stuff which mankind forms, then the 
problem of form is one of art and nature (chapter 5); and if forms are 
eternal, and things in this diurnal sphere mere changeable dross, then 
the problem of form is the problem of transcendence (chapter 6). This 
linkage by topos is one of the things that puts the poems into enough 
of a relation to one another that the essays can be disjunctive rather 
than being merely indifferent, but it also makes it possible to focus 
attention on the ways in which issues in poetics and interpretation are 
bound up with metaphysical questions. If we see the basic problem of 
criticism as the difficulty of getting from form to content, from an 
observation about a text to its meaning, then the relationship between 
form and content is a central problem of method. My aim has been to 
set into relation a set of poems that, in thematizing metaphysical 
issues, also thematize the problems of interpretive method, thus 
ideally allowing us to think through poetry’s own theory of itself rather 
than our theory of it. And it is no mere accident that it should be 
possible to do so: when we invoke the category of form in literary 23 
criticism, the concept bears with it a long philosophical history and an 
enormous array of difficult problems that we must deal with if we are 
to take literary form even remotely seriously. One of the most 
unfortunate features of the fragmentation of literary study is that 
critics with the greatest philosophical sophistication often have limited 
acquaintance with the technical problems of linguistics and poetics, 
and critics with intricate knowledge of linguistics and poetics often 
have a limited grasp of the philosophical tradition. The peculiar 
problems of literary study demand that these two things be thought 
together. 
The philosophical tradition I draw especially heavily on in the 
following essays is German Idealism, along with some of its important 
antecedents in the ancient world and inheritors in the present. In part 
this choice is motivated by the fact that the philosophers in this 
tradition have some of the most interesting things to say about 
metaphysics and form, since both categories are central concerns of 
their philosophical projects. But this is also another element that 
draws together this particular set of poems. Despite the considerable 
stretch of time between the earliest and the latest poems I discuss 
(1821-1914), all of them emerge out of an intellectual historical 
situation that is deeply informed by idealist philosophy (and the 
utilitarian and positivist reactions to it). These poems thus share a 
negative relation to similar historical circumstances, which draws 
them just close enough to one another that their differences are 
thrown into relief. The choice of the long 19th century is not an 
absolute restriction: it would be possible to pursue work along similar 24 
lines in any period (or with a selection of poems that cuts across 
periods), and the choice of period for this dissertation is in no small 
part a practical matter. But there are more substantial reasons why 
the 19th century should be a particularly rich seam. 
If one of the substantial (rather than merely critical) aims of 
metaphysics is to think the absolute, then metaphysics begins to 
resemble theology (more on this in ch. 6). But metaphysics remains 
something other than theology; it preserves the impulse to think the 
absolute but is fraught with problems in attempting to fulfill that 
impulse (not least that it insists on thinking the absolute rather than 
merely  believing  in it). The culture of the 19th century exhibits a 
peculiar sympathy with the predicament of metaphysics, since the 
durable verities of religion then seemed seriously threatened in a new 
way (principally by historical criticism of the Bible and new 
developments in the natural sciences), and new discourses of the 
transcendent arose to fill the void (the Everlasting Yea!) that showed 
strain at every seam but could not simply be dismissed. In this sense, 
as in so many others, our own concerns are inherited from the 19th 
century, both in the larger culture and in academic life, where an 
interest in religion is on the rise (though, admittedly, not always in a 
salutary way). These poems, then, remain responsive to our condition, 
the determinate negations of an intolerable world that, in perpetually 
disturbing thought’s dogmatic slumber, demand that we learn not 
merely to think different thoughts but to think differently, in order 
that we might think a world better than the present one. 25 
Chapter 1 
Form & Matter: The Workbox 
 
  The Workbox, like so many of Hardy’s poems, summons gravity 
out of triviality, a gesture which puts on display the curious power of 
the accidental and contingent to draw the inevitable and necessary. In 
Channel Firing, for instance, the churchyard dead are woken up 
accidentally by gunnery practice out at sea, which they mistake for the 
thunder of the Day of Wrath, and, after being set right by a whimsical 
Deity, make the kind of small talk which only the long perspective of 
death makes possible; but the roaring of the guns echoes through the 
final lines all the way back to the abyssal druidic past. Most of the 
poems which, like The Workbox, appeared in the volume titled Satires 
of Circumstance are centered on some mere contingency which points 
beyond itself: the coincidental convergence of the Titanic with a block 
of ice, which “jars two hemispheres”; the dog in Ah, Are You Digging on 
My Grave? who, having utterly forgotten his dead mistress, like 
everyone else, happens to have buried a bone on her grave; or the tune 
playing outside the newlyweds’ window in In the Nuptial Chamber 
which inspires the bride’s revelation about her old lover. In The 
Workbox the accidental lodestone is a sewing box offered by a joiner to 
his wife in the first two lines: 
  ‘See, here’s the workbox, little wife, 
     That I made of polished oak.’20 
We can hardly be surprised that the poem opens by gesturing at the 
workbox of its title, but it is less clear why the joiner should go on to 
                                       
20 All quotations are from Complete Poems. 26 
specify what the workbox is made out of. The difference between the 
two lines is the difference between matter and form: the second 
designates the material at the joiner’s disposal and the first specifies 
the particular thing he made out of it. The second line is a relative 
clause modifying the noun phrase the workbox, thus subordinating 
mere matter to form. We cannot be sure, however, whether the relative 
clause is restrictive (i.e., the workbox made of oak as opposed to the 
one made of cedar), and hence necessary and essential, or whether it 
is non-restrictive (i.e., the workbox, which just happens to be made of 
oak), and hence contingent. 21 In the former case, matter would not be 
subordinated to form but would define its essence; matter would be 
that upon which form depends, the wood without which there could be 
no workbox. In the latter case, matter would be inessential: a workbox 
could be made out of a different material and still be the same sort of 
object, a workbox. If the workbox is the hinge on which the drama of 
the poem turns from happenstance to fear and trembling, it embodies 
the drama within itself, an embodiment brought into being by the form 
of the poem. 
  Working out the relations between form and matter, contingency 
and necessity in even these first two lines is far from straightforward. 
                                       
21 In Standard American English, which can normally be used with either restrictive 
or non-restrictive relative clauses, but that can only be used with restrictive clauses 
unless it is accompanied by an intonational break (which, in writing, the comma 
often marks). In my view, the phrase “little wife,” intervening where it does, provides 
just such an intonational break, and therefore opens up the ambiguity I’m 
suggesting. Also, the Old English þe, from which that is derived, could be used either 
restrictively or non-restrictively (Allen 91), and Hardy, being an avid amateur 
philologist, might well have been acquainted with this earlier usage. Moreover, there 
are some dialects of Modern English that still may use that ambiguously in this way 
(see Jacobsson and van der Auwera). (Thanks to John Bowers and Wayne Harbert 
for these references.) 27 
Since the oak is polished the raw material which the joiner used to 
form the workbox isn’t really raw at all; it has been preformed, 
subjected already to the labor of art (a point to which we will return 
presently). The ambiguity of the relative clause mentioned above 
results from the fact that the usual means of clarification, namely the 
comma (the workbox that is made of oak versus the workbox, which is 
made of oak), have been preempted by the parenthetical little wife. 
This suggests already the way in which the joiner’s wife will form 
another hinge, somehow associated with the workbox, marking the 
enigma of the relation between form and matter. 
  We should not be surprised that difficulties and puzzles abound 
since these lines invoke metaphysical categories, categories bearing 
with them the most durable problems facing two millennia of 
philosophical speculation. Even the etymologies of the Greek 
philosophical vocabulary seem to glimmer through the language of 
these lines: hylē, the term for matter in Plato and Aristotle, originally 
meant ‘wood,’ and both idea and eidos, two of the slippery names of 
form, derive from verbs meaning ‘to see.’22 The earliest sense of these 
philosophical terms, as their origin suggests, was ‘perceptible form’ or 
‘type.’ But it is worth tracing the trajectory of these terms so that we 
can understand, against its philosophical background, how The 
Workbox extends and complicates a set of familiar problems. 
                                       
22 Liddel & Scott, s.v., “hylē,” “idea,” “eidos,” “*eido.”  Aristotle even associates the 
desire to know that motivates metaphysics with sight in the first paragraph of his 
Metaphysics (980a in the Complete Works; all further references are to this edition 
unless otherwise indicated). 28 
  Plato’s early dialogues, on a traditional reading of the Platonic 
corpus, give us a relatively clear picture of the Socratic conception of 
philosophy.23 For Socrates, the vocation of philosophy is the teaching 
of the right life. One cannot live rightly without knowing what is right, 
and so right action presupposes a prior inquiry into the nature of 
right. Much of the early dialogues are thus concerned with 
establishing reliable definitions for conceptions of right embodied in 
virtues. Euthyphro, for example, is concerned with piety, and the aim 
is to discover “that form itself that makes all pious actions pious . . . 
so that I may look upon it, and using it as a model, say that any action 
of yours or another’s that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it 
is not” (6d-e).24 “Form,” here, is thus the property that each pious 
action has by virtue of which it is pious. This pursuit presupposes, of 
course, that the set of pious actions is a natural kind and that the 
criterion for inclusion in the set is a particular property. For example, 
Euthyphro proposes to define the pious as “what is dear to the gods” 
(6e). In order for this definition to satisfy Socrates’ criteria, it must be 
the case that every pious action has the property of being dear to the 
gods and every impious action does not have this property. The 
problem that Socrates sets himself here is only incidentally to 
establish what piety is (that is, which property makes an action pious). 
                                       
23 My account of Plato here and in what follows may be unfair in certain respects 
because I am reading Plato through the lens of Aristotle (see Met. 987a32-b10, 
1078b9-1079a4, 1086a32-b11), though I am doing so mainly to outline a specific set 
of problems that bear on the poem. This is, in other words, a reading of the 
philosophical tradition through the lens of the The Workbox, rather than a reading of 
The Workbox through the lens of the philosophical tradition (which, in my view, 
wouldn’t be a reading of The Workbox at all). 
24 All references to Plato in this chapter are to Five Dialogues, unless otherwise 
noted.  29 
The definition of this virtue or any other is sought not for its own sake, 
but for the sake of an act of judgment in which we decide which 
actions are pious and which ones are not. Such judgments allow us to 
evaluate the courses of action open to us and to choose the virtuous 
course. But Euthyphro is an inconclusive dialogue in the sense that 
Socrates never agrees to any of the definitions Euthyphro proposes. By 
the end, Socrates’s line of thinking seems to be heading, if anywhere, 
in the direction of dissolving the virtue of piety into the virtue of 
justice. The point is not (or not only) to expose the self-importance 
behind Euthyphro’s pretended piety; Socrates is quite earnest in 
seeking a definition of piety. But since the aim is right action, 
knowledge of the essence of piety is finally irrelevant: the only test of a 
good definition is the practical test of whether it will consistently 
produce the right results. In this respect, Socrates is not interested in 
“form” in a metaphysical sense at all, or if he is interested in 
metaphysics it is only as something wholly subordinated to ethics. 
  The Plato of the middle dialogues, however, is a metaphysician 
proper, and “form” therefore comes to mean the real essence of things 
rather than an ethical rule of thumb.25 For Plato, 26 ethics is just the 
pursuit of the good (not, say, the practice of right), and thus ethics 
presupposes metaphysics and metaphysics cannot be subordinated to 
                                       
25 I am setting aside the late Plato in order to make the contrast with Aristotle more 
stark, thereby to make the philosophical issues clearer. But it is worth noting that 
many of the common criticisms of the theory of forms as it is described in Phaedo 
and Republic are to be found in Plato’s own Parmenides, and the Laws seems to have 
little use for the theory of forms. 
26 I am using “Plato” here as a shorthand for the views that Plato’s Socrates seems to 
advocate in the middle dialogues, which, in accordance with the traditional reading, I 
take to be more properly Plato’s views (though Plato surely regarded them as an 
elaboration of his master’s views rather than a refutation of them). 30 
it. Plato’s metaphysical categories have an ethical comportment, which 
is why the Form of the Good is the highest reality, but knowledge of 
essence is no longer purely instrumental. Phaedo  is the dialogue in 
which it is most clear how knowledge of essence becomes, in Plato, the 
sum of ethics, since philosophy is there construed as a “training for 
death” that eases the passage of the soul into its more durable 
environs (81a). Plato makes the distinction between forms and sensible 
particulars by observing that the soul perceives the former, whereas 
the body perceives the latter (65-66a). But the body is a merely 
mutable thing and suffers change. Plato claims that “the Equal itself, 
the Beautiful itself, each thing in itself, the real, [cannot] ever be 
affected by any change whatever,” whereas “the many beautiful 
particulars, be they men, horses, clothes, or other such things, or the 
many equal particulars, and all those which bear the same name as 
those others . . . never in any way remain the same as themselves or in 
relation to each other” (78d-e). The suggestion that sensible 
particulars don’t even “remain the same as themselves” might sound 
implausibly extreme, but the rationale here is a compelling one. There 
is presumably something about all beautiful things by virtue of which 
they are beautiful (call it Beauty), but a beautiful horse will one day 
die. And it makes little sense to say (except hyperbolically) that Beauty 
itself dies when the horse dies, since after the horse’s death there are 
still beautiful things. That by virtue of which the horse is beautiful 
must be immutable since it seems unaffected by all the 
transformations to which flesh is heir. If we say that the horse and 
that by virtue of which the horse is beautiful are the same thing, since 31 
we can’t imagine the two separately, we put ourselves in the position of 
saying that the horse is simultaneously mutable and immutable; so, if 
we are to be consistent, we must suppose that the horse and its 
beauty are different, the one mutable the other immutable. In the 
Socratic terms we began with, we might say that any definition (of a 
virtue, for example) that we might construct must, if it is a true 
definition, always be true of what it defines, which is just to say that it 
must be a universal. But if a definition must be universal, then it must 
always be true, and if it must always be true then it cannot be subject 
to change and must therefore be something qualitatively different than 
any particular virtuous person or act.  
  The problem, of course, is then to explain how it is that forms 
relate to sensible particulars, how Beauty and a horse add up to a 
beautiful horse. Plato’s rather dodgy answer is to say that “nothing 
else makes [a beautiful thing] beautiful other than the presence of, or 
the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to the 
Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of 
this relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the 
Beautiful” (100d). Plato here leaves a significant gap in his account 
since he simply refuses to explain how exactly this “presence” 
(parousia) or “sharing in” (koinōnia) or participation (methexis) of the 
Form in the thing happens. He seems to presume that the exact 
nature of the interaction of Forms with sensible particulars will not 
affect the claims he has explicitly made (that Forms and sensible 
particulars are separate, that Forms are immutable and sensible 
particulars are mutable, that Forms are perceived by the soul and 32 
sensible particulars are perceived by the body). Part of the reason why 
this linkage can be left alone in the Phaedo is that its larger purpose is 
to prove that the soul is immortal once separated from the body—and 
a feebler linkage is more easily broken. 
  Aristotle takes Plato to task on just this point. As he observes in 
the  Metaphysics, a Form is always the form of  something, and so 
depends upon the particular for its content in such a way that it 
cannot be really autonomous (991b). In a sense, this is the revenge of 
the problem of definitions, since every Form except the Form of the 
Good is a Form of something particular, and its definability therefore 
chains it to sensible particulars like a man chained to a corpse. For 
Aristotle in the Metaphysics, the primary question is the nature of 
substance (ousia) and whether or not it should be associated with form 
(morphē) or matter (hylē). When we seek to know the substance of 
something we are looking for two things, according to Aristotle: (1) 
what it is that makes the thing what it is (its essence), and (2) what it 
is in the thing that persists through various changes (to 
hypokeimenon, ‘the substrate,’ or more literally, ‘the what-underlies’).27 
The key to the problem of essence is to distinguish merely accidental 
properties of each object from those properties that are necessary to 
the object being what it is (1031b). In a very straightforward way, 
matter doesn’t seem like a very good candidate for providing us with 
the essence of the thing: there’s nothing about the sheer fact of being 
made of bronze that explains the essence of a bronze statue, especially 
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since so many things can be made of bronze that the bronze must be 
indifferent to what is made of it. Form thus seems like the more 
plausible candidate, and so Aristotle sets himself the task of showing 
that form is the substance of things, in the sense that their form is 
their essence, without reproducing the Platonic dualism. 
  Of course Aristotle must also deal with the problems that Plato’s 
theory was responding to, not least the problem of change. Since 
sensible particulars are subject to change, Plato supposed that there 
must be something immutable behind them. Aristotle also wants to 
claim that there is something that persists, but what persists for 
Aristotle must be something internal to the thing itself since we are 
able to recognize the same object even as it changes (in fact, being able 
to recognize the object as the same is the only thing that makes it 
possible for us to know that it has changed). As Aristotle puts it, “the 
substratum is that of which other things are predicated, while it is 
itself not predicated of anything else” (1028b-1029a). For example, we 
can say that a man who learns music becomes ‘musical,’ and by doing 
so we presuppose that something holds constant (the man) even 
though we have predicated something new of him (that he is musical). 
The substrate of the man is what persists through any number of 
predications, what persists when the man becomes a musical man, 
just as the essence of the man is what makes him a man rather than, 
say, a sheep. Aristotle’s project is to construe the relationship of form 
and matter in such a way that he can explain the substance of things 
both in terms of their substrate and in terms of their essence. 34 
  In order to do so, he reconceives form as actuality (energeia or 
entelechia) and matter as potentiality (dynamis). Aristotle’s claim is 
that the categories of form and matter as conceived by Plato were too 
static. On the one hand, Plato tried to keep them too strictly apart 
when the real question is how they relate to one another; on the other, 
Plato used the distinction as a bulwark against the flux of the 
perceptible world instead of finding a way to explain that flux as a 
movement toward the immovable. On Aristotle’s account, 
understanding form as a permanent determination prevents one from 
understanding change. We need to be able to say not only that a 
particular sheep is a sheep, but also to say that a lamb becomes a 
sheep, that a lamb is potentially a sheep. Understanding form as 
actuality, as the realization of essence, explains why change happens 
the way it does, why acorns become trees and not sheep—because the 
acorn is already potentially a tree.  
  The clean separation between form and matter in Plato is thus 
quite done away with, not because it is impossible to conceive of a 
realm of pure Forms carrying out some immutable existence more real 
that ours (though Aristotle does think that notion absurd), but 
because it is impossible to conceive of pure matter: “matter is 
unknowable in itself” (Met. 1036a8). If matter is understood as 
potentiality, then it is already potentially something. The potentiality of 
matter is infinite—wood could be made into as many things as human 
ingenuity can come up with—but it is also determinate—wood will 
never be made into a round of cheese or a sparrow (1044a). Matter is 
preformed (1049b). The closer the matter is to actualization in a 35 
sensory particular, the more preformed it is—wood which has been 
hewn into boards is closer to being actualized as a workbox than a 
living tree is, and hence is a more proximate potentiality (1049a; Irwin 
230-3). In this sense, Aristotle maintains the traditional hierarchy 
which places form above matter (1049b), since matter is only 
conceivable in its relation to form.28 
  The Workbox seems to proceed against the grain of this 
traditional elevation of form over matter. When the joiner’s wife 
comments, upon receiving the present, “’Twill last all my sewing 
years!” (8) the joiner responds, not with observations about aspects of 
the box’s form (those aspects of its construction which resulted in its 
durability, for example), but with observations about the materials 
from which it was made: 
‘I warrant it will. And longer too. 
   ’Tis a scantling that I got 
Off poor John Wayward’s coffin, who 
   Died of they knew not what.’  (9-12) 
The it, which is contracted into “’Tis”  in the second line of this stanza, 
refers to the workbox, and the line immediately proceeds to identify 
the workbox in terms of its matter, as “a scantling” with a particular 
provenance. The morbid associations of this provenance seem to have 
suggested the issue of matter in the first place: half way through the 
first line the joiner has agreed that it will “last all [her] sewing years,” 
but then goes on to remark that it will last longer than that, longer 
than her ability to sew lasts, longer even than her life. What calls John 
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Wayward’s demise to mind, in other words, is the hypothetical 
persistence of the workbox beyond the inevitable demise of its owner. 
As in the Phaedo, death provokes the question of form. Matter is thus 
identified with what persists, and by extension form seems, like 
human life, to be a mere accidental contingency. 
  The joiner elaborates on the persistence of matter in the two 
stanzas that follow: 
  ‘The shingled pattern that seems to cease 
     Against your box’s rim 
  Continues right on in the piece 
     That’s underground with him. 
 
  ‘And while I worked it made me think 
     Of timber’s varied doom; 
  One inch where people eat and drink, 
     The next inch in a tomb.’  (13-20) 
“The shingled pattern” only “seems to cease” at the edge of the box; the 
truth behind this deceptive appearance is that the pattern persists in 
the matter of the coffin. The pattern is, in this sense, the 
hypokeimenon of the workbox and the coffin. On the other hand, there 
is in fact a physical division between the matter of the workbox and 
the matter of the coffin—the division which makes it possible to speak 
of the matter of the workbox. The wood of the workbox is not, however, 
so proximate a potentiality as to differentiate between the kinds of 
boxes it might be formed into. The extent to which the materials of the 
workbox are remote from actuality, the extent to which they gravitate 
towards pure matter, is also the extent to which coffin and workbox 
become indistinguishable or interchangeable. In terms of matter, and 
even to an extent in terms of form, the two are identical; the real 
difference is what you put in them. 37 
  It is not the wood out of which the workbox is made that “seems 
to cease”; it is the “shingled pattern”—the pattern which marks the 
material as preformed. “Shingled” in this context seems to mean 
“arranged tile-wise, imbricated,” like the overlapping tiles on a roof.29 It 
seems unlikely that this pattern refers to a natural property of the 
wood (its grain, for example), and so must refer to some artificial 
modification of the original material. The relative clause opened in the 
first line of this stanza itself “seems to cease” at the line break since 
“seems to cease” is a constituent (i.e., a syntactic unit30); the fact that 
the relative clause continues with “Against your box’s rim” marks 
through syntax the persistence of the pattern over the discontinuity of 
the line break, the shingling of syntax and lineation. 
  Just as the fact that “seems to cease” is a constituent inclines 
us to think the relative clause might end at the line break, so in the 
following line “the box’s rim” marks the real end of the relative clause, 
as well as the large grammatical subject of which it is a part. We 
finally arrive at the main verb for the sentence in the following line, 
which continues with “Continues.” The phrase “Against your box’s 
rim,” since it continues over the line break, formally embodies 
persistence over separation, whereas its meaning remains on the side 
of the workbox instead of the side of the coffin, only the first half of the 
shingled pattern. Syntax and semantics, in other words, are at odds in 
that phrase. But the two meet again at the box’s rim: the line break 
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divides subordinate from main clause, subject from predicate, workbox 
from coffin.  
  The stanza is also “shingled” with respect to the metrical 
positions of its polysyllables. The word “shingled” itself is positioned as 
a bracketing mismatch (a mismatch between the phonological word 
boundaries and the metrical foot boundaries),31 setting up a pattern 
continued by the word “pattern.” The following line has another 
disyllabic word, “against,” but this time without the bracketing 
mismatch. The second two lines each contain a trisyllabic word, the 
first in a W1S2W3 configuration (where ‘W’ is a weak, or unstressed, 
syllable, ‘S’ is strong, or stressed, syllable and the subscripts 
correspond to metrical positions), the second shifted one position to 
the right into a S2W3S4 configuration. This shift is exactly the inverse 
of “shingled” and “against,” which are S2W3 and W1S2, respectively. 
These metrical details divide the stanza neatly in half, with the 
couplets in an antithetical or inverse relationship, just as we have seen 
in their syntactic constituency, lineation and meaning. 
  This stanza, then, is shingled in a way that brings out the 
continuity of matter, the persistence of the pattern at all levels of 
structure, the vein of form that runs through the workbox’s wood. The 
two couplets of the following stanza are neatly antithetical by 
comparison: the first two lines form a continuous sentence and the 
second two are made up of two discontinuous noun phrases, so the 
first two seem to emphasize continuity and the second two emphasize 
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division. Whereas the former stanza was concerned primarily with the 
matter of the workbox, this stanza is concerned primarily with the 
form given that matter, with “timber’s varied doom.” In opposition to 
Plato and Aristotle, here it is form that is on the side of contingency, 
that is a sign of mere flux, whereas the undivided wood, the pure 
matter, is necessity and unity. At precisely this point in the drama of 
the poem the color drains from the face of the joiner’s wife. 
  ‘But why do you look so white, my dear, 
     And turn aside your face? 
  You knew not that good lad, I fear, 
     Though he came from your native place?’ 
 
  ‘How could I know that good young man, 
     Though he came from my native town, 
  When he must have left far earlier than 
     I was a woman grown?’  (21-28) 
  This dramatic turn contains some of the poem’s most metrically 
rough lines, including the only two lines in the poem which have two 
resolutions each (24, 26; a resolution is when two unstressed syllables 
occupy a single metrical position because they are between two 
stressed syllables, as in “Two roads diverged in a yellow wood”). In the 
first of these two stanzas, the joiner asks two questions, only the latter 
of which his wife answers: “You knew not that good lad, I fear, / 
Though he came from your native place?” What the joiner fears is not 
that his wife did not know John Wayward, but that she did know him, 
so logically it should be annexed to a positive version of the sentence 
rather than the negative one he actually produces (“You knew not…”). 
The sentence functions both as a question (did you know that good 
lad?) and as a statement (I fear that you did know that good lad). His 
wife answers him with another question, repeating almost word for 40 
word the qualification the joiner adds, a qualification that suggests 
why she might in fact have known the dead man but which is added, 
in both cases, only to exclude its own implication. Of these eight lines, 
five require resolutions (on top of the “d’you” in line 21), and the nearly 
repeated lines each contain two. In each case, the resolution serves to 
de-emphasize the words involved, squeezing both into a single weak 
slot in the meter through their reduction. What is de-emphasized in 
both cases is the pronoun “he,” referring to the dead man, and the 
genitive pronouns “your” and “my,” both referring to the joiner’s wife. 
This underscores the rhetorical function of these lines: John Wayward 
and the joiner’s wife are associated, but only to suppress and exclude 
that association. 
  But the two lines are only near repetitions; apart from the 
genitive pronouns, the only difference between them is the final noun: 
“place” in the first instance and “town” in the second. We are told in 
the first stanza of the poem that “He was a joiner, of village life; / She 
came of borough folk.” The word “borough” seems to be used here in 
the somewhat antiquated sense of something larger than a “village” 
but not so large as to deserve the title of “city.”32 Both the joiner and 
his wife, then, are not metropolitan, but of the two the wife seems to 
be more so, a fact which she underscores here by changing the 
indeterminate title of “place” to “town” (which presumably also 
suggests something larger than the joiner’s mere “village”). The 
implications of this are difficult to pin down, but it seems to suggest 
that the period of her maturation was not passed in the joiner’s village 
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(hence she may have a past he does not know about through local 
gossip) and that this past might be worth concealing, given that the 
larger a town is the greater is its power to corrupt (as in, for example, 
The Ruined Maid). In other words, the implication might be not only 
that she was associated with John Wayward in the past, but that she 
was wayward herself. 
  The last two lines of the stanza not only contain another 
resolution but are the most syntactically odd in the poem. One 
plausible reading of the syntax is to take “woman grown” to be an 
inverted adjective-noun sequence (i.e., ‘I was a grown woman’). But 
this does not remove the oddity produced by the expression “earlier 
than,” which usually requires two conjuncts with the same main verb, 
with the second usually ellipted, as in John left earlier than Sally [left]. 
The awkwardness of line 28 is comparable to *John left earlier than she 
got up, which would be more idiomatic with ‘before,’ as in John left 
before she got up. The awkwardness of this construction is 
underscored by the labeling mismatch on “than,” which, being at the 
end of the line, should receive quite strong stress, but can’t without 
sounding very peculiar indeed; this fact is reinforced by the strong 
enjambment (one of only two such in the poem, the other being line 
11). The meter of these lines also seems to be reprising the 
suppression of she and the dead man in the repeated line. “He” again 
disappears into a resolution and the “I” of the second line is in a weak 
position (though, since inversion is commonly allowed in the first foot, 42 
this could easily bear contrastive stress without the meter becoming 
inaudible).33  
  An alternative reading of the syntax of this phrase is to take 
“grown” as a main verb, as in John grew marigolds.34 This would mean 
that line 28 is a passive construction meaning that some unspecified 
agent grew her (into a) woman—which opens the question of who this 
unspecified agent might be. The phrase “woman grown” also places the 
word “grown” at the end of a line (and at the end of a sentence and 
stanza), thus bringing to the forefront the question of her maturation, 
and what kind of experiences it entailed. All of the aspects of the form 
of this stanza that I have pointed to seem to imply some sort of 
concealed narrative, suggestive of a past association with the dead 
man that might explain her turning pallid at the mention of his name. 
The poem even invites us to imagine the sort of past which is revealed 
in In the Nuptial Chamber or something like the conclusion of Joyce’s 
“The Dead.” But in this poem the answer to the question of what the 
dark past might be is not supplied, any more than the wife directly 
answers the joiner’s first question. The joiner proposes an answer 
himself in the stanza that follows, but his wife rejects his supposition 
as condescending, a suggestion that she might be affected by “Mere 
accidental things” (34). The accidental thing to which she is referring is 
her husband’s suggestion that “It shocked [her] that [he] gave / To 
[her] one end of a piece of wood / Whose other is in a grave.” In other 
words, she decisively denies just the material continuity which the 
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joiner elaborated in his comment on the “shingled pattern.” The 
following stanza opens with a “Yet” which may suggest that we are not 
to believe the wife’s denial, that this deep continuity of matter—mere 
accident or not—is in fact what renders her pale and averse. 
  The first question the joiner asks (in the sixth stanza) is about 
the present moment; the question his wife answers is the second, a 
question about the past. But the first clause of her answer is in the 
present tense (“How could I know that good young man”). This 
suggests a displacement such that she appears to be answering the 
first question as well as the second, instead of flatly leaving the first 
unanswered. But the use of the word “know,” which appears in lines 
12, 39 and 40 as well, stands out. The two different senses of each use 
of the word in the last couplet of the poem correspond to the two prior 
instances in which it appears: first in the context of knowing what 
John Wayward died of, and second in the context of knowing John 
Wayward himself (with perhaps an archaic hint of carnal relations).35  
Yet still her lips were limp and wan, 
   Her face still held aside, 
As if she had known not only John, 
   But known of what he died.  (37-40) 
This last stanza has altogether less metrical tension than any other 
stanza of the poem; it is also not “shingled” like some others by 
enjambment, and displays an extremely tight parallelism in each of the 
two couplets. Each couplet contains two clauses which share the same 
verb, but in the second couplet the verb, know, is repeated, whereas in 
the first it is ellipted in the second line. Know, thus emphasized, has a 
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slightly different sense in each of the two instances. The first sense 
(corresponding to the German kennen or the French connaître) is to 
know as in to recognize someone, to be familiar with him, or more 
generally to know through the senses. This mode of knowing remains 
within the domain of appearance as opposed to essence, and is 
therefore bound up with what both Plato and Aristotle regard as the 
transience and volatility of materiality. The second sense 
(corresponding to the German wissen or the French savoir) is to know 
as in to have certain information in mind, or to know by means of the 
mind. This suggests knowledge of essence or of form. 
  For Plato, the Forms are the only true object of knowledge, and 
the purpose of philosophy is to renew our acquaintance with the 
Forms through anamnesis. But for Aristotle, as we have seen, form is 
immanent to sensory particulars, and so he describes the movement 
from knowledge of appearance to knowledge of essence as a movement 
from knowledge of the object as it is for us to a knowledge of the object 
as it is “by nature” or in itself ( Phys. 184a10-21).36 Aristotle 
understands inquiry into the object as it is “by nature” as an inquiry 
into its causes (aition), by which he means questions about why the 
object is as it is, where it came from, who made it and what purpose it 
serves—as opposed to thought simply coming to rest at the mere fact 
that the object appears. 
  This final stanza presents us with a description of the wife’s 
appearance, in the first two lines a strictly physical description. And in 
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a sense, it’s a very straightforward description, providing us with 
physical details about how “her lips were limp and wan, / Her face still 
held aside.” But this is immediately qualified by a description which is 
precisely not physical and concrete, a description which is 
emphatically about what she knows, about spirit instead of body. It 
does not claim, however, to actually provide access to her mental 
state: the statement, already a qualification subordinated to a physical 
description, announces itself with an as if. This could plausibly be 
understood as a jealous projection, but if so it seems like a jealous 
projection which is brought up short: “As if she had known not only 
John” could easily have been followed by ‘But other men as well,’ 
where known would return the issue to pure physicality by way of a 
Biblical euphemism. In the event, however, the final line seems 
unexpected, not a plausible projection at all. The mental state it 
describes would not actually be secondary to, much less be in the 
same domain as, the physical appearance; the former would explain 
the latter, since the former would be the cause of the latter. She looks 
as if she knew, not the circumstances of John Wayward’s death, or the 
mere fact of his death, but the cause of his death, “of what he died.” 
The question of cause leads Aristotle to the question of being, then to 
the question of substance, then to the question of change—effectively a 
return since questions about causes are always questions about 
change—in this case, the change into death, the transformation from 
body ensouled to mere flesh. The question about the cause of John 
Wayward’s death, about which the “they” (12) from whom the joiner 
obtained the scantlings knew nothing, is a question about a 46 
discontinuity of soul bound up with a continuity of flesh—a continuity 
of matter which is no mere accidental thing but the telos and terminus 
of all created things. 
  The workbox and the coffin, despite the obvious differences 
between them, differences which animate the drama, have one feature 
in common: both are boxes, and hence both have contents. Content, in 
the case of boxes or in the case of poems, is the opposite of form, but it 
is not quite the same thing as matter. The two boxes have much the 
same matter, preformed in similar ways (being “polished” [2], the 
“shingled pattern,” &c.), but they have different contents: one contains 
natural matter which is declining from actuality, falling from form, 
whereas the other contains matter that is the proximate potentiality of 
yet more artifacts to come. Pure matter in either case is dead.  
If, on Aristotle’s account, form ends up on the side of the 
particular, then matter should end up on the side of the universal. In 
The Workbox the universality of matter is spelled out as death. But the 
domain of the universal is where communication transpires because 
concepts (mental universals) are bound up with language. Without the 
universal, we would be simply opaque to one another. But here, matter 
is the universal, and so the wife is not simply opaque in the sense that 
she fails to communicate. She communicates, but communicates only 
her opacity; she speaks, but only to deny the joiner’s suppositions 
about her internal state. The wife, in other words, is not coyly 
dissembling but honestly setting forth the consciousness of her 
incommunicability in the face of death. If the only universality is 
matter, and the universality of matter is death, then the only truth 47 
becomes the sheer fact that all things must die—the major premise of 
the old syllogism, All men are mortal. We thereby lose the possibility of 
thinking the cause of ourselves as life and see in our origin only the 
telos, only our demise, that we are born only to die.  
 48 
Chapter 2 
Universal & Particular: To Autumn 
 
  Autumn, more than any other season, provokes reflections on 
the passage of time, on change and on death. Winter, already dead, 
figures the inhuman and indifferent, quiet without calm—at its most 
human, it figures bare survival; the frothy profusion of Spring bodies 
forth raw life, the sheer immediacy of vital spirits; Summer’s 
distending days seem unbounded and undivided, never passing until 
wholly past and given over to silence and slow time. So Summer 
appears in the retrospect of Autumn, whose harvest must outrun 
decay and the looming dark. To Autumn, endlessly praised for its 
praise of plenty, fills our ken with such concretion that time is out of 
mind and we, like the bees, “think warm days will never cease” (line 
10). But the bees are deceived. 
  To praise the poem as “perfect” suggests not merely that it is 
faultless (a dubious compliment, even outside Vasari) but, as Walter 
Jackson Bate observes, that it has been brought to completion (581), 
that it is as free of superfluities as it is of defects, that, as in the 
Ptolemaic cosmos, each wandering star has its allotted place and 
contributes its lone melody to the music of the spheres. However much 
this may be so, the poem is not uniform, and if it will succeed in 
reconciling “process and stasis” as Bate claims (582), it must invoke 
them in isolation. Bate’s intuition is that the first stanza presents us 
with process and the second presents us with stasis, an intuition 
which has been given a firmer foundation in Donald C. Freeman’s 49 
analysis of the poem’s verbs. Since the publication of Freeman’s essay 
in 1978, research in linguistics has provided yet more support for his 
main observations and has given us an opportunity to elaborate others 
in more detail. The risky passage is, as always, from these formal 
descriptions to meaning. Freeman’s analysis opens the possibility of a 
linguistically rigorous mode of criticism, but it is also a crucial case for 
understanding how linguistically informed criticism has often gone 
astray, namely by equating form with pattern rather than with syntax 
(and, as I will show, one of the crucial features of poetic language, 
what I call ‘synthetic constructions,’ cannot be construed as a 
question of pattern at all). 
  Syntactic theory, aspiring as it does to systematically formalize 
the constants of human language, has often been treated with 
suspicion by those who dread the reduction of language to a 
mathematical purity void of human meaning. But for some time its 
tendency has not been to purify syntax of any semantic perplexities 
but to assimilate semantics into syntax. According to a more 
traditional view, the (synchronic) study of human language has three 
primary domains: syntax, the purely formal study of the allowable 
sequences of word categories, presumably indifferent to which 
particular words appear in a given instance; semantics, the study of 
the meanings of individual words and how these meanings combine 
into propositional meanings; and pragmatics, the study of the use to 
which sentences are put, accounting for such issues as the effects of 
context and background assumptions. But as Noam Chomsky has 50 
argued, much of semantics may be redundant if we understand syntax 
properly: 
One can speak of “reference” or “coreference” with some 
intelligibility if one postulates a domain of mental objects 
associated with formal entities of language by a relation 
with many of the properties of reference, but all of this is 
internal to the theory of mental representations; it is a 
form of syntax. (Knowledge of Language 45) 
As Chomksy puts it, rather bluntly, in a more recent book, “It is 
possible that natural language has only syntax and pragmatics” (New 
Horizons 132). This polemical claim is probably too strong to be true, 
but it will be easiest to see what its limitations are if we attempt to 
hold it in this strong form. The fact that many syntactic processes are 
sensitive to the semantic properties of particular lexical items is a 
clear indicator that the move to integrate semantics, at least partially, 
is heading in the right direction.  
  A particularly clear instance of the significance of semantic 
information in current syntactic theory is the prominence of the theory 
of thematic relations or “θ-roles” (originating in work by Gruber). Every 
verb requires a specific number of arguments, typically noun phrases; 
for example, an intransitive verb like sneeze takes one argument (John 
in  John  sneezed) whereas a transitive verb like buy takes two 
arguments (a buyer and a thing bought, and an optional argument for 
the seller). The mental lexical entry for each verb must specify how 
many arguments the verb takes, but it must also have some way of 
distinguishing the argument positions to be filled, otherwise it would 
fail to differentiate between John bought the cheese and The cheese 
bought John. The distinction between John and the cheese in John 51 
bought the cheese is in part a semantic one (John is the entity doing 
the buying and the cheese is the entity being bought), and the 
syntactic realization of a verb’s argument positions seems to strongly 
correlate with the semantic differences (e.g., the grammatical subject 
of an action verb like buy or tickle is almost invariably the agent of the 
action). John, then, bears the θ-role of AGENT and the cheese bears the 
θ-role of THEME.37 In cases such as these, syntax and semantics are 
clearly on intimate terms: a change in one effects a corresponding 
change in the other. 
  Θ-theory unveils a set of cases in which this intimacy almost 
goes over into identity, in which a strictly syntactic phenomenon is 
inexplicable without an appeal to semantic distinctions. Luigi Burzio, 
in Italian Syntax, uses θ-theory to distinguish between two classes of 
intransitive verbs. Being intransitive, each takes only a single 
argument, but the argument of one class, the unergative verbs, is 
assigned the AGENT θ-role, whereas the argument of the other class, 
the  unaccusative verbs, is assigned the THEME  θ-role. The class of 
unergative verbs would include the following:38 
(1) John  may  protest. 
 John  was  lying. 
 John  complained. 
 John  was  fishing. 
 John  whistled. 
                                       
37 These terms are extremely difficult to define abstractly, but the intuitions of native 
speakers about which arguments are AGENTs, which THEMEs, and so on, are 
extremely consistent. We can therefore use the terms with reasonable precision even 
in the absence of explicit definitions. 
38 Examples (1)-(6) and (8)-(10) are adapted from Radford. 52 
 John  sang. 
The subject of each of the verbs in (1) seems to be an AGENT, and many 
of these verbs can be paraphrased as a verb+noun in which a THEME 
argument also appears: 
(2) John  may  make a protest. 
 John  was  telling a lie. 
 John  made a complaint. 
 John  was  catching fish. 
The paraphrases in (2) suggest that each of the verbs in (1) has an 
implicit THEME argument, and hence that their explicit argument must 
be an AGENT (Radford 390-1; see also, Baker). 
  The subjects of unaccusative verbs, on the other hand, do not 
seem intuitively to be agents of the action designated by the verb: 
(3) The  train  arrived. 
 The  sun  emerged from the clouds. 
  A slight discomfort will begin. 
 A  corpse-light  appeared on the bog. 
The intuition that the subjects of these verbs are THEMEs rather than 
AGENTs gains force if we paraphrase the sentences in (3) as noun 
phrases, in which case the subjects in (3) appear in a normal THEME 
position: 
(4) The  arrival of the train… 
 The  emergence of the sun from the clouds… 
 The  beginning of a slight discomfort… 
 The  appearance of a corpse light on the bog… 53 
Just like the city in The destruction of the city, where the city is not the 
entity that initiates the action but the entity that must suffer it, the 
overt subjects in (3) show up as THEMEs in (4). 
  The distinction between unergative verbs (which take an AGENT 
argument) and unaccusative verbs (which take a THEME argument), a 
distinction which seems primarily semantic, produces a wide array of 
systematic syntactic effects, as in the following sentences (in what 
follows, sentences marked with an asterisk [*] are ungrammatical): 
(5)  An unfortunate misunderstanding arose. 
 There  arose an unfortunate misunderstanding. 
 
  A ghostly face appeared at the window. 
 There  appeared a ghostly face at the window. 
 
(6)  The dentist’s patient groaned. 
 *There  groaned the dentist’s patient. 
 
  Major Muddle has apologized for firebombing civilians. 
*There has apologized Major Muddle for firebombing 
civilians. 
Unaccusative verbs, such as those in (5), are consistently grammatical 
in expletive constructions with there, whereas unergative verbs, such 
as those in (6), are consistently ungrammatical in the same 
constructions. 54 
  Auxiliary selection also seems to be determined by the 
unergative/unaccusative distinction, as in the case of Burzio’s 
examples from Italian: 
(7) Giovanni  è arrivato. 
  Giovanni is arrived. 
  ‘Giovanni has arrived.’ 
 
 Giovanni  ha telefonato. 
  Giovanni has telephoned. 
Unaccusative verbs like arrivare take essere (‘to be’) as their auxiliary 
in the past tense, whereas unergative verbs like telefonare take avere 
(‘to have’). The same distribution appears cross-linguistically in 
languages like French and German, and the remnants of the 
distinction are to be found in Early Modern English before the past 
auxiliary be fell out of the language entirely, as in these (unaccusative) 
examples from Shakespeare: 
(8) Mistress  Page  is come with me. (Merry Wives V.v.22) 
Is the duke gone? / Then is your cause gone too. (Measure 
for Meas. V.i.299-300) 
How chance thou art returned so soon? (Comedy of Err. 
I.ii.42) 
  All of these syntactic phenomena are inexplicable without 
appealing to the fundamentally semantic categories of θ-theory, and so 
the unergative/unaccusative distinction is one clear case in which 
syntax as a “theory of mental representations” in Chomsky’s sense 
must wholly incorporate semantics. Literary critics, obliged as they are 
to cross the mountainous border between form and content, 
description and interpretation, might reasonably hope that this 55 
distinction, employed in the analysis of such a poem as To Autumn, 
will ease their passage. This is just what Donald Freeman has done in 
his essay on To Autumn, albeit sometimes a bit approximately due to 
the limitations of the theory then at his disposal (his essay was 
published nearly a decade before Burzio’s monograph). 
  The centerpiece of Freeman’s analysis is his observation that 
each of the three stanzas of To Autumn is almost exclusively 
dominated by a single verb type. The dominant type in the first stanza 
is causative transitive verbs, whose distinguishing property is that 
they have unaccusative intransitive counterparts, as in the following: 
(9) The  Americans  sank the boat. 
 The  boat  sank. 
 
 Sally  opened the window on the south side. 
  The window on the south side opened. 
 
 John  broke the vase on Tuesday. 
 The  vase  broke on Tuesday. 
Non-causative transitive verbs, on the other hand, do not have 
intransitive counterparts at all: 
(10) John  watched the sunset. 
 *The  sunset  watched. 
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 Colonel  Kilgore  smelled the napalm. 
 *The  napalm  smelled.39 
 
 Egbert  found the Easter eggs under the chiffonier. 
  *The Easter eggs found under the chiffonier. 
Just as the syntactic behavior of unaccusative and unergative 
intransitive verbs was determined by their semantic properties, 
causative verbs cause some state of affairs to be the case (hence the 
name). Freeman’s observation, then, is that the first stanza of To 
Autumn is dominated by causative transitive verbs (as in [9]), the 
second by non-causative transitive verbs (as in [10]), and the third by 
unergative verbs (as in [1]). 
  The first stanza of To Autumn is largely made up of non-finite 
clauses whose main verb is a causative transitive (“to load and bless… 
/ To bend… / And fill… / To swell…and  plump…”); as Freeman 
argues, this “mak[es] the subjects of these natural processes—the 
vines (which load), the trees (which bend), the fruit (which fills with 
ripeness), the gourd (which swells), and the hazel shells (which 
plump)—into objects of Autumn’s all-powerful agency. All of the verb 
phrases in the first stanza reflect the transformation of natural 
states…into active dynamic processes fundamental to the poem’s 
structure” (87). 
  In the second stanza, Autumn’s agency wanes: “nearly every 
mention of Autumn here [is surrounded] with past participles, which 
                                       
39 This sentence can be parsed in such a way that it’s grammatical (where it means 
the napalm was smelly), but not under the relevant interpretation, where it must be 
interpreted in a manner analogous to the rest of the paired examples in (9) and (10). 57 
are reduced passives (‘soft-lifted,’ ‘half-reaped,’ ‘drows’d,’ ‘twined,’ 
‘laden’). Even the transitive verbs predicated of Autumn are strangely 
inactive (‘spares,’ ‘keep steady,’ ‘watchest’)” (Freeman 92). All of these 
“strangely inactive” verbs are what we have just defined as non-
causative transitives (those lacking unaccusative counterparts), and 
here they are largely verbs of sensory perception. 
  As Freeman points out, the third stanza marks a dramatic shift 
since its verbs are predominantly intransitive, but, thanks to Burzio, 
we can also observe that all these intransitive verbs are also 
unergative (their subjects are assigned the AGENT θ-role and they have 
only an implicit THEME). Freeman claims that in the final stanza “the 
personified vision fades…[T]he poem ends in a series of short 
conjoined sentences all of which have intransitive verbs which focus 
on minute and precise detail, and which, with the dying of the light, 
leave us with only sound—the unaffected, utterly spontaneous and 
natural end of another ‘diurnal course’ in a wholly ordered and 
harmonious natural universe.” The trajectory of the whole poem, then, 
is on Freeman’s reading “a steady diminution of transitivity, agency, 
and causation: by the last lines of the poem, natural processes occur 
self-caused, autonomously” (92). 
  This direct conversion of syntactic observations into interpretive 
claims seems, given the nature of the evidence, quite plausible, and 
the resulting reading is consistent with some of the more influential 
readings of the poem (those of Hartman and Bate, both of whom 
Freeman specifically acknowledges). But one category intervenes with 
seeming innocence between description and interpretation here: the 58 
notion of pattern. The conception of linguistic pattern Freeman appeals 
to is derived from Paul Kiparsky’s essay “The Role of Linguistics in a 
Theory of Poetry.” Kiparsky defines a pattern as “some kind of 
recurrence of equivalent linguistic elements” (233), but what he has 
primarily in mind are phenomena like meter, rhyme and alliteration 
(from analogy with which he derives an account of syntactic pattern). 
All three phenomena involve the repetition of some linguistic element 
or structure (a phoneme or stress contour) that is potentially 
significant only by virtue of that repetition. It is simply a formal 
linguistic fact that spill and fill end with the same sounds; the 
specifically poetic use of such accidental properties results from their 
repetition, and only when repeated can they bear on poetic meaning. 
  Syntax, however, is a rather different case. It is certainly 
possible to have a syntactic pattern of the sort that Kiparsky has in 
mind (a repetition of Adjective-Noun sequences, for example), and 
such a pattern may well be significant (hence the utility of classical 
rhetorical schemes). But the individual instances in a syntactic 
pattern are already meaningful in themselves and do not depend on 
repetition to accrue significance. On the contrary, the significance of 
the pattern will be highly dependent on the significance of the 
individual words and phrases that make it up. 
  The focus on patterns that leads Kiparsky and Freeman astray 
here is not an idiosyncrasy of theirs, but is a nearly universal feature 
of literary scholarship informed by linguistics. In his influential essay 
“Linguistics and Poetics,” Roman Jakobson goes so far in disputing 
Wimsatt as to claim that “As soon as parallelism is promoted to canon, 59 
the interaction between meter and meaning and the arrangement of 
tropes cease to be ‘the free and individual and unpredictable parts of 
the poetry’” (83). This devotion to pattern persists to the present: a 
recent textbook in the field is bluntly titled Patterns in Language 
(Thornborrow, et al.). One classic essay that promises a clear 
departure from this proclivity is Richard Ohmann’s “Literature as 
Sentences” (1966). The basic insight of the essay, an insight that 
always bears repeating, is that “whatever complex apprehension the 
critic develops of the whole work, that understanding arrives 
mundanely, sentence by sentence” (232). He also argues that the 
relationship between form and content unfolds within the domain of 
syntax, and infers (plausibly, given the theory of the time) that form 
amounts to “surface structure” and content to “deep structure” (232). 
Current theory has done away with deep structure and surface 
structure (and all other “levels of representation” [q.v., Chomsky, 
Minimalist Program]), a development wholly in accord with the literary 
reticence about treating form and content as if they were tidily 
separable. But Ohmann’s impulse to locate both of them in syntax is 
for this reason all the more compelling. 
  The procedure that such a view would imply comes a bit clearer 
when Ohmann takes up the analysis of Dylan Thomas’ A Winter’s Tale: 
he proceeds to a careful and thoroughgoing analysis of how best to 
characterize the phrase “the river wended vales,” not as vaguely 
understandable nor as simply deviant and therefore vacuous but as a 
structure with specific properties defined by its relationship to facts 60 
about English syntax. But when he proceeds from description to 
interpretation he automatically grabs hold of pattern to get him there: 
There are many other examples in the poem of deviance 
that projects unaccustomed activity and process upon 
nature.…[M]uch of Thomas’ poetry displays the world as 
process, as interacting forces and repeating cycles, in 
which human beings and human thought are indifferently 
caught up. I suggest that Thomas’ syntactical 
irregularities often serve this vision of things. To say so, of 
course, is only to extend the natural critical premise that a 
good poet sets linguistic forms to work for him in the 
cause of artistic and thematic form. (237-8) 
From a rather vague statement about the significance of the structure 
he has so ingeniously unfolded we are immediately propelled into 
snatching up “many other examples” from the poem, and only a few 
sentences later all of Thomas’ poetry is at issue. Suddenly syntactic 
structure merely “serves” these thematic generalizations—as if it 
hadn’t been the sentence that came first—and some patterned 
regularity of “linguistic forms” subserves the greater, and still more 
general, “cause of artistic and thematic form.” 
  This sort of maneuver is just what leaves linguistically-informed 
approaches to literature vulnerable to the criticisms of Barbara 
Herrnstein Smith or Stanley Fish, that the real relationship between 
form and content is undertheorized. In the first of two essays with the 
same title (both reprinted in Is There a Text in This Class?), Fish 
“focus[es]…on the arbitrary relationship between the specification of 
formal patterns and their subsequent interpretation,” and claims that 
many linguistically-oriented critics have tried to evade this problem by 
making their formal observations highly technical and keeping their 61 
interpretations relatively impressionistic. In the second, more extreme 
essay his 
thesis is that formal patterns are themselves the products 
of interpretation and that therefore there is no such thing 
as a formal pattern, at least in the sense necessary for the 
practice of stylistics: that is, no pattern that one can 
observe before interpretation is hazarded and which 
therefore can be used to prefer one interpretation to 
another. (267) 
The weak point both of these theses are aimed at is the notion of “a 
formal pattern”: since identification of a pattern always involves a 
principle of selection, and since any non-arbitrary principle of 
selection must contain interpretive determinations, Fish believes he is 
authorized to infer that there is no such thing as form—an inference 
which, in his mind, fells stylistics and Chomskyan linguistics in one 
blow. Much as Fish is inclined to make his opponents into straw men, 
and much as he is hampered by a lack of even rudimentary 
competence in the linguistics he opposes, and much as his case is 
wildly overstated—still, he has a point about patterns. The 
implications of his point are clear: whatever relies on patterns is of no 
necessary use to literary interpretation, including statistical word 
counts, attempts to identify an author’s style in terms of linguistic 
regularities, microgrammars of poems or corpora, and much else.40 
  As usual when Fish is right about something, he is wrong about 
the reasons he is right, for they are invariably more metaphysical than 
he would wish them to be. And in the metaphysics we may find a clue 
                                       
40 In other words, one may well be able to make plausible interpretive inferences 
from formal patterns as long as one also analyzes the formal particulars that make 
the pattern up, and of course one may plausibly interpret the formal particulars 
directly. But Fish is right to rebuke the reliance on patterns alone to make an 
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about what kind of linguistically-informed criticism would not be 
vulnerable to Fish’s argument. Patterns have the structure of 
universals. The individual instances of the pattern (like spill and fill in 
my previous example) are only specimens, and in the absence of the 
pattern are nothing at all, blank, mere stuff. A universal term like 
muffin enables us to designate some class of objects in the world, and 
presumably all muffins bear properties by virtue of which they are 
muffins and not, say, sheep. But every particular muffin has many 
more properties than just those that make it a muffin, and we can only 
arrive at the category of muffin by subtracting every unique property of 
a given muffin, everything concrete and specific in our experience of 
the muffin. This subtraction of the singular is what makes universal 
terms useful, allowing us, for example, to make predicative judgments: 
armed with the category of muffin you will be able to spot muffins 
when you see them, you will have a much better idea what a muffin is 
going to taste like and so you will be better able to decide if you would 
prefer to have a muffin or a croissant or a leg of lamb. Socrates’ project 
of defining the Just and the Good aims similarly at making reliable 
moral judgments: if you know what makes an action just you will have 
a rule by which to govern your action in any given situation; if you 
know what makes a man virtuous, you will have a much easier time 
aspiring to be such a man. 
  Plato elevates the universal to a higher order of reality. Instead 
of the universal being simply an abstraction from an actual experience 
(being, in other words, post rem not ante rem) it is the ground of that 
experience, its condition of possibility. Even Aristotle in his 63 
Metaphysics, which takes Plato to task for failing to explain just how 
universals ground particulars, reproduces the elevation of form over 
matter41 (q.v., Ch. 1 herein). But in his Poetics Aristotle provides an 
account of poetry that seems to muddle the distinction between 
universal and particular, claiming that poetry is “something more 
philosophic and of graver import than history, since poetry rather 
speaks universally [katholou], whereas history speaks the particular 
[hekaston]” (1451b5-7, my trans.). Achilles may have been an 
historical personage, and an historical discourse about him could 
relate all the particular facts of his character and life; but the Iliad 
does more than present us with the mere historical fact that Achilles 
returned Hektor’s corpse to his grieving father. The Iliad invests this 
fact with universal significance, extending beyond the mere particulars 
of a given time and place—extending it toward some abstract idea of 
compassion or caritas, unmoored from culturally specific burial rites. 
But the Iliad is not a philosophical discourse, which takes place 
merely at the level of universals like compassion or caritas; the poem 
is about particulars and is itself irreducibly particular. For Aristotle, 
then, poetry is neither merely concrete and particular nor merely 
abstract and universal, but is a way of thinking the universal through 
the particular. 
  One strand—perhaps the main strand—of philosophical thinking 
about art continually returns to its paradoxical relationship with the 
                                       
41 For Aristotle, form is on the side of the particular rather than the universal: the 
particular just is a realization through form of mere matter (which by itself is less 
than nothing); rather than just saying that universals are more real than particulars, 
then, Aristotle affirms the particular but only insofar as it is already mastered by the 
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universal and particular. Kant, in his Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, defines the beautiful as that “which pleases universally 
without a concept” (5:219). The claim that “x is beautiful” is not 
conceptual for Kant because no rational argument, no appeal to 
shared concepts, could settle a dispute over such a judgment; such 
judgments are, to that extent, trapped in particular judges. But the 
claim that “x is beautiful” also differs from the claim that “x makes me 
feel good” in that the former presupposes universal assent whereas the 
latter has no implications for other people’s responses. Hegel, of 
course, would never subscribe to an account which, even if only for a 
moment, uttered the words non disputandum est, but in some respects 
his account is similar to Kant’s, only transferred from the perceiving 
subject to the artwork itself—the universal actualized in the particular 
artwork: 
In the products of art, Spirit has to do solely with its own. 
And even if works of art are not thought or the Concept, 
but a development of the Concept out of itself, a shift of 
the Concept from its own ground to that of sense, still the 
power of thinking Spirit lies in being able not only to grasp 
itself in its proper form as thinking, but to know itself 
again just as much when it has surrendered its proper 
form to feeling and sense, to comprehend itself in its 
opposite, because it changes into thoughts what has been 
estranged and so reverts to itself. (13, trans. modified; see 
also 153-60) 
Although art on Hegel’s account (poetry being the highest form of art) 
never attains to the level of the Absolute, and so falls short of 
Philosophy, it nevertheless is characterized by a true, achieved unity of 
the Idea and its concrete form, of universal and particular. John 
Crowe Ransom, in his essay “Wanted: An Ontological Critic,” argues 65 
that such a unity is neither desirable nor possible, that concretion and 
particularity can never be assimilated to the universal without the 
destitution of the very things we value in art. Scientific discourse, on 
Ransom’s account, aims at just such an assimilation and destitution; 
poetry is therefore a counter-measure to scientism that returns us to 
the materiality of our experience: “under the iconic sign the abstract 
item is restored to the body from which it is taken” (285). 
  Such a view is always in danger of stripping art bare in order to 
save it, despairing of poetry’s claim to truth. But to commit oneself 
wholly to universality (e.g., to appeal to the ‘timeless themes’ of 
literature) is to repudiate poetry as such, poetry as something different 
from merely instrumental language. As Cleanth Brooks argues, poems 
dramatize ethical situations, and are likely to inspire us to ethical 
reflection by putting us in someone else’s shoes, but “poems as such 
indulge in no ethical generalizations” (258). Poetry in particular among 
the arts invites the liquidation of the particular because its medium is 
language, and language is inextricably bound up with conceptuality 
(and hence with the universal) in a way that granite and oil paint are 
not. If poetry is particular, then, it must achieve that particularity 
against the grain of the medium it uses; and because poetry’s medium 
is language, its full unfolding within the domain of the universal is 
already present in the poem’s particularity. 
  The main consequence of this for our purposes is that no 
meaningful syntactic pattern is possible that is not already present in 
nuce in singular constructions. Fish is right that there is “no pattern 
that one can observe before interpretation is hazarded,” but the 66 
“interpretation” in question emerges from reflection on the form of 
specific, individual syntactic constructions whose structure does pre-
exist the act of conscious interpretation. The particular contains the 
principle of selection from which the universal derives. Form, then, is 
not only something quite different from pattern, but precedes pattern 
and is its ground.42 It is possible to pay no attention to patterns in a 
literary work, but form, in the sense of syntactic structure, cannot be 
ignored. Every interpretation of a poem that pays even the slightest 
attention to the text itself (i.e., any interpretation which meets the 
most minimal standards for evidence) is engaged in the analysis of 
form. 
  If, as Aristotle argues, poetry thinks universality through 
particularity, and if the sort of particularity peculiar to poetry dwells in 
its syntactic form, then the project of criticism is to seek the moments 
in which syntactic particulars point beyond themselves.43 In Keats’s To 
Autumn we should search for the ways in which the pattern Freeman 
brings out is monadologically determined by and transformed in 
particular constructions. In the first stanza, for example, Freeman 
points out that the main verbs of the non-finite clauses (“to load and 
bless…” &c.) are all causative transitive verbs, and he infers from this 
that “the subjects of these natural processes” have been turned into 
“objects of Autumn’s all-powerful agency” (87). If we turn to the main 
                                       
42 We might understand form in this sense as what Malabou (via Hegel) calls 
plasticity: both that which gives form (as in plastic surgery) and that which is formed 
(as in plastic forks) (8-12 & passim.). 
43 Put another way, criticism must understand form as energeia (actuality) in 
Aristotle’s sense, the realization of the particular, rather than simply as that under 
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clause to which these non-finite clauses are subordinated, looking for 
evidence of Autumn’s agency, what we find is that the main clause—
“Conspiring with him [the sun] how to load and bless…”—is in fact 
ungrammatical. The verb conspire must be followed by a naked non-
finite clause, not by a wh-word like how as in 
(11)  a.  *Sally and John conspired how to rob the bank. 
The normal use of conspire looks like (11b): 
b.  [The President and his cronies]1 conspired [PRO1 to 
enrich themselves]. 
Instead of an expressed wh-word like how, this lower clause begins 
with a phonetically null element identified in the literature as PRO (so 
named because it functions similarly to a pronoun). The rationale 
behind positing this null element has to do with θ-roles, according to 
Chomsky’s account in The Minimalist Program (see Adger 304-5 for an 
accessible summary). In example (11b), the verb of the lower clause, 
enrich, must assign both AGENT and THEME  θ-roles;  themselves can 
take the THEME, but there is no subject in the same clause to take the 
AGENT role. Enrich also cannot assign the AGENT role to the subject of 
the higher clause, The President and his cronies, because this already 
has a  θ-role assigned to it by its own verb, conspire.44  The AGENT θ-
role for enrich is therefore assigned to a null element within its own 
clause, viz., PRO. We understand the agents of the action of enriching 
to be the same as the agents of the action of conspiring, so PRO must 
refer to the same entity as the subject of the higher clause. This is 
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what is called a control construction, and conspire is thus a control verb 
(because its subject controls the reference of PRO). 
  The construction that shows up in the poem would have been 
just fine with a non-control verb like explain, as in (11c): 
 c.  Sally  explained  how to build an obelisk. 
So what we get in the poem is something we might call a synthetic 
construction, an ungrammatical combination of two different normal 
grammatical constructions, in this case a combination of a normal 
construction with a verb like conspire and a normal construction with 
a verb like explain. Synthetic constructions are one way the language 
of poetry differentiates itself from ordinary uses of language and effects 
the enigmatic union of familiarity and estrangement through which 
poetry’s truth content unfolds.45 
  According to Freeman’s reading, this stanza, dominated as it is 
by causative transitive verbs, is all about Autumn’s agency. But the 
introduction of how into this construction prevents the null element 
PRO from appearing in any of the lower clauses, thus preventing it 
from embodying Autumn in any of those clauses (since it would have 
been coindexed with the subject of the higher clause, “Season of 
mists…”) and from bearing the AGENT  θ-role assigned by each 
causative transitive verb. Autumn-as-agent is thereby excluded from 
participating in the unfolding processes each subordinate clause 
describes; the verbs of the subordinate clauses are still transitive, but 
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their AGENTs are hidden. One way to gloss this phrase is to say that 
Autumn and the sun have a conspiracy which involves some entity 
(which may or may not be the two of them) causing all of the 
enumerated things to happen. This synthetic construction, in other 
words, introduces an ambivalent third term between Autumn (the 
universal) and her phenomenal manifestations (the particulars), which 
means that this stanza cannot be read as a straightforward affirmation 
of Autumn’s agency in the transformation of things. 
  The slightly sinister undertones of the word conspire flower in 
the final subordinate clause, which Freeman does not discuss: 
to set budding more, 
And still more, later flowers for the bees, 
Until they think warm days will never cease, 
For Summer has o’er-brimm’d their clammy cells. 
(8-11) 
This clause also fits Freeman’s pattern to the extent that it too is 
causative and transitive. But here the cause and the process effected 
do not appear through a single verb; set marks the initiating cause 
and  budding the process that, once caused, carries on 
autonomously.46 The gap between Autumn’s agency (or someone else’s 
agency) and the process it brings into being finds explicit form here, 
monadologically reflecting within the particular the gap that separates 
it from the universal. Moreover, we can no longer speak here of the 
conversion of “natural states…into active dynamic processes,” since 
budding is a process already. The causative here just sets in motion 
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what was already processual, adding to Summer’s already excessive 
abundance a super-added plenitude of natural bounty. 
  Autumn’s agency looks even shakier if we consider that the 
entire first stanza does not have a main verb; despite the complexity of 
its subordinate clauses, the first stanza is nothing but an appositive, 
just a noun phrase, reducible simply to O Autumn…. The first 
complete sentence of the poem is a question: “Who hath not seen thee 
oft amid thy store?” (12). If we take this question literally, it concerns 
only a single individual: who is this person who has failed to often see 
Autumn in her abundance? (Or perhaps: who is this person who has 
often failed to see Autumn in her abundance?) The question seems, in 
a way, to have a straightforward answer, since we might well wonder 
who has actually seen Autumn personified (if she is amid her “store” 
then she and her “store” are different things). But the question is also 
a strange one because it is addressed to Autumn. How would Autumn 
know who hasn’t seen her? The bees don’t seem to have noticed her 
arrival, but the bees is not singular and we know the answer to the 
question must be singular from the inflection of the verb (“hath”). The 
only thing we can be sure of if we take this question literally is that the 
person being inquired about cannot bear witness to the veracity of the 
poem’s statements about Autumn, and we might understand the 
question as an attempt to include those lonely souls who are excluded 
in principle by the gesture of apostrophe to a deity. 
  The more intuitive reading is surely to take the question as 
rhetorical, and in so doing the question expands from the particular to 
an emphatic universal. As a rhetorical question, it is in effect a 71 
statement that no-one has failed to see Autumn amid her store. This 
rhetorical question is perhaps the most roundabout possible means of 
claiming universal validity for the poem’s truth. Such a near-
qualification through form emerges explicitly in the sometimes with 
which the following line begins. Strict logical consistency between the 
two lines would require that “whoever seeks abroad may find” Autumn 
often, not “sometimes.” And if only those who willfully seek Autumn 
out can find her, then the proportion of those who see her will surely 
be a good deal smaller than the rhetorical reading of the preceding 
question would suggest. This dubiety about the visibility of Autumn 
emerges naturally from any attempt to take the poem seriously, to take 
seriously its claim that Autumn is a person. The fact that the poem 
explicitly registers this dubiety indicates retroactively that the poem is 
to be taken seriously, that this personification is not just a manner of 
speaking but a matter of fact. Autumn must therefore be rendered not 
merely personable but visible, and the aim of the second stanza is to 
achieve this through the incarnation of the divinity, through the unity 
of universal Autumn and her plumping particulars. The rhetorical 
question, with its oscillation between (literal) particular and (rhetorical) 
universal, is the fulcrum on which Autumn’s descent into concretion 
turns. 
  If the actual agency behind the ripening of things in the first 
stanza turned out to be some unspecified third term, we might imagine 
that the second stanza has now provided us with the identity of that 
third term: the observer who “seeks abroad” for Autumn and finds her 
“sitting careless on a granary floor” (13-4). Autumn, as Freeman’s 72 
observations make clear, appears exceedingly passive in this stanza (or 
at least in lines 14-18). Although all of the main verbs in the stanza 
are non-causative transitives, lines 14-18 contain only one main verb 
but four reduced passives (see Freeman 92), two describing Autumn 
and two describing the furrow, twining the two together. Autumn is 
neither subject nor AGENT of a single verb in this stanza until line 18, 
and even then it is only her “hook” (stranded at the end of a line) that 
“Spares the next swath and all its twined flowers.” The cost of 
rendering Autumn visible is to render her utterly inactive; even the 
instrument of her agency, her hook, can perform no action but to 
realize its restraint as Autumn sleeps the afternoon away. 
  In the last few lines of the stanza, though, the gazing third party 
disappears and we get a direct description of a slightly more active 
Autumn: 
And sometimes like a gleaner thou dost keep 
Steady thy laden head across a brook; 
Or by a cyder-press, with patient look, 
Thou watchest the last oozings hours by hours. 
(19-22) 
Here Autumn acts, but these are actions of a peculiar sort. In order to 
“keep / Steady [her] laden head” she must continuously act, unlike 
her hook simply sparing the flowers, but the outcome of the act is 
stillness, immobility, something that does not look like an action. The 
visible action that she is presumably performing, crossing the river, is 
nowhere to be found in the sentence (i.e., we do not get a phrase like 
as you cross the brook or while crossing the brook). The syntax of the 
phrase “across a brook” is similar to a sentence like Sally held her 
breath [all the way home], which implies, if anything, that Sally is 73 
being passively transported. At the very least, these lines suggest that 
the primary, important action is the invisible act of Autumn steadying 
her load. 
In the following two lines Autumn again performs an action that 
is invisible, watching “the last oozings hours by hours.” Just as the 
previous lines emphasize the labor underwriting her seeming 
inactivity, here the qualification that her “look” is “patient” suggests a 
gaze that is deliberate, engaged, meaningful, a watching that needs to 
be done.47 But it is not clear why exactly this job does need to be done; 
if it is only “the last oozings” Autumn is watching, then we can 
scarcely be concerned that the barrel they are oozing into will overflow. 
Where the flowers and the bees’ clammy cells continued to 
overproduce in the first stanza, here we seem to be reaching the end of 
Autumn’s fecundity.  
With this thought of the end, the first hint of “last” things, 
comes the issue of time, raised strangely in the phrase with which the 
stanza ends: “Thou watchest the last oozings hours by hours.” This 
also seems like a sort of synthetic construction, in this case a 
combination of two idioms. One idiom is exemplified by the phrase one 
by one, meaning ‘one at a time’ (i.e., successively), and the other is 
exemplified by the phrase hour after hour, indicating an excessive 
accumulation of hours, an exhausting persistence. Both idioms are 
relatively productive, meaning that they can be used with other nouns 
(as in C. Rossetti: “Remember me when no more day by day / You tell 
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me of the future that you planned”; or Coleridge: “Day after day, day 
after day, / We stuck, nor breath, nor motion”48), but both require at 
least that the nouns be singular. Both are, so to speak, semantically 
plural in the sense that they suggest multiple elements (perhaps an 
iteration of two elements represented by the two nouns), but one by 
one keeps its eye on only one element at a time whereas hour after 
hour dissolves the individual units into an undifferentiated plural 
whole. Put another way, one by one achieves multiplicity by adding 
individual units one at a time, whereas hour after hour achieves 
multiplicity by breaking down the very boundaries between individual 
units. The phrase in the poem, “hours by hours,” seems to achieve 
multiplicity by adding multiples, suggesting a succession of 
persistences. 
If we understand persistence to mean persistence over time, 
then we might follow Kant in concluding that persistence is just 
another name for substance (CPR B224-5), and that therefore the idea 
of a succession of persistences is unintelligible since that which 
persists cannot be subject to change and still be what it is. 
Alternatively, we could understand the persistence implied by “hours” 
as duration (durée) in the sense that Bergson uses the term, i.e., as 
the immediate temporality of lived experience in which individual 
states of consciousness “melt into one another” (Bergson 186). For 
Kant, time is “nothing except the form of our inner intuition” (CPR 
A37/B54) i.e., it is a subjective determination (which, in Kant’s view, 
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does not make it any less real); similarly, Bergson’s view of time (which 
he sees as a refutation of Kant’s view; see 211-2) depends upon a 
perceiving subject who is capable of having experiences. The 
temporality of Autumn’s gaze, then, is a vital clue as to what kind of a 
subject personified Autumn is—or whether Autumn can be a subject 
at all.  
That which oozes is by definition slow moving,49 and the oozing 
cider here has been almost arrested even in that slow movement 
through nominalization as an oozing. But the “oozings” are, like the 
“hours,” plural, as if the issue were not just distension, duration—the 
elongation of experience by concentration—but a multitude of 
unmediated and unmeasurable durations, a crowd of unique objects. 
Where does one oozing end and the next begin? One can count drops, 
but oozings? Both the mode of the watching (“hours by hours”) and the 
mode of what is being watched (“the last oozings”) display the same 
elusive structure, some kind of grouping which dissolves the rule by 
which it comes into being as a group, particulars that do not remain 
subject to a universal. Paradoxical as it may be, a time made up of 
successive durations (instead of successive instants) would be a time 
packed full, in which each cell of experience were bottomless and the 
last load of pomace would never cease to yield its thick slow juice. 
But if these “last oozings” were to last forever, the cider would 
never be made—and since cider (which must mature for 5 or 6 months 
after fermentation) comes of age in the Spring, the thought of Autumn 
obeying Zeno’s paradox calls Spring to mind. Spring is the subject of 
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the questions with which the third stanza opens: “Where are the songs 
of Spring? Ay, where are they?” Our initial reading of these questions 
will no doubt take them to be rhetorical, much like the question that 
opened the second stanza. But whereas the question in the second 
stanza, taken rhetorically, can be glossed as a straightforward 
statement (‘Everyone has often seen Autumn amid her store’), the 
question in the third stanza does not admit of a straightforward gloss. 
Does it mean The songs of Spring are nowhere? Or There are no songs 
of Spring? Is Spring being dared to sing? The following line clarifies 
matters in the sense that it takes the form of a reply to the question: 
“Think not of them, thou hast thy music too.” But if the question 
actually elicits a reply, it is not  rhetorical at all. Moreover, if it is the 
speaker of the poem who replies and who refers to the questioner in 
the second person (thou hast thy music), and if thou and thy must 
refer to Autumn (since a comparison between Spring’s music and 
Autumn’s music is at issue), then the question is not only literal but is 
spoken by Autumn herself. Unlike the Grecian Urn, the addressee of 
this ode does not pipe up merely to mutter a consoling platitude; 
Autumn interrupts the speaker’s discourse to interrogate him about 
Spring, attempting perhaps to derail the poem, to silence the 
apostrophe that conjures her into presence. 
As Jonathan Culler has observed, the aim of apostrophe is to 
overcome man’s alienation from the natural world, to reconcile subject 
and object by speaking to a non-human entity as if it were human (63-
4). An apostrophe to Autumn presupposes, minimally, that Autumn is 
something capable of listening, even of talking back. But To Autumn 77 
pushes the prosopopoeia to which apostrophe is bound considerably 
further than this bare minimum, moving from what Hegel would call  
natural divinity in the form of “mere personification,”a mere mask (Gr. 
prosopon), to  natural divinity in the form of a free “spiritual 
individual” (454-5). Here we have an Autumn made fully human, 
which is a desirable state of affairs if we agree with Adorno that “It is 
only through humanization that nature is to be restored the rights 
that human domination took from it” (41). But Autumn’s autonomy 
seems to have gotten a bit out of hand; as is typical in Keats, this 
poem takes the conventions of its kind (here, the ode) so literally that 
they reveal just how strange and wayward they always were. But 
taking the convention of apostrophe literally also involves taking it 
seriously, investing it with real power. In the first stanza Autumn’s 
agency and activity suffers from a chorismos between universal and 
particular, and even the incarnation of the second stanza, much as it 
concretizes Autumn, also leaves her listless and passive. Autumn’s 
first real assertion of herself, in which she  kindles into speech, would 
seem to be a triumph of apostrophe, an achieved reconciliation of man 
and nature, but just at that point the poem veers towards intransitive 
verbs and away from depicting a natural abundance earmarked for 
human consumption. 
Our first glance at the question with which the final stanza 
opens is not only wrong because we take it to be a rhetorical question 
and because we take it to be issued by the speaker of the poem; we 
will likely also take “the songs of Spring” to mean ‘the songs about 
Spring.’ In itself this is a plausible enough reading, since the of is 78 
ambiguous here and could mean either about or by. But the response 
that follows the question is not similarly ambiguous: “thou hast thy 
music too” must mean the music which Autumn possesses or 
produces, not the poems about Autumn we euphemistically call songs. 
The answer retroactively disambiguates the question, making it plain 
that, although the speaker/poet responds affirmatively to the 
challenge issued by Autumn, he only succeeds in affirming Autumn’s 
denial of the poem—this poem is no longer the “music” of Autumn, she 
is writing her own score with the speaker as a mere instrument. Pater 
may have been right that “all art constantly aspires towards the 
condition of music”; what he failed to note was that any poem that 
succeeds in that aspiration fails thereby to remain a poem. 
Given the appeal to “music” we might expect the lines 
immediately following to provide us with descriptions musical, or at 
least auditory. Instead we immediately get the tactile figuring the 
visual: 
While barred clouds bloom the soft-dying day, 
And touch the stubble-plains with rosy hue… (25-6) 
And given the pattern Freeman has pointed to, we expect this stanza 
to be dominated by unergative intransitive verbs, but these two lines 
do not fit that expectation. Instead they recapitulate the pattern of the 
poem as a whole: from bloom in line 25, a causative transitive in this 
usage, to touch, a non-causative transitive, and then on to mourn in 
line 28, which is the first in a string of unergative constructions. 
Unlike the first stanza, however, the causative transitive bloom is not 
participating in a synthetic construction and has a perfectly 
transparent causal relation to its object (the soft-dying day). All 79 
problematic mediations of agency have gone, but here the causative 
transitive verb is not forming a link between a universal and a 
particular: both the “barred clouds” and the “soft-dying day” are 
particulars. Similarly, the non-causative transitive touch designates a 
direct, positive action, unlike the inactive or invisible actions of the 
second stanza (“Spares the next swath,” “keep / Steady thy laden 
head,” “watchest the last oozings”), and the subject of the verb is again 
the “barred clouds.” What has disappeared, despite the identity at the 
level of pattern between this moment and the larger pattern of the 
previous stanzas, is the attempt to render Autumn human (the other 
meaning of the Greek prosopon is ‘face, person’); prosopopoeia has 
fulfilled itself in its own dissolution. 
These two lines are also marked by another synthetic 
construction: ‘while x, then y.’  While usually appears in parallel 
constructions of the following sort: While bombs fell on civilians, the 
perpetrators spoke of “liberating” them. Then has a number of uses, but 
the relevant one in this context seems to be the deictic use, indicating 
a specific moment in time, as in We now take tea in the afternoons, but 
then we wandered the moors. The ‘while x, y’ construction indicates 
simultaneous periods of time, whereas the ‘x, then y’ construction 
indicates successive periods of time; put another way, while designates 
simultaneous durations whereas then designates successive instants. 
This construction, then, recalls the difficulties at the end of the 
preceding stanza, but here the richness of duration calls out only to 
receive a bare instant in reply, a dearth that comes after (and hence 
puts an end to) duration instead of an answering parallel plenitude. 80 
This collapse into a pure instant, in which sheep are 
simultaneously “lambs” and “full-grown,” has all of the immediacy of 
music with none of its development over time. There seems to be 
something human in the music of the “wailful choir” in which “the 
small gnats mourn,” but mourn is not only intransitive, it is 
unergative: they mourn without an object or a THEME, and mourning 
without an object is a pure immediacy of suffering that can never end 
and can never be worked-through. This mourning is no more human 
than the singing of the “Hedge-crickets,” the whistling of the “red-
breast,” the bleat of the “full-grown lambs” or the twitter of the last 
“gathering swallows.” There is no human Autumn to which the 
speaker might address himself, no venturesome soul to seek her 
abroad—no human beings at all. If this music is spontaneous, it is 
only because it is thoughtless. If it is orderly, it is because it has no 
aim. If it is beautiful, it is because it is sublime. This poem does not 
present simply the epitome of that negative capability which seeks to 
enter into its object so fully that the speaking voice disappears; the 
poem succeeds at fully entering into a world in which there is no-one 
to speak to, no-one to hear, and nothing to say. What has made for 
uneasiness even among many critics who find this poem ultimately 
peaceful50 is just this sense that its peace is a result of 
dehumanization or outright inhumanity—that it is not far from a call 
to collective suicide. The fissures in the smooth surface of the poem’s 
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patterned progression are the undialectical traces of the human 
subject upon whose sacrifice the universal reconciliation depends. 
 
  If linguistically-informed criticism has often been thwarted by 
the gap between form and content, between description and 
interpretation, and has therefore fallen back on a creaky vocabulary of 
‘mimesis’ and ‘reflection,’ it is because it has focused on patterns and 
not on local syntactic phenomena themselves. For it is at the level of 
the individual moment, the unrepeated and singular, that form and 
content intertwine in systematically explicable ways. The pattern 
Freeman describes in To Autumn turns out to be useful (far more so 
than observations about patterns typically are) because it is drawn 
directly from the analysis of the particular sentences which are its 
ground; in the above reading, I have attempted to bring the issues the 
pattern raises back down to earth again, to follow a trajectory that 
remains within the individual sentences without lording it over them 
from above. One need not sail off in search of patterns to get from 
poetic form to poetic meaning. An observed pattern may serve as a 
useful foil, a pattern may provide useful clues, a pattern may inspire 
sheer mathematical delight, but a pattern cannot be converted into an 
interpretation and cannot be substituted for the analysis of particular 
sentences and lines. Pattern is, if anything, the opposite of poetic form. 
In the end, interpretations derived from patterns are always reductive, 
because patterns themselves are reductions, and it is the business of 
serious literary criticism always to thwart reduction just as poems 
thwart interpretation. Unlike pattern-hunting, the analysis of 82 
individual sentences has the virtue that it cannot possibly promise 
what Fish calls “an automatic interpretive procedure” (70). On the 
contrary, it makes the business of interpretation more difficult, and 
opens up possibilities that demand yet more nuanced labors of 
thought. 83 
Chapter 3 
Form & Figure: Ode to a Nightingale 
 
A sentence uttered makes a world appear 
Where all things happen as it says they do; 
We doubt the speaker, not the tongue we hear: 
Words have no word for words that are not true. 
W.H. Auden, “Words” 
 
There are two kinds of metaphor: metaphor as it is used in 
works of literature and metaphor as it is used in conversation. These 
two kinds of metaphor are linguistically analogous, but require such 
different kinds of interpretive labor that we are ill advised even to use 
the same word for both. Most of the errors that beset the scholarly 
study of literary metaphor result from a confusion between literary 
metaphor and conversational metaphor, derived in turn from a more 
basic confusion between aesthetic and instrumental uses of language. 
Attending to the distinction between the aesthetic and the 
instrumental has, or so this essay will argue, two significant 
consequences for understanding literary metaphor: no literal/ 
metaphorical distinction can be maintained in the description or 
interpretation of literary metaphor, and literary metaphors cannot be 
interpreted in referential terms (that is, in relation to anything non-
linguistic). Both of these claims fall under the rubric of what we will 
call literalism. The aims of this essay are (1) to show that literalism, in 
this sense, follows of necessity from the belief that there is such a 
thing as literature (a belief that literary criticism cannot coherently 
renounce), (2) to provide a literalist account of literary metaphor based 84 
on current work in syntax, an account that sees literary metaphor as a 
disruption of semantics by syntax, and (3) to explore this disruption of 
semantics through a close reading of a poem for which it is a central 
concern, John Keats’s Ode to a Nightingale.  
 
 
I. Literalism Against Figuralism: A Program for Inquiry into Literary 
Metaphor 
 
Someone who wants to understand metaphor might reasonably 
suppose that a sensible way to proceed would be to begin with a 
simple case (like someone saying in conversation that their cousin 
George is a gorilla) and, once we attain an understanding of the simple 
cases, only then to proceed to the more complex cases that appear in 
poems. The presupposition of this procedure is that the use of 
metaphor in conversation is different in degree but not in kind from 
the use of metaphor in a poem. In order to see how this view is 
mistaken, we will have to consider the nature of the difference between 
aesthetic and communicative language in general. To begin at the 
beginning, we can distinguish natural objects from man-made objects 
by saying, to borrow some Aristotelian jargon, that natural objects 
have their formal causes within themselves whereas man-made objects 
have their formal causes outside of themselves.51 The formal cause of 
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an object is that by virtue of which it is what it is; this is most easily 
understood by considering the way organisms grow: an acorn becomes 
a tree not because of any property of the soil, water or sun that it is 
exposed to (these are its efficient causes), but because of its inherent 
properties, whatever they may be. Exposed to the appropriate efficient 
causes, an acorn will, if anything, become a tree and not a sheep. 
Similarly, no amount of soil, water or sun will make a lamb grow into a 
tree. On the other hand, a tree does not become a table (rather than 
something else) by virtue of any properties inherent in the tree. If a  
person makes a tree into a table, the form of the table (that by virtue of 
which the table is a table and not something else) is imposed from 
outside by the maker. All man-made objects (or, lest we neglect beaver 
dams and the like, artificial objects) become what they are because 
they are given form externally. 
  Most people who make things do so for a reason. If I make an 
umbrella, presumably I do so in order to keep my head dry. Keeping 
my head dry is the umbrella’s final cause, the purpose for which the 
umbrella was made. I may use an umbrella however I like, of course: 
to ward off intruders, to dowse for hidden wells, to restrain errant 
sheep. But then I am not using the umbrella as an umbrella. An 
umbrella is what it is by virtue of its purpose, and we distinguish an 
umbrella from a shepherd’s crook based upon what it is used for. To 
put it another way, an umbrella is not an end in itself; its final cause 
is outside of it. A painting, on the other hand, has no external final 
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cause. I may use a painting to ward off intruders, to dowse for hidden 
wells, or to restrain errant sheep, but then I would not be using the 
painting as a painting, and not just because it is poorly suited to those 
uses. To use a painting properly is simply to observe it, which is a 
refusal to use it for anything at all. A painting may inspire in me a 
thought, and from my perspective the painting is the cause of the 
thought (without the painting my mind would have remained a still 
pool), but that is not a property of the painting itself: what makes the 
painting a painting is not that it inspires my thought. The painting 
would be a painting even if I had never seen it. Any attempt to use the 
painting for some external end (even an attempt by the artist) would 
fail to use the painting as a painting. Whereas if I use an umbrella to 
keep my head dry, I am using the umbrella as an umbrella, even 
though it is subordinated to an external end, since that is what the 
umbrella is for. In short, works of art are immanently autotelic, or, to 
use a more familiar term, autonomous.52 
  What is true of art in general is also true of poems: they are in 
themselves autotelic, though for us they serve to spur reflection. 
Communicative acts, on the other hand, are a use of language that is 
purely instrumental. Their external end (final cause) is 
communication, i.e., the inducement in the listener of a mental 
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representation that matches the speaker’s own.53 If poems are 
aesthetic objects and the aesthetic is, by definition, non-instrumental, 
it follows that the language of poems cannot be a mere means and that 
poems are not communicative acts. Since our ordinary use of language 
is communicative, and since in most respects poems seem to use 
ordinary language (we are not obliged to learn poetic language in the 
same way that we learn a foreign language), we naturally imagine that 
poems and communicative acts are at least analogous, if not identical. 
But further reflection on the two uses of language reveals just what a 
chasm lies between them. For example, communicative acts always 
take place in a concrete context, a context that affects very 
significantly what is communicated. If I say this afternoon It is raining, 
my communicative act means something different than if I say It is 
raining tomorrow afternoon; in the first case, I mean to say that it is 
raining on the 15th of April, whereas in the second I mean to say that it 
is raining on the 16th of April. In both cases I use the same sentence, 
but I use the sentence to communicate different things.54 A poem is 
always actualized concretely as well (where being actualized includes 
recollection, printing, reading or performance), but every instance in 
which the poem is actualized is an instance of the same poem, 
                                       
53 The term communication is not very perspicuous in that it suggests that a thought 
somehow moves from one person’s mind to another, whereas in fact the listener is in 
the position of having to produce a representation that approximates the thought 
that the speaker intends to communicate. If thoughts could move between minds, we 
would all have a much easier time understanding one another. 
54 The usual way of putting this is that the sentence is the same in the two cases but 
the proposition the sentence expresses is different. I prefer to avoid putting it this 
way because I have yet to find an account of just what a proposition is that is even 
remotely plausible, whereas linguists have given quite explicit accounts of just what 
is meant by sentence. 88 
whereas every communicative act is bound to its context—which is 
why a marriage performed on stage can never end in divorce. 
  Moreover, a communicative act could use a wide variety of 
linguistic means to achieve its end. If I wanted to communicate that it 
is raining, I could say It is raining or Rain falls on the world or What a 
wet afternoon!—or I could give up on language entirely and do 
charades until my listener guessed correctly what my frantic flailing 
meant. All of these could reasonably count as the same communicative 
act, and if I succeed at inducing the right mental representation in the 
listener’s mind it doesn’t really matter how I manage to do so. The 
linguistic facts about a communicative act are, in other words, 
radically contingent in relation to the communicative act itself. A 
poem, however, is not only bound to specific sentences—a poem just is 
a set of specific sentences (and specific line breaks). If I change the 
words, I am not just uttering a different version of the same poem, I 
am uttering a different poem. If the notion of same poem could 
encompass different linguistic objects, then we would have 
considerable trouble telling the difference between a poem and a 
paraphrase of a poem, between A slumber did my spirit seal and “I was 
sleepy, she was lively, but now she’s dead and going around in 
circles.” The linguistic facts about a poem, in other words, are strictly 
necessary in relation to the poem. 
  This distinction between poems and communicative acts also 
affects how we understand their meaning. Since the point of a 
communicative act is to induce in the listener’s mind whatever mental 
representation the speaker is trying to communicate, a communicative 89 
act can only correctly have one meaning attributed to it. Even if I utter 
a formally ambiguous sentence like Someone ate every tomato, the 
communicative act is not ambiguous: the sentence (qua 
communicative act) means whatever I intend to communicate by it, 
regardless of whether or not the sentence (qua sentence) can be 
differently parsed. Even if I make a grammatical error and utter a 
sentence that literally means something that logically excludes what I 
am trying to communicate, the meaning of the communicative act will 
still be what I intended to communicate, not what I actually said. The 
reason for this, as we have seen already, is that communicative acts 
are defined instrumentally, by their ends, and however much I may fail 
to make myself understood the meaning of my communicative act 
cannot be ambiguous. A poem, on the other hand, means only what its 
sentences mean, and is therefore quite capable of being ambiguous. 
Absolutely nothing can change the fact that “A slumber did my spirit 
seal” is formally ambiguous: either the speaker’s spirit sealed a 
slumber or a slumber sealed his spirit. We may interpret the line in 
any number of different ways (where an interpretation is an account of 
its significance) but the strictly descriptive facts about its meaning are 
determined by the facts about the language, e.g., that any sentence 
with the same form as “A slumber did my spirit seal,” such as A 
spaniel did my cat pursue, will be ambiguous in the same way. 
  So the meaning of a communicative act is determined both by 
the mental state of the speaker and by the context of the utterance, 
whereas the meaning (in a narrow sense) of the poem is exclusively 
determined by its linguistic facts. This means that the seemingly 90 
intuitive strategy of beginning with such conversational metaphors as 
George is a gorilla and applying our discoveries to more complex 
literary metaphors will not work because the theory we would produce 
would necessarily be impertinent to poetry. For example, we might 
consider an utterance of George is a gorilla as an indirect way of 
making a direct statement (that George is bulky and hairy, has a 
saggital crest and an opposable big toe) or we might regard it as an 
implicit comparison (that George is, in some perhaps unspecified way, 
similar to a gorilla, though he is not in fact a gorilla). Both of these 
kinds of account depend on initially observing that George is a gorilla 
is not “literally” true, and then attributing to the sentence a 
“metaphorical” meaning. But a poem is not determined by context in 
the way that a communicative act is, and so it would make no sense to 
distinguish a metaphorical meaning (George is big and hairy) from a 
literal meaning (George is a gorilla, not a man). If the sentence George 
is a gorilla appeared in a poem, it would mean just what the words 
mean in that order, and to complain that the sentence makes a false 
statement would be simply obtuse, a sort of metabasis eis allo genos.  
  This means that the literal/metaphorical distinction itself, which 
accounts of metaphor have almost universally relied upon as far back 
as Aristotle, simply does not apply to literary metaphor. And if we 
believe Donald Davidson, it doesn’t even apply to conversational 
metaphor. On Davidson’s account, “metaphors mean what the words, 
in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more” (32). So 
far Davidson and I agree, but his rationale is exactly the opposite of 
the one I am suggesting: “I depend on a distinction between what 91 
words mean and what they are used to do. I think metaphor belongs 
exclusively to the domain of use” (33).  And his argument is quite 
convincing, except for the fact that he assumes throughout his essay 
that poems are just one of many kinds of communicative acts, whereas 
if my argument above is correct then poems differ from communicative 
acts in ways that fundamentally determine how we ought to conceive 
metaphor. If Davidson is right about how conversational metaphors 
work, and if I am right about the differences between communicative 
acts and poems, then it follows that poems don’t have metaphors in 
them at all. For example, Davidson insists that “most metaphorical 
sentences are patently false” (42, his emph.), whereas it really makes 
no sense to call a sentence in a poem true or false in the sense that 
Davidson means (correspondence between a proposition and a state of 
affairs, or, in the more graceful Scholastic vocabulary, adequatio rerum 
et intellectus).55 Since Davidson seems to me to be more or less right 
                                       
55 It follows from my account here that poems are neither true nor false in this sense, 
and it would be reasonable to infer from this fact that poems have no relation to 
truth whatsoever. But it seems to me that, rather than despairing of poetry’s claim to 
truth, this circumstance should compel us to rethink the category of truth itself. 
More specifically, I would suggest that we can think about truth in poetry in terms of 
Hegel’s conception of truth as explained in his Phenomenology of Spirit and Science of 
Logic (though not in his Lectures on Fine Art, where it seems to me that he 
presupposes the details of his system in such a way that he fails to live up to the 
stringency of the demands his system places on an account of art). To give an 
account of Hegel’s conception of truth and its relevance to the truth of poetry would, 
given the complexity of the issues, take me very far afield, and so I will have to leave 
this matter fallow for the time being. But, to put it a bit simplistically, my view would 
be that Hegel’s emphatic conception of truth is linked to actualization in the world 
(what is true is the actualization of Spirit), and therefore we can think of the truth of 
poetry as its realization in the reader’s experience of reflection—which is just to say 
that the truth of poetry is criticism. Just as a moral demand (e.g., that all people 
should be free) issues from the world and is true of the world but nevertheless does 
not refer to a state of affairs in the world—refers, in fact, to the absence of a state of 
affairs (people are not free)—so the poem arrives in the form of a demand, not a 
merely indicative proposition. The poem, by virtue of its enigma-character, demands 
that the reader think, and the fulfillment of that demand is the precondition of the 
fulfillment of any moral demand whatever. 92 
about conversational metaphors (and since I think I’m right about the 
differences between communicative acts and poems), the case of 
literary metaphor seems to me extremely problematic. Thus far, we 
know at least that it is categorically different from the case of 
conversational metaphor. 
  But the negative discoveries about how not to approach inquiry 
into literary metaphor also have positive implications. (From here on 
out, metaphor just means literary metaphor.) An approach that defines 
metaphor in terms of a relation to the extra-linguistic world (like 
Davidson’s appeal to the “patent falsity” of metaphors) or an approach 
that defines metaphor in terms of a relation between sentences and 
thoughts (like that of Samuel Levin) will never hold water if my 
account of the difference between poems and communicative acts is 
correct. But it follows from this that, if there is such a thing as literary 
metaphor, it should be something we can describe in terms of the 
linguistic facts about the text—that is, something we can describe in 
terms of what is literally there on the page (literal comes from litteræ, 
‘letters’). Literalism, in this sense, is turns out the be the same thing 
as an immanent approach to the language of the text. This puts us 
immediately in the domain of linguistics, specifically syntax and 
semantics. On the face of it, semantics seems like the relevant area: 
metaphorical sentences generally aren’t ungrammatical, so the heart 
of the matter must be some kind of semantic deviance. To anticipate a 
bit, my argument will be that metaphors are sentences that contain 
inconsistencies between the semantic features of their words. This 
means that a metaphorical sentence is one that runs against the grain 93 
of normal semantic associations, and it follows from this that the 
normal operations of semantics, if a metaphor is to deviate from them, 
cannot themselves produce the metaphor. It must be the case that the 
semantic deviance of a metaphor is an effect that the syntax of the 
sentence has on its semantics, and so it is to syntax we must turn if 
we are to explain how literary metaphors work. 
 
II. Syntax Against Semantics: The Linguistic Structure of Literary 
Metaphor 
 
The basic problem we face in providing an account of metaphor is to 
distinguish two sentences such as the following on the basis of the 
language alone (that is, without appealing to reference): 
  (1)  The ship ploughed the sea 
  (2)  The ship traversed the sea 
The simplest way to face this problem might be just to say that the 
verb plough doesn’t fit with the rest of sentence (1), whereas the verb 
traverse does fit with sentence (2). We might say that the normal use 
of plough  is in such a sentence as the following: 
  (3)  The farmer ploughed the field. 
Or we might appeal to the fact that the OED lists the primary transitive 
use of the verb plough as “To make furrows in and turn up (the earth) 
with a plough, especially as a preparation for sowing” (def. 1a). The 
OED also helpfully lists the usage of plough in sentence (1), which it 
marks as “fig.” and “Chiefly poet.,” “Of a ship, boat, swimming animal, 
etc.: To cleave the surface of the water” (def. 4a). We might say, then, 94 
that sentence (1) uses plough  in a transferred sense, where the 
transfer in question is from OED definition 1a to OED definition 4a. 
This is essentially the account which Aristotle gives in the Rhetoric, 
and it is embedded in the Greek etymology of the word metaphor itself, 
which just means ‘transfer’ or ‘transport’ (hence the commonplace in 
introductory literature courses that the literary tourist who finds 
himself in Greece may be tickled to discover the word metapherein 
plastered on the sides of city buses). 
  The problem with such an account is that it locates the 
metaphor in a single word. If the rest of the sentence is simply normal 
and literal (and hence can be fitted out comfortably with the verb 
traverse), then the locus of the metaphor is the word ploughed itself. 
But it doesn’t make sense to say that the word in itself is the 
metaphor, since it does not seem to carry any particularly 
metaphorical sense when used in (3). Part of the problem here is, in 
accordance with the argument from the previous section, that the 
metaphorical/literal distinction doesn’t make much sense if we are 
talking about literary metaphor and are thus confined to facts about 
the sentence itself. But the other, more important, part of the problem 
is that metaphor is here conceived as a property of a word rather than 
of a sentence as a whole. If we conceive of metaphor as a property of 
sentences rather than of words, the literal/metaphorical distinction at 
once falls away. The ship ploughed the sea thus becomes a 
metaphorical sentence, not a sentence containing words used 
metaphorically.  95 
  The most significant attempt to salvage the word-based theory is 
Max Black’s account in Models and Metaphors (1962). For Black, we 
solve the problems outlined above if we see a metaphorical sentence as 
one in which a word (here ploughed) is what he calls the focus of the 
metaphor and the rest of the sentence is what he calls the frame of the 
metaphor (28). The advantage of this account is that it allows us to 
understand metaphor as a kind of relation between a focus and a 
frame, so that we can locate its metaphorical quality at the level of the 
sentence. At the same time, it allows Black to preserve Aristotle’s 
sense that in The ship ploughed the sea or Achilles was a lion, a single 
word is being used (Black might say framed) in a special way whereby 
it acquires a special meaning. Thus Black can say that we have a 
metaphorical word embedded in a literal sentence without having to 
commit himself to the notion that the word is in itself metaphorical. 
The problem, as Roger M. White observes in The Structure of Metaphor 
(1996), is that when one applies this view to actual literary examples 
one often finds that it is difficult to systematically distinguish focus 
from frame. One example White discusses at length is this sentence 
from  Othello: “His [that is, Othello’s] unbookish jealousy must 
construe poor Cassio’s smiles, gestures and light behaviors quite in 
the wrong” (IV.i.9-11). We seem to be able to go along with Black’s 
theory in saying that the word unbookish is the focus of the metaphor, 
but what do we do with the word construe? The problem here is 
precisely that one can both construe behaviors and construe 
literature, that both are equally possible objects of interpretation. So 
Shakespeare’s metaphor, as White points out, hinges on construe, 96 
which allows the meaning to swing between literary and behavioral 
interpretation (77).56 Even if we stick to the simple task of assigning 
each of the words in the sentence to either focus or frame, literary 
examples persistently muck up the works. 
  The basic problem we face, then, is to account for our intuition 
that a metaphor is a sentence in which some words are in some way 
semantically incompatible with other words in the sentence, without 
falling into the trap of imagining that some words are being assigned 
special or metaphorical senses. In other words, we need to find a way 
to explain the distinction between metaphorical and non-metaphorical 
sentences without having to produce a metaphorical semantics to 
complement the existing non-metaphorical semantics. We might, 
therefore, construe the real problem as being how the words in a 
metaphorical sentence relate to one another, which puts us back in 
the domain of what is literally on the page. If Black’s theory was no 
good because it fell back into assigning special senses to individual 
words, he still had the right instinct in attempting to produce a theory 
that would understand metaphor as a relation between the words in a 
sentence. The study of the relations between words in sentences is, of 
course, just syntax. 
                                       
56 For White, the vocabulary associated with interpreting behavior is the primary 
vocabulary, whereas the vocabulary associated with interpreting literature is the 
secondary vocabulary. The primary vocabulary is primary, on his account, because it 
refers to the “actual situation” (Othello interpreting Cassio’s behavior) rather than 
some “hypothetical situation” (someone interpreting a work of literature) (111). 
Despite his opposition to the notion of special or metaphorical meanings, White ends 
up reproducing the literal/figural distinction in a different way, and I suspect that 
part of what leads him astray is the fact that his example comes from a play and 
therefore resembles a speech act more than, for example, a lyric poem might. 97 
  One of the most straightforward kinds of relationships between 
words is what linguists call c-selection (short for “categorial-selection”). 
The lexical entry for each word includes a specification of what kinds 
of words can follow it, a specification that linguists call its c-selection 
features. For example, the distribution of intone  in the following 
sentences shows that it can be followed by a noun phrase as in (4) or 
by that+sentence as in (5) (more technically, it selects for a Determiner 
Phrase or a Complementizer Phrase), but it cannot be followed by a 
lone adjective as in (6). 
  (4)  Mathilde intoned the prayer 
  (5)  Mathilde intoned that she was tired 
  (6)  *Mathilde intoned old57 
A sentence in which the c-selection features of any of its words are 
violated will be, like (6), ungrammatical. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, one often finds in poems expressions that are, strictly 
speaking, ungrammatical (like “Conspiring . . . how to load and bless”), 
but can be understood as a combination between two different 
grammatical constructions. We might understand such “synthetic 
constructions” as cases in which the c-selection restrictions of a word 
have been violated; more precisely then, we might call such cases c-
synthetic constructions.  
  But this doesn’t seem to get us very far with metaphor since, 
although a metaphor might appear in an ungrammatical sentence, 
                                       
57 These examples and some of the following discussion are borrowed from Adger 87-
90. The classic treatment is Grimshaw, though she uses an older vocabulary: she 
uses the term “selection” to refer only to what Adger (along with most people these 
days) calls “s-selection” and she uses the term “subcategorization” to refer to “c-
selection.” 98 
there’s nothing about being metaphorical that requires a sentence to 
be ungrammatical. The ship ploughed the sea is perfectly grammatical: 
the c-selection features of the transitive verb plough allow it to be 
followed by a noun phrase but not by that+sentence (*The farmer 
ploughed that he was happy). We would be obliged to say that the 
following sentence is grammatical as well, but nevertheless something 
seems to be seriously wrong with it: 
  (7)  ?Mathilde intoned the mirror 
This sentence is not ungrammatical, but it nevertheless seems 
unacceptable; in other words, it doesn’t seem to violate a basic 
syntactic restriction, but it does seem to violate a basic semantic 
restriction (from now on, I will use a question mark at the beginning of 
a sentence to denote unacceptability). In order to account for cases 
such as these, linguists have suggested that the lexical entry for each 
word, in addition to a specification of its c-selection features, also 
contains a set of s-selection features (short for “semantic selection”). 
Just as the c-selection features of a word restrict which categories of 
words can follow it, so the s-selection features of a word restrict which 
kinds of words can follow it on semantic grounds.58 The verb intone, 
for example, seems, on the basis of the data in (4)-(7), to include in its 
lexical entry the s-selection feature {utterable} (from now on, I will 
indicate s-selection features with curly brackets). In other words, the 
                                       
58 If we assume that c-selection motivates merge (that is, that a given word merges 
with another in order to satisfy its c-selection feature), then we can define a 
complement as an expression that merges with a head. S-selection would then be a 
relation between a head and its complement, a relation that would have no effect on 
whether or not a sentence satisfied the bare output conditions but which would have 
some effect on the eventual interpretation of the sentence in the conceptual-
intentional apparatus. 99 
word that follows intone must have in its own lexical entry a 
specification that it is included in the class of things that are 
{utterable}, just as it must also have in its lexical entry a specification 
that it is included in the category of [DP] or [CP]. 
  We might therefore understand ?Mathilde intoned the mirror as 
an s-synthetic construction, i.e., a construction in which the s-selection 
features of intone are violated. This kind of relation between words in a 
sentence seems to be just what we were looking for in an account of 
metaphor: it accounts for intuition that some words in a metaphorical 
sentence seem out of place but without falling into claiming that the 
words have anything other than their normal meanings or that the 
metaphorical character of the sentence is actually a property of the 
word. ?Mathilde intoned the mirror might seem like an odd example of a 
metaphor, but it is just a particularly extreme case of precisely the 
same phenomenon. In a similar way, *Mathilde intoned old seems too 
extreme an ungrammaticality for Keats (or even for Shelley), but 
“Conspiring . . . how to load and bless” is ungrammatical nevertheless. 
Metaphors, then, are just s-synthetic constructions. 
  If metaphors are s-synthetic constructions, then they are not 
simply a matter of either lexical or sentential semantics. This view of 
metaphor depends on the semantics of individual words (namely, their 
s-selection features), but it assumes that all of the individual words 
have the same semantics in a metaphorical sentence that they have in 
a non-metaphorical sentence. What makes the sentence a metaphor is 
that certain words are placed in a structural relationship to one 
another such that their s-selection features clash, which is just to say 100 
that  syntax  is what makes a metaphor a metaphor.59 The primary 
advantage of this view is that it allows us to approach particular cases 
very concretely: if the metaphorical character of a sentence is 
exhaustively mediated by its syntax, then the focus of our interpretive 
energies should be the syntax of the metaphorical sentence. In this 
sense, what we will be concerned with is just the words on the page, 
and our inquiry will therefore be literal both in the sense that we are 
concerned with what’s actually on the page (litteræ, ‘letters’) and in the 
sense that we are not concerned with some kind of special, 
‘metaphorical’ meaning. This allows us to approach metaphors in a 
very precise and explicit manner, and we can thereby avoid the danger 
of in many discussions of particular metaphors of falling into vague, 
impressionistic generalities or simple-minded reductions (like when 
Lakoff and his collaborators take an enormous array of both literary 
and non-literary examples and boil them down to such crude formulæ 
as “THE MIND IS A CONTAINER” [152]). In short, metaphors are best 
understood literally. 
  Another advantage of this account is that it allows us to 
understand how we come to have dead metaphors, like The SUV 
ploughed into my sensible sedan. Here plough seems to fit in the 
sentence just fine; it just has an idiomatic interpretation in 
                                       
59 The closest thing I have seen to an approach of this kind is Christine Brooke-
Rose’s A Grammar of Metaphor (1958), though the main aim of that book is to provide 
a taxonomy (rich in examples) of different kinds of constructions in which metaphors 
appear. She deliberately leaves her theory of metaphor a bit vague in order to be as 
capacious as possible (23-4), thereby to get the best sense of how poets exploit 
opportunities for metaphor provided by different kinds of constructions, though she 
generally assumes that the metaphor is located in a particular word (which allows 
her to break things down in terms of which part of speech the metaphorical word is). 101 
constructions of this kind where the phrasal verb plough into is 
synonymous with ram into. Given our account of a metaphor as an s-
synthetic construction, it makes sense that if the construction were 
repeated enough the relevant lexical entries would just be modified to 
include the new usage as idiomatic. It would then not, as Richards 
says (following Johnson), give us “two ideas” at once (119). At some 
point, a sentence like The ship ploughed the sea is likely to simply 
cease to be a metaphor in the sense that it will cease to be s-
synthetic—the fact that the relevant interpretation of plough is already 
listed in the OED  suggests that it is nearly dead already. 
Understanding metaphors in this way also allows us to distinguish 
them sharply from similes, which are perfectly grammatical and 
acceptable sentences, thereby discouraging the approach to metaphors 
that seeks to reduce them to similes (such as we find in Aristotle, Rh. 
1457b and Quintilian, Inst. VIII.vi.9). 
  The main problem faced by an analysis of this kind is that the 
linguistics literature on s-selection has some serious limitations if we 
want to put it to practical use, not least that no-one (as far as I can 
discover) has proposed a worked-out list of the set of s-selection 
features. Although different languages lexicalize concepts differently in 
certain respects, there are also clearly underlying similarities (and so 
there must be if a language is to be learnable at the pace with which 
children acquire languages). It should be in principle possible, 
therefore, to determine the universal set of s-selection features just as 
linguists have determined the universal set of phonetic features. There 
are two main difficulties facing any attempt do so, however. The first is 102 
that one must have categories more universal than simply the 
meaning of the word in question, otherwise the argument for a 
particular s-selection feature ends up being circular. So, for example, 
it would be easy enough just to say that the s-selection feature for 
intone  is {intonable}. In order for the attribution of an s-selection 
feature to a word to be substantive, the proposed feature must be a 
concept with greater extension than that of the word itself. In the case 
of  intone, we seem to accomplish something if we say that its s-
selection feature is {utterable}, since intoning is only one kind of 
uttering.  
  The other problem faced by any attempt to provide the universal 
set of s-selection features is that, if we aim to define those features in 
terms of the most basic conceptual categories available, then the 
attempt to do linguistics goes over into metaphysics. We might take a 
starting point from the philosophical tradition by, for example, 
adopting Kant’s table of the categories from the Critique of Pure Reason 
and attempting to adapt it to the data we find. But it will be difficult to 
justify the choices we make between different kinds of conceptual 
distinctions on linguistic (rather than metaphysical) grounds, and so 
we end up stuck doing something like a science of everything in order 
to understand a small (if important) issue in semantics. In the end we 
aim to give an account of intuitions that we all use when judging 
sentences, and since most of us probably don’t have much trouble 
distinguishing metaphorical from non-metaphorical sentences (e.g., 
My lady is a rose from My lady is like a rose), there must in fact be 
universal categories already in place. So we do not have to construct 103 
the universe ex nihilo; the question is how we are to obtain access to 
the underlying concepts that our linguistic knowledge seems to rely on 
(and which, presumably, are part of our innate genetic endowment). 
Studying metaphors in poetry, with informed introspection about what 
intuitions guide our perception of metaphors, might, in this instance, 
be of some use to linguists, since examining concrete instances in 
which s-selection features are clearly in conflict may well allow us to 
work out what the s-selection features must be such that they are 
inconsistent with one another (in other words, it allows us to take the 
fact that a particular sentence is a metaphor as given). And so, in the 
next section I will turn to examining the use of metaphors in a 
particular poem, Keats’s Ode to a Nightingale. This poem is 
particularly illuminating on these issues, and a particularly good test 
case for the theory outlined here, because the poem itself is, to 
anticipate a bit, concerned with the attempt to have a kind of 
experience that exceeds or violates the limitations of the conceptual 
categories that otherwise form and constrain our experience. 
 
 
III. Language Against Concepts: Ode to a Nightingale and Metaphysical 
Experience 
 
Ode to a Nightingale ends with the speaker bluntly questioning the 
reality of the experiences he has just described: 
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Was it a vision, or a waking dream? 
   Fled is that music…Do I wake or sleep? (79-80)60 
This finale seems out of keeping with the poem since up to this point 
the poem is focused on minute, concrete and determinate—even 
literal-minded—descriptions even of the speaker’s enigmatically 
synæsthetic experiences. A poem that begins with so definite an 
experiential assertion (“My heart aches”) seems to promise an equally 
definite conclusion. The problem is one of mood (here, the 
interrogative), so the first step in understanding this finale is to work 
out just what is being asked. The last question seems like the most 
straightforward. If the speaker were simply unconscious (in a 
dreamless sleep), then he presumably could not inquire after his 
condition in this way.61 The directly active construction (“Do I wake or 
sleep?” not Am I awake or sleeping?) suggests something other than 
the mere passivity of unconsciousness, so the question seems best 
glossed as Am I experiencing waking reality or the dreams of sleep? But 
it remains unclear why the absence of the nightingale’s “music” should 
cause the speaker to question the reality of his present experience.  
  Turning to the previous line, we might wonder whether “that 
music” even refers to the nightingale’s song at all. Presumably, “that 
music” refers to the same thing that “it” refers to in the previous line, 
but what is the antecedent of “it”? The immediately preceding clause 
itself has “it” as its subject (77), but that clause is conjoined to a 
parallel construction whose subject is “thy [presumably the 
                                       
60 All citations from Keats’s poems are from Allott’s edition. The ellipsis in the final 
line is Keats’s. 
61 One could argue that the speaker is, once the nightingale’s song is fled, in an 
entirely anæsthetic state, but I see no indication in the poem that his senses of 
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nightingale’s] plaintive anthem” (75). The “plaintive anthem” is a good 
fit with “that music” in the final line, but in what sense could an 
“anthem,” however “plaintive,” be either a “vision” or a “waking 
dream”? We might speak of a musical composition as ‘visionary,’ but if 
Sally tells Egbert that she ‘had a vision’ Egbert will not take her to 
mean that she had a purely auditory experience; visions are (at least) 
visual (hence the derivation from videre, ‘to see’). So a more plausible 
candidate for an antecedent for it might be “the fancy” of lines 73-4. 
But it’s far from clear what “fancy” exactly this line is referring to: it 
could be the fancy of the preceding stanza (that the nightingale is 
immortal or its song transhistorical), or it could be the fancy of the 
fourth stanza in which the speaker abruptly declares that he is 
“Already with thee!”, or it could be the fancy of the entire poem.62 This 
last option becomes more attractive when we consider that the poem is 
the only thing which we could call both a ‘song’ and a ‘vision,’ and that 
the opening of the stanza, with its reflexive rumination on the word 
forlorn (“the very word” troubles him, not its meaning), reminds us that 
“Poesy” itself is one of the poem’s central topoi. The question of the 
reality of the poem’s language is thereby explicitly bound up with the 
reality of the speaker’s experience, and the phrase “waking dream” 
gives this difficulty concrete form—Morpheus, we must remember, is 
not only the god of Sleep and Dreams, but also the god of Form. 
  A poem that ends with a question would seem to be a poem that 
has undone itself; we would surely feel more at ease with a poem that 
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sense), but if so it cannot be referring to the same entity as the “vision” of the 
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began with a question which it proceeded to answer. But to answer a 
question about experience would be to redact it into a conceptual 
framework that is alien to experience itself, especially when one is 
concerned with an experience whose content resists conceptualization. 
This is why, in this case, the questions can only be asked once the 
experience has fled. Since the poem links that experience to its 
language, we must turn to the language of the poem in order to 
understand what kind of experience the poem attempts to think.  
  The poem opens with the dead metaphor “My heart aches,” 
which functions as an idiom in that we directly assign a special sense 
to it (‘I feel sad’). But this already numb phrase is conjoined to 
another, stranger phrase: “and a drowsy numbness pains / My sense” 
(1-2). This has all the earmarks of an s-synthetic construction: a 
“numbness” is not the sort of thing that can inflict pain or be the 
source of pain and “my sense” is too much of an abstraction to be a 
recipient of pain (can something inflict pain on the faculty of 
perception itself? or, more generally, can a capacity be in pain?). To 
put it a bit more explicitly, the verb pain requires a subject that is 
{sensible} (i.e., ‘a possible object of sensation/feeling’) and it requires 
an object that is {sensitive} (i.e., ‘capable of sensation’63).  
  The oddness of this conjunct is doubled by the line break,64 
which encourages one to read pains as if it were intransitive, a 
suggestion reinforced by the parallelism between “a drowsy numbness 
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‘non-sensible’ (not as opposed to ‘senseless’). 
64 See Chapter 5 for the theoretical justification of approaching lineation this way. 
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pains” and “my heart aches.” The mere fact of conjunction suggests 
that the conjuncts have some kind of relation, but it leaves the nature 
of the relation totally undetermined, thereby compelling us to give it 
content. The form of the conjunction combined with the parallelism 
created by the lineation thus requires us to reconsider “my heart 
aches,” and what at first seemed a dead metaphor seems, thus 
contextualized, to quicken again. The word heart has always referred 
to the bodily organ and to the seat of feeling, but earlier uses of the 
word had a materialist cast: the physical heart was the physical place 
where feeling was located. More modern usage has no such materialist 
underpinnings, so that heart can be unproblematically used as an 
abstraction for a (presumably non-physical) mental state, as in My 
heart yearns for peace. On the other hand, ache has remained 
essentially physical, which is why a sentence like ?My faith aches 
sounds anomalous. Despite its idiomatic character, then, “My heart 
aches” is in fact an s-synthetic construction, something that might 
have gone unnoticed without an aggressively s-synthetic conjunct. The 
resurrection of this dead metaphor not only opens up the problem of 
synaesthesia that saturates the entire poem but exhibits it as dwelling 
within language we thought to be straightforward. This resurrection is 
thus something more than simply a garden-variety defamiliarization 
but is an attempt to experience what is as something already 
transformed,65 to resurrect the dead letter of the world into living 
movement of Spirit.66 
                                       
65 Criticism on this poem very often attempts to understand it in terms of a binary 
opposition like that between “the world of imagination” and “the real world” (Brooks, 
Modern Poetry 31) or between the “ideal and the real” (Tate, quoted in Fogle, “Keats’s 108 
  Having brought “My heart aches” back to life and having 
introduced a “numbness” (presumably the absence of pain) that 
nevertheless causes pain, we then discover that the speaker’s state is 
neither pain nor numbness: 
‘Tis not through envy of thy happy lot, 
   But being too happy in thine happiness – (5-6) 
This is not a language of suffering: three variations on happy appear in 
two lines. In the first instance, “thy happy lot,” happy seems to mean 
‘lucky’ or ‘fortunate,’ but in the second case it seems to mean 
something like ‘joyful’ (being too joyful in your happiness sounds better 
than  ?being too lucky in your happiness). The movement from the 
nightingale’s merely external circumstances (“thy happy lot”) to the 
speaker’s internal state (“being too happy”) returns us to the domain of 
experience. Now we are faced with the difficulty of specifying what 
“being too happy in thine happiness” might mean. The heart of the 
problem is the seemingly innocent preposition in. This is clear if we 
replace  in with for (‘being too happy for thine happiness’), in which 
case the sense would clearly be that the speaker experiences an excess 
of joy as a result of the fact that the nightingale is joyful, experiences a 
                                                                                                              
Ode to a Nightingale” 33) or between the speaker and the bird (Bate 503). But surely 
Earl Wasserman is right that this poem is emphatically processual, and shifts 
through any number of problems (179ff.). What I am trying to do in this essay is to 
show that the attempt to experience what is beyond experience is the fundamental 
process or operation throughout the poem, unfolding through a shifting chiaroscuro 
of different problems. 
66 In other words, rather than experiencing the world as a set of static givens (like 
when we think of the world as a collection of scientific data), in this moment the 
speaker seeks to experience the world as something living, something continuously 
exceeding itself, something, so to speak, with a mind of its own. I am filtering Paul 
through Hegel here in order to emphasize the way in which the spirit, rather than 
the letter, of the Law is just the law written on the living flesh of a human heart, 
rather than being a law that is given, either as the law of God or a law of nature (2 
Cor. 3). 109 
feeling-for-other (Oh, you found your long-lost twin again? I’m so happy 
for you!). The preposition in, however, does not have a straightforward 
reading in this context (an interpretive crux that rests on a preposition 
is usually impossible to resolve in a satisfactory way—but in is at least 
easier to handle than of). As a rule in selects for noun phrases that are 
{extended} so that even such things as mind or memory are treated as 
if they had extension (as in Egbert preserved her in memory or Mathilde 
kept his last words in mind as she opened the safe).  Happiness, 
however, is not a noun which we typically treat as if it were extended 
(Egbert is happy not ?Egbert is in happiness), so this construction is s-
synthetic.67 The point of this construction seems to be that the 
speaker is in the nightingale’s happiness, as if the nightingale’s 
happiness were a space within which one could dwell, thereby denying 
that the speaker is outside (or in some external relation to) the 
nightingale’s happiness, as would be the case if the speaker envied the 
nightingale’s “happy lot” or if the speaker sympathized with the 
nightingale’s agreeable mental state. 
  Strangely, this denial that the speaker has an external (or 
alienated) relation to the nightingale seems to be reversed in the third 
stanza, in which the speaker laments the state of the world, 
   What thou among the leaves hast never known, 
The weariness, the fever, and the fret 
   Here, where men sit and hear each other groan; 
Where palsy shakes a few, sad, last gray hairs, 
   Where youth grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies[.] 
(22-6) 
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being beautiful or having beauty but not being in beauty. 110 
These lines as well focus on a specific location, a location filled with 
the opposite of the nightingale’s song of summer: “Here, where men sit 
and hear each other groan.” The speaker does not claim to be in this 
place (and hence to yearn to escape from it to the place where the 
nightingale is), but rather the speaker has already left this place and 
wishes to “quite forget” that it exists (21). The difference between the 
speaker and the nightingale, in other words, is not that one is in 
misery and one is in joy, but that, while both are in joy, one 
remembers what misery was like, remembers that misery exists 
elsewhere. And the speaker is obliged to remember that suffering in 
order to understand his present condition as a freedom from suffering, 
which is why he still refers to the world of suffering as “Here.” The s-
synthetic constructions in these lines do not point the way out of a 
world of suffering: the “few” and “last gray hairs” are also “sad,” so that 
decay and death cannot inspire an Epicurean detachment and 
serenity (i.e., that death is nothing to fear because nothing of you 
persists that might suffer68) but are infused with suffering at the level 
of their very being (the old man does not lament his lost hairs, the 
hairs themselves suffer and are sad). Similarly, it is “youth” itself (not 
young people in general, not some young person in particular) that 
“grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies”; in other words, metaphysical 
entities themselves now suffer decay, fall into the mutability which so 
terrified the ancient world. 
  In light of the way the very metaphysical foundations seem 
suddenly to be made of sand, the speaker’s desire for flight is 
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understandable. His first attempt at finding a means of flight is, in the 
second stanza, to yearn for “a draught of vintage” that would 
constitute “the true, the blushful Hippocrene,” as opposed to the 
merely transparent waters of the classical muses (11,16). But the 
strong drink that this stanza invokes in the muses’ place turns out not 
to be merely a means by which the speaker can escape the suffering of 
the world or enter into the singing of the nightingale; it is no common 
table wine. The s-synthetic constructions in this stanza produce a 
wine that actually contains an experience in itself, and not a merely 
gustatory experience. A gustatory experience, though, is what we are 
led to expect when we are told how the wine is supposed to taste: 
  Oh, for a draught of vintage that hath been 
     Cooled a long age in the deep-delvèd earth, 
  Tasting of Flora and the country green, 
     Dance, and Provençal song, and sunburnt mirth! 
(11-14) 
What we get, of course, is an s-synthetic construction. Tasting of 
selects for something that is {concrete} (as opposed to abstract), which 
encourages us to find a concrete way of understanding “Flora.” Given 
that the word is capitalized, we might take it to be a proper name, and 
hence to understand it as referring to the Roman goddess of flowers. 
But while this would render the semantics of the expression internally 
consistent, it seems hardly likely, despite the capitals, that the 
speaker yearns for wine that actually tastes like the goddess (how 
would a goddess taste? can a goddess be fermented? would she 
tolerate being pressed?). Alternatively, we might understand “Flora” in 
a secular sense as a name for the flowers themselves. But even this 
seems like an awkward solution since what these lines invoke is surely 112 
not a wine that actually tastes like flowers, but a wine that is ‘floral,’ 
that tastes like flowers smell. In order to work out what sense of 
“Flora” could satisfy the semantic requirements of “Tasting of” we are 
obliged to seek something concrete and material. But what we find, 
though it is indeed concrete, is not concretion of the right kind: 
however closely linked the sense of smell and taste are, one cannot 
actually taste a smell. When we speak in this way (‘That 
Gewürtztraminer is strangely floral’), we are drawing an analogy, and 
the analogy is only an analogy to the extent that smell and taste are 
not inter-translatable. But however synæsthetic our understanding of 
the phrase ends up being, we are likely to go along with it since our 
habitual use of language already presupposes a synæsthetic analogy, 
which allows us to speak of a wine as ‘floral.’ 
  While it seems possible to reconcile “Tasting of Flora” to 
gourmanderie, we would be hard-pressed to do the same with “Tasting 
of . . . the country green” (assuming that we’re not talking about wheat 
grass juice). The phrase “the country green” could mean the “village 
green” of some unspecified locale (OED,  s.v., “green, n.” B.12.b). A 
particular village green of a particular place is perfectly concrete, and 
even if the poem read ‘a  country green’ it would be referring to a 
concrete green, albeit one arbitrarily selected. But to speak of “the 
country green” is to speak of an abstraction, just as someone who 
observes that ‘the domestic feline is easily swayed by the promise of 
food’ is referring to an abstraction (unless the expression is 
contextualized in such a way that we know that a particular domestic 
feline is being referred to). The noun green could also refer to “foliage,” 113 
in which case the country greenery is what is at issue (op. cit., B.9). 
But even then the determiner the  renders this expression an 
abstraction: not the greenery behind my house or even the greenery in 
Yorkshire, but the country greenery in general. Regardless of which 
way we understand green, then, the construction is s-synthetic since 
the phrase must be an abstraction, in the one case an abstraction over 
nature enclosed within the social order and in the other nature outside 
of the social order (i.e., in the country rather than the polis). 
  While it takes some reflection to see that “the country green” is 
something abstract, not something concrete, no-one would make the 
same about “Dance,” which, lacking any determiner, is clearly an 
abstraction. In fact, the phrase full of dance so conspicuously violates 
acceptability that we only fail to notice its oddity because of the 
intervening phrases. Of the many things lines 14 and 15 tell us the sip 
of wine is supposed to contain, this is by far the most abstract, but it 
also refers to a kind of experience (the experience of dancing) that is 
the most immediate thus far: the experience of the goddess or her 
flowers is mediated by (nature-) religion and the experience of the 
green is mediated by society (even if only negatively), but the 
experience of dancing is purely bodily. But precisely what is concrete 
about dancing cannot be concrete in such a way that it could fill a 
beaker or fill a mouth, and it is no easier to imagine how a wine might 
contain or produce or reproduce the experience of dancing. Here the 
split between the abstract and the concrete, the distinction on which 
the selectional properties of full of depend, marks a point at which 
experience would be patently unassimilable to language. This is a 114 
serious problem for a poem that, however much it seeks to attain to 
(some kind of) experience, seeks to do so within language, albeit by 
using language against itself. 
  And so the next item in the line invokes poetry itself. The 
movement from dance to song wouldn’t seem like much of a leap (one 
must have something to dance to), but the additional qualifier that the 
song must be Provençal suddenly pull song into the realm of historical 
specificity. The adjective Provençal  presumably also disambiguates 
song so that it refers to poetry and only in a derivative manner to song 
(that is, a poem might be sung but song in this sense would exclude 
wordless singing, birdsong, and the like). The appeal to the 
troubadours is hardly adventitious, given that that the troubadour is 
so often a figure for the poet in his freedom and that the nightingale is 
a persistent figure in troubadour poetry (in fact, the muses’ fountain in 
this stanza, and the nightingale and eglantine elsewhere, particularly 
call to mind Jaufré Rudel’s Quan lo rius de la fontana—and what is the 
Ode to a Nightingale but an amor de lonh?). At this point, we might be 
tempted to see these lines not so much as a list of things the sip of 
wine is supposed to contain as a description of the setting of an 
experience that this wine is supposed to (somehow) produce. With the 
specificity of the appeal to the troubadours, it becomes plain just how 
remote an experience the speaker wishes to have: both troubadours 
and ancient Roman goddesses are to be in attendance on this country 
green full of dancers. And the final item in the list nicely summarizes 
the affect he seeks in an s-synthetic construction within this larger s-
synthetic construction: “sunburnt mirth.” This calls to mind, of 115 
course, the end of the preceding stanza, in which the nightingale’s 
“happiness” provoked it to sing “of summer in full-throated ease.” Just 
as the nightingale’s “ease” itself seems to be “full-throated,” so “mirth” 
itself is here subject to the warmth of the sun’s rays, so that, if 
abstractions have become concrete, it is to their benefit. Mirth itself 
has a body and can feel its own joy. 
  But it is not the abandon of sheer pleasure that the speaker 
seeks, a world in which concepts can be redeemed by simply falling 
out of language into incarnation. As the appeal to the troubadours has 
already indicated, it is poetic inspiration that he seeks from his 
“blushful Hippocrene,” inspiration enough, we might imagine, to 
conjure the dancing green. And yet his stated aim at the end of the 
stanza is, strangely enough, not to call into being a dancing world: 
  That I might drink, and leave the world unseen, 
     And with thee fade away into the forest dim [. . .] (19-20) 
All of these things the sip of wine is supposed to contain are merely 
means to an end, and that end is to “leave the world unseen.” This 
phrase is syntactically ambiguous; it could either mean that he aims 
to escape the world without being seen by the world (or by the people 
in the world), or it could mean that he aims to stop looking at the 
world, to leave the world unseen as one would leave the book unread. 
In the one reading, the world is doing the looking, and the speaker just 
wants to avoid being the object of that gaze, whereas in the other, the 
speaker is doing the looking and he wishes to avert his gaze (inward, 
perhaps, or towards the forest). In the following line, the phrase “fade 
away” suggests the first reading, i.e., the speaker wishes to fade from 
view. But the beginning of the next stanza continues the sentence: 116 
“Fade far away, dissolve, and quite forget . . .” (21). Here the speaker 
seems actually to be fading away himself, dissolving, not just fading 
from sight, and quite forget suggests that it is the speaker’s 
attentiveness, not the world’s, that is at issue. The ambiguity of leave 
the world unseen thus produces a reversal from a position in which 
the speaker is merely the object of the world to a position in which the 
speaker is a subject. But the speaker only becomes subject enough to 
dissolve, and so finds himself aligned with just those features of the 
world he most seeks to escape: the “youth” that “grows pale, and 
spectre-thin, and dies.” The speaker’s desperate turn inward thus 
unconsciously becomes a turn outward, a painful identification with 
the world’s mutability that offers no solace to his suffering. 
  The speaker thus far has little luck in fulfilling his desire to flee 
this miserable world into the nightingale’s domain. It comes as a 
shock, then, that in the fourth stanza, immediately after declaring his 
intention to “fly to” the nightingale (in the future), the speaker declares 
that he has already achieved unity with the nightingale: “Already with 
thee!” (35). It sounds as though the speaker has not only succeeded, 
but has come to realize that he was already where he wanted to be, 
that the miseries of the third stanza were already illusory. The 
mechanism by which he gets to this point is not “Bacchus and his 
pards” (Roman deities are rarely helpful in this poem) but “the viewless 
wings of Poesy” (32-3). Since “Poesy” usually refers specifically to the 
composition of poetry, we might imagine that the font of inspiration to 
which he turned in the second stanza was the reading of poetry, and 
that this turning to tradition failed him in comparison to his own 117 
creative powers. But what exactly are poesy’s “viewless wings”? To 
speak of poetry as capable of flying surely suggests (especially to a 
poet living before the age of the aeroplane) an identification of poetry 
with some material creature like a bird. It also, of course, makes sense 
to say that poetry is invisible, both since it exists as sound when 
performed and since its visible manifestation (letters on a page) is not 
really the poem itself. It might seem odd to mix the two, but being both 
winged and invisible seems to be the condition of the nightingale: the 
nightingale is in “some melodious plot,” not this or that melodious plot, 
so the speaker is just hearing the nightingale’s song through the trees. 
The mechanism by which the speaker is to achieve unity with the 
nightingale thus just is the properties of the nightingale itself; the 
manner in which unity is sought entails that it is already possessed. It 
is for this reason that the speaker can both aim at unity with the 
nightingale in line 31 and then declare that unity already obtained at 
line 35. 
  Up to this point, much of the language has been s-synthetic as a 
way of bringing together otherwise irreconcilable categories (e.g., the 
abstract and the concrete) in order to obtain unity with the 
nightingale. The achieved unity is epitomized in the expression “the 
Queen-Moon is on her throne” (36). As in the preceding line and at the 
beginning of the next sentence, the main verb here is merely the 
copular be (“Tender is the night,” “here there is no light”), which can 
join any two things in a manner that is linguistically unrestricted. So 
this expression is certainly not s-synthetic in the manner we have 
discussed thus far. The domination of copular be, along with the use 118 
of the transitive perplex and  retard as if they were intransitive (34), 
also makes these lines quite static, suggesting that the speaker is 
already where he wants to be. But the compound “Queen-Moon” has 
an effect very much like an s-synthetic construction in that it seems 
like a category mistake to merge the celestial with the political in this 
way. The “Queen-Moon” thus seems like a metaphor that has been 
subjected to such compression that it vanishes into the realm of the 
lexical and leaves syntax aside entirely. Here the sentence need not 
assert the unity of Queen and Moon; that unity is simply given by the 
lexicon. 
  Even as a compound, however, the “Queen-Moon” is a bit odd. A 
compound is a lexical item made up of two other, independent lexical 
items, like houseboat, which is made up of house and boat.69 But the 
two parts of the compound are not equal: we distinguish as houseboat 
from a boathouse, even though both are compounds of the same two 
words. Moreover, we know immediately that a houseboat is a kind of 
boat (one that resembles a house) and that a boathouse is a kind of 
house (a house containing boats). This dependency is expressed by 
saying that the second element in the compound is the HEAD, and 
determines the basic meaning of the compound, whereas the first 
element is the MODIFIER, which further specifies the meaning of the 
compound. This is not to say that the semantics of every compound 
works out so neatly—it’s difficult to imagine any sense in which a 
nuthatch  is a kind of hatch. But when we encounter an entirely 
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unfamiliar compound, we assume that it has the MODIFIER-HEAD 
structure just described (if it were appropriately contextualized, 
someone who had never heard the word nuthatch might well suppose 
that it is a kind of hatch). Compounds also have the phonological 
property that the stress falls on the first element, whereas a non-
compound sequence of the same lexical items is the reverse (bláckbird 
versus black bírd). 
  If the “Queen-Moon” were a compound we would expect the 
natural pronunciation to stress the first syllable. Such a pronunciation 
does not sound especially marked, but the meter of the line, which 
puts “Queen” in a weak metrical position and “Moon” in a strong 
metrical position, encourages us to pronounce it the other way, 
“Queen-Moon,” which makes it sounds like it isn’t a compound. 
Moreover it seems odd to consider the “Queen-Moon” a kind of moon, 
as if there were many moons and this moon were the queen of the rest. 
Surely the point of calling the moon a “Queen” is to attribute grandeur 
to her in comparison to the stars, the “starry fays” that are “Clustered 
round” their sovereign. Disraeli’s perhaps unconscious appropriation 
of this phrase in his 1826 Vivien Grey is an instructive comparison: 
“The bright moon with her starry court” (III.vi).70 The sense in Keats is 
presumably similar, so reading “Queen-Moon” as a compound seems 
unsatisfactory. But reading it as a non-compound expression of some 
kind is equally unsatisfactory since a non-compound expression 
should be separable in a way that this expression is not. The sense of 
“Queen-Moon” here seems almost to demand a compound with two 
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heads. In this sense, the compound demands a unity that the 
language cannot quite provide it. To the extent that the relations 
between the parts of the compound resemble syntactic relationships 
(particularly in having the property of headedness), the form of the 
compound is still not adequate to do away with the conceptual 
distance between the bare astronomical fact and the world of 
imagination. 
  And so the speaker returns abruptly to earth: “But here there is 
no light” (38). If there is no light here, then the speaker cannot be 
“Already with” the nightingale in the moon’s luminous court. Since 
unity with the nightingale at the beginning of the stanza is merely 
prospective, and since, here near the end of the stanza, that unity 
seems still not yet achieved, the moment in which that unity is 
triumphantly declared seems all the more strange. With the sober 
vision of retrospection, we might note that “Already with thee!” is a 
construction without a verb, which leaves us with two options in terms 
of understanding its syntax: either we regard it as an elliptical form of 
a longer expression (I am already with thee), or we attempt to 
assimilate it to the subsequent sentence. The second option is more 
viable than it might seem on first glance: the main impediment is the 
exclamation point, but we could just regard the exclamation point as 
medial punctuation71 (the capital t  of “Tender is the night” in the 
printed text seems like less of a problem, especially in light of the fact 
that in the manuscript of the poem it is clearly lowercase). If we take 
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the exclamation point as medial and undo the inversions, the sentence 
would read Already the night is tender with thee. The point of the line 
would then be to suggest the intimacy between the nightingale and the 
night (the orthographic coincidence already points in this direction), 
and the medial punctuation would put contrastive stress on the “with 
thee”—contrasting it, that is, with “here” where “there is no light.” The 
promise of declared unity, however close the “Queen-Moon” may come 
to incarnating that unity in language, thus dissolves here, slipping 
through the speaker’s fingers just as the darkness of his surroundings 
begins to dissolve his discrete experiences into one another. 
  Even though he doesn’t achieve unity with the nightingale, the 
speaker does at least seem to achieve the dissolution he yearned for at 
the beginning of the third stanza. This dissolution takes the form of 
synæsthetic experiences, the first hint of which appears just at the 
moment when the speaker despairs of his distance from the 
nightingale: 
        But here there is no light, 
  Save what from heaven is with the breezes blown 
     Through verdurous glooms and winding mossy ways. 
(38-40) 
The despair of distance is quickly qualified: there is, in fact, light here, 
but it is light of a peculiar kind, the kind of light that can be blown 
with the breezes down from heaven.72 This construction with blow is s-
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light blown with the breezes because it is at once obvious that Keats has 
consummately described the effect of glancing light filtering down through leaves 
stirred gently by the wind” (“Synaesthetic Imagery” 49). This impressionistic 
maneuver obliges one, it seems to me, to overlook what the text actually says. For 
Fogle, phrases such as this one actually reconcile two senses rather than producing 
any sort of conflict between them, and his tendency to treat the text rather cavalierly 
is motivated by his belief that Keats has “an intuitive sense of the Oneness of 
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synthetic because blow, like taste of, selects for noun phrases that are 
{concrete}, which light  is clearly not.73 But the syntax of this 
construction, with its passive voice, its inversions, and its wh-word 
standing in for light, makes the fact that it is s-synthetic difficult to 
spot. These are lines that it is quite easy to pass through without 
noticing anything odd about the suggestion that light can blown 
around. Moreover, we would expect the blowing to be done by the 
breezes, but in fact the light is blown from heaven with the breezes; in 
the absence of an agent doing the blowing, the with doesn’t invite an 
instrumental interpretation here.74 This suggests that both the breezes 
and the light are being blown from heaven by some unspecified entity, 
a suggestion that is strange not only because light is being blown 
around but because the blowing around of air is itself being blown 
around. This is no normal, everyday wind, anymore than the light is a 
normal, everyday light, since we discover at the beginning of the next 
stanza that the light does not allow the speaker to “see what flowers 
are at [his] feet” (41). We can construe this wind which bears both the 
light and the breezes as something like the breath of some god (coming 
as it does from “heaven”), with the implication that, although the 
                                                                                                              
evidence for these views in the texts of Keats’s poems in general or in the text of this 
poem in particular. Surely Keats is the least affirmative of the big six Romantic 
poets. 
73 I do not mean to take a stand here on whether light consists of particles or waves; 
concretion here is determined by our experience, not by its objective properties (as 
being a form of energy and thus, in a sense, material). 
74 With can, of course, receive an instrumental interpretation in a passive sentence 
such as He was killed with a sword. But I suspect that such a sentence is 
grammatical because verbs like kill or tickle already suggest an action that employs 
an instrument (or employs one’s body parts as instruments), whereas a verb like 
blow does not have the same suggestion because one doesn’t really use any 
particular body part to blow with (hence the oddity of John blew on the fire with the 
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speaker failed to received inspiration hitherto from either Flora or from 
Bacchus, he is here finally receiving the divine breath from some 
unspecified heavenly source. What seems at first to be an expression 
of despair, of the distance between the Queen-Moon’s court and the 
speaker miserable immanence, thus reverses itself here into achieved 
inspiration, if not achieved unity with the nightingale. 
  What is curious about this reading, of course, is the givenness of 
the inspiration, as if it were grace and not the labor of language in the 
poem. The divine breath of inspiration (especially issuing from 
something natural—here “heaven” as merely sky—and coursing 
through the untamed natural world, the “verdurous glooms and 
winding mossy ways”) is, to put it mildly, a characteristic concern of 
“Romantic” verse, but Keats’s treatment of it here is characteristically 
negative. For example, Coleridge’s effusion about the Aeolian harp, 
much as it passes through similar reflections on birds and faery lands, 
prepares the way for an affirmation of “the one Life” (12-33).75 In 
Keats, this affirmative moment is bound up with the sensory privation 
of the fifth stanza. It is the “seasonable month” that “endows / The 
grass, the thicket, and the fruit-tree wild” with various flowers, but the 
“seasonable month” does not satisfy the selectional restrictions of 
endow, which require something {agentive} (which is why the passive 
use of endow  to speak of the abilities of human beings can only 
emerge within a Weltanschauung that presupposes a divine creator). 
This s-synthetic construction makes the “seasonable month” more 
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poem for the collection Sibylline Leaves of 1817, but the original version alone is 
emphatically affirmative even in its closing chastisement of itself. 124 
than just a condition of possibility of the blossoming flowers, it invests 
the month with creative power, something that can be the agent of 
giving (endow originally derives from the PIE stem *do-ti, ‘to give’). But 
the flowers with which the month endows the greenery are themselves 
only occasions or conditions for the exercise of the speaker’s own 
creative power, designated by the activity of guessing. 
  I cannot see what flowers are at my feet, 
     Nor what soft incense hangs upon the boughs, 
  But, in embalmèd darkness, guess each sweet 
     Wherewith the seasonable month endows 
  The grass, the thicket, and the fruit-tree wild— 
     White hawthorn, and the pastoral eglantine; 
        Fast-fading violets covered up in leaves; 
           And mid-May’s eldest child, 
     The coming musk-rose, full of dewy wine, 
        The murmurous haunt of flies on summer eves. 
(41-50)  
The verb guess  is ambiguous here, and could either mean that the 
speaker is engaged in the activity of speculating about a factual 
question (We can only guess the time of his arrival) or that he has 
actually hit upon the correct solution (Egbert guessed right away the 
nature of the visit). The former reading would be much more idiomatic, 
however, with an embedded question as its object (I guess which 
flowers the seasonable month endows the greenery with) rather than 
simply with a noun phrase (I guess each flower that the month endows 
the greenery with). Moreover, the list he then provides in lines 46-50 is 
in apposition to “each sweet,” not to his supposition, and it therefore is 
a list of each flower that is actually there, not just the flowers that the 
speaker thinks are there. Since the speaker is able to provide such a 125 
list, he does not merely suppose but actually knows (or knows that his 
supposition is in fact correct, which amounts to the same thing). 
  The object of his knowledge is not, however, so straightforward 
as the “flowers” of the first line of the stanza would suggest, since the 
following line identifies his object as “what soft incense hangs upon 
the boughs.” A traditional approach to metaphor would regard this as 
a straightforward example of a single metaphorical word (“incense”) or 
short phrase (“soft incense”) clearly replacing a more literal word 
(“flowers”); the two clauses are in parallel, a parallelism reinforced by 
the lineation, and are thus clearly identified. But the poem could, after 
all, if it wanted to repeat itself merely use the same word again 
(incense has the same stress contour as flowers); the difference 
between the two is not reducible to simply decorative variation. Part of 
what makes this phrase tricky is the adjective “soft,” which in modern 
English most commonly modifies {tactile} nouns, but it can also apply 
to sounds (as in soft music), hence modifying {auditory} nouns, and to 
light (as in soft focus), hence modifying {visual} nouns, and even to 
tastes (though this is probably on analogy with the tactile uses, as in 
the opposition between soft  and  sharp flavors), hence modifying 
{gustatory} nouns.76 The noun incense is itself ambiguous since it can 
refer either to the incense smoke or the substance whose combustion 
produces the smoke—in the one case something potentially {tactile} 
                                       
76 Each of these sensory s-selection features designates an object of the sense in 
question, not something with the capacity for that sense nor something that 
constitutes the content of that sense; for example, something that is {visual} in this 
sense is a possible object of the faculty of sight (like a rock), not capable of sight 
itself (rocks can’t see) or constituting the content of the activity of seeing (the rock is 
not the same thing as the light which renders the rock visible or the mental 
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and in the other something {olfactory}. If we construe “incense” as 
{tactile}, then we can easily reconcile it to “soft,” but only at the cost of 
sense—flower petals might be soft, but incense certainly isn’t. 
Moreover, the following line identifies the speaker’s objects as sweets, 
presumably a nominalization of the adjective in its {olfactory} not its 
{gustatory} sense since there’s no indication that the speaker is 
actually eating flowers as if they were candies. Incense, then, should 
be equally {olfactory}, which makes it s-synthetic with the adjective 
“soft.” The language of the stanza is thus located right on the 
boundary between the familiar sensory associations and synaesthesia, 
using s-synthetic constructions in combination with lexical 
ambiguities to leverage us into a different kind of experience. 
  Just as the “soft incense” suggests a crossover from the {tactile} 
to the {olfactory}, so the phrase “embalmèd darkness” suggests a 
crossover from the {olfactory} to the {visual}. “Embalmèd” here already 
implies the givenness of “endows,” but here what is given is not merely 
the flowers themselves but the balmy fragrance that infuses the very 
darkness. It is not just that the speaker is in the dark and is 
surrounded by sweet smells, or that the speaker, since he is in the 
dark, is more sensitive to other sensory inputs; the implication of this 
phrase is that the darkness itself is sweetly odoriferous (and perhaps 
even has healing properties). Whereas the end of the previous stanza 
suggested that there was some kind of light, a kind of light that could 
be “blown” down “from heaven,” here we see that perhaps the light in 
question is a kind of darkness (which allows us to take line 38, “But 
here there is no light,” more seriously). But “darkness” usually 127 
designates merely the absence of light, not something positive that 
displaces light. Here the darkness is something positive enough to be 
invested with an {olfactory} quality, something whose very negativity 
enables an experience unconstrained by the mechanisms of 
identification that can operate only in the natural light of reason. The 
aim of this stanza (and perhaps of the entire poem) is thus not to 
advocate the immediacy of sensory experience, as if the horrors of the 
world could be evaded by stopping to smell the flowers between the 
tracks that lead to the extermination camps, but neither does the 
poem advocate a flight from the corporeal world to a disembodied 
realm of pure spirits. The discourse of experience becomes ideology as 
soon as it thinks it can wish its way out of thought, but a thought that 
wasn’t bound up with concrete realities would be its own less-than-
empty delusion. The aim here is to use the fact that experience is 
mediated by concepts against concepts, rather than to flee thought or 
to philosophize about philosophy’s outside. The phrase “embalmèd 
darkness,” by virtue of that fact that it is both intelligible and 
impossible to reconcile to the categories of cognitive judgment, is 
quintessentially aesthetic since, among other things, it obstructs 
paraphrase infinitely. But it is not, for all that, simply empty or 
meaningless, and as it invests a concrete negativity with sensory 
content it compels us to see in even our habitual categories the seeds 
of their own transformation. 
  But this stanza, which is as affirmative as this poem gets (even if 
it is an affirmation that the negative is not merely nothing), is 
immediately followed by a meditation on death. The phrase “embalmèd 128 
darkness” already throws a shroud over the proceedings by calling to 
mind the aromatic spices with which the bodies of the dead are 
preserved as well as a darkness that really would be just nothing. The 
darkness is now no longer a kind of richly interwoven light: “Darkling I 
listen” (51). The speaker’s declaration here that he is in the dark 
recalls Milton’s blindness without recalling the “celestial light” by 
which Milton is inspired (PL  III.51). This statement that the poet is 
busy listening is immediately followed by a strange construction about 
time not unlike those we saw in To Autumn: “and for many a time / I 
have been half in love with easeful Death” (51-2). “For many a time” is 
a c-synthetic construction combining two idioms, one such as for 
many years and another such as many a time. The first kind of idiom 
designates an extended, continuous stretch of time, whereas the 
second kind suggests a large number of particular moments in time; 
the first is the accumulation of continuous quantity whereas the 
second is accumulation of discrete quanta.77 These two temporalities 
suggest quite different relations to death, the first a continuous 
orientation towards death (something like the brooding on death that 
Heidegger finds so contemptible), the second a life punctuated by the 
momentary yearning for death. To combine the two suggests moments 
of yearning for death against a continuous background of brooding on 
death, redoubling the force of those moments of longing which do not 
turn away towards life but only slide back into the dull ache of the 
self-same longing. He is only “half in love,” but his longing is all-
consuming. 
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  The death that the speaker longs for, however, is not simple 
non-existence like the speaker of Shakespeare’s Sonnet 66 (“Tired with 
all these for restful death I cry”). Given his laments about the world in 
the third stanza, we might expect him to want to case to exist so that 
he is no longer capable of suffering. On the other hand, one of the 
things that makes the world horrible in third stanza is exactly that 
“youth grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies” (26). Death can hardly 
be a solution if death is part of the problem. And yet the speaker here 
tells us that death is “easeful” (52), recalling the “full-throated ease” of 
the nightingale’s song in the first stanza, and thus associating death 
with the condition of the nightingale to which the speaker has aspired 
throughout the poem. The speaker goes on to explain just what he 
asks of this “Death” with whom he is “half in love”: “To take into the 
air my quiet breath” (54). This is not a request to cease to be, or even a 
request to case breathing; the speaker does not say that this breath is 
to be his last, only that it is to be “take[n] into the air.” The ideas of 
“breath” and “air” are deeply intertwined with the notions of spirit and 
the “soul” which the nightingale is “pouring forth . . . abroad / In such 
an ecstasy” (57-8), that is, in a casting-out-of-himself. The Greek 
pneuma and psychē both originally refer to breath, but pneuma is also 
associated with the wind (Liddell & Scott); in Paul’s appropriation of 
the Gnostics, pneuma  thus ends up being associated with what is 
divine in man (the breath that is also the breathing of the world and 
thus recalls the original inspiration into Adam in Genesis), whereas 
psychē  comes to mean the merely private spirit (and hence 
consciousness, mind; see 1 Cor. 2:14-3:4). We thus might take the 130 
speaker as asking death to transform his psychē  into  pneuma, to 
dissolve his individuality into something that is more than merely 
himself, into the air which is the ambient aether of nature.78 This is, 
then, not strictly speaking a desire for non-being, but a return of the 
yearning for dissolution into nature introduced at line 20. What is 
striking in this stanza is that the speaker yearns for unity with the 
nightingale through a sort of reciprocal breathing out—the 
nightingale’s singing is an exceeding of its mere individuality, just at 
the speaker exceeds himself in expiring from himself.  
  The dissolution into nature does not have a satisfactory end, 
though, because what is left behind here is that the synæsthetic 
experiences of the previous stanzas depended on embodiment; 
however much it may strain the mind, synaesthesia needs a 
sensorium. In the final lines of the stanza, the speaker observes that 
their two kinds of expiring are not quite equal: “Still wouldst thou sing, 
and I have ears in vain— / To thy high requiem become a sod” (59-60). 
Here again the traditional theory of metaphor would be tempted to 
imagine that becoming a sod must just mean becoming a corpse or, 
more briefly, just dying. But it is particularly important that we take 
the speaker at his word here since a sod, even though it is part of 
nature and (since the word sod usually refers to a grass-bearing clump 
of dirt) is very much alive, it still is dead to the experience of the 
nightingale’s singing. The ground cannot yearn, and so cannot be 
fulfilled in being itself. Materiality in the previous stanza, embodiment, 
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gets there by claiming that death is a source of poetic inspiration here, which does 
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was what made experience possible, even the experience of the 
unthinkable, but in this stanza materiality is what blocks experience 
altogether. The “embalmèd darkness” and the “fast-fading violets” of 
the previous stanza already suggested the way in which the promise of 
experience in materiality already contains death within itself. As Hegel 
says, “The finite not only alters, like something in general, but it 
ceases to be; and its ceasing to be is not merely a possibility, so that it 
could be without ceasing to be, but the being as such of finite things is 
to have the germ of decease as their being-within-self: the hour of their 
birth is the hour of their death” (SL 129). 
  This doom of material finitude is in stark contrast to the 
nightingale as the speaker addresses him in the following stanza: 
“Thou was not born for death, immortal bird! / No hungry generations 
tread thee down” (61-2). “Generations” here could be either 
descendants (presumably of the nightingale) or instances of production 
or procreation. In either case, the point seems to be that the 
nightingale has no demanding children, that the nightingale is outside 
of the finite cycle of reproduction that makes things only in order that 
they may die. It is for this reason that the speaker goes on to describe 
“the self-same song” as having been heard “In ancient days”; the 
nightingale is only exempt from death because it cannot give birth. 
And so it is now no longer the condition of the nightingale itself that 
the speaker is concerned with, but rather he is concerned with those 
who have heard the nightingale, since (as the insight of the sod 
suggests) a mere bird is not in a position to recognize the beauty of its 
own song any more than it is in a position to recognize its own 132 
finitude. Hence the pathos of these strange and moving lines about the 
biblical figure of Ruth: 
  Perhaps the self-same song that found a path 
     Through the sad heart of Ruth, when, sick for home, 
        She stood in tears amid the alien corn.  (65-7) 
What is most peculiar about these lines is that they seem to describe a 
dramatic moment that not only doesn’t appear in the Book of Ruth but 
that seems exactly the opposite of what does appear there. Ruth leaves 
her homeland, Moab, with her mother-in-law, Naomi, when Ruth’s 
husband dies. Naomi tries to persuade Ruth to stay in her homeland 
and to return to her family, but Ruth (unlike the other local girl who 
married Ruth’s husband’s brother, now also dead) insists on 
accompanying her mother-in-law to Bethlehem (1:14-18). Once in 
Bethlehem, Ruth takes to working in the fields, and is so dutiful in her 
labor, refusing even to take breaks, that the owner of the land takes 
an interest in her, displays considerable generosity towards her, and, 
after some sexual shenanigans and the disposal of Ruth’s husband’s 
land, the owner marries her. At no point is Ruth said to suffer from 
homesickness; if anything, Ruth is bizarrely unconcerned about 
committing herself to living in a foreign land, given that foreigners in 
general and foreign women in particular had little if any rights in the 
ancient world. The story of Ruth in the Bible, in other words, is the 
story of a woman who is exemplary both in her work ethic and in her 
commitment to her husband’s family (to which she is supposed to 
cleave). Keats’s miniature narrative suggests, if anything, the pain of 
unsought exile and the drudgery of unremitting manual labor, 133 
especially in light of the persistent theme of ease and freedom from 
work throughout the poem. 
  The biblical account also makes no mention of any singing 
birds, and even in itself these lines do not make clear why the song of 
the nightingale should have the effect it does. If the song of the 
nightingale has the effect on Ruth that it had on the speaker in the 
first stanza, we would perhaps not be surprised at the tears but we 
would be surprised if there were only tears—the speaker’s pain, after 
all, came from “being too happy in [the nightingale’s] happiness.” The 
song itself is a bit peculiar since, thanks to an s-synthetic 
construction with find, it seems to be capable of volition. The most 
intuitive way to understand these lines is to imagine that Ruth, in 
exile from her homeland, hears the song of the nightingale and it 
reminds her of home, thus being the cause of her homesick weeping. 
But if the whole point of the stanza is that the nightingale’s song is 
infinite, if it has been heard throughout time, then surely it also 
extends infinitely over space—or at least covers enough territory that 
two adjacent near-eastern territories might both have heard it. These 
lines imply, in other words, precisely some kind of limitation of the 
nightingale to a specific locality, some kind of finitude. To commit the 
nightingale to the infinite is to locate the nightingale finally in an 
inaccessible beyond, leaving only humanity and the yearning for home. 
Whereas an excess of body seemed to confine the speaker to a chunk 
of dirt, here an excess of spirit seems to push the nightingale infinitely 
far away, so that in the final three lines the word referring to the 
nightingale’s song is ellipted from the sentence: “The same [_] that oft-134 
times hath / Charmed magic casements, opening on the foam / Of 
perilous seas in fairy lands forlorn” (68-70). 
  Keats’s reversal of the biblical story is particularly strange 
because the original narrative seems much more closely analogous to 
what the speaker has thus far sought to do: bravely to venture forth to 
seek a foreign and unknown land, committing himself to the care of 
Roman dieties or the “Queen-Moon” and “her starry fays.” Instead, we 
get a version of the Ruth narrative that suggests the opposite 
trajectory: the return home, the yearning for the familiar. And so it 
should be no surprise that this comes just before the moment in which 
the speaker snaps back into himself, spurred by the word forlorn. 
Cleanth Brooks has observed that  
In the first instance, “forlorn” is being used primarily in its 
archaic sense of “utterly lost.” The faery lands are those of 
a past which is remote and far away. But the meaning of 
‘forlorn’ is definitely shifted as the poet repeats the word. 
In its meaning, “pitiable; left desolate,” “forlorn” describes 
the poet’s own state, and applies, as he suddenly realizes 
in the poem, to his own case. (31) 
 The second sense of forlorn is somewhat clearer than the first, but 
perhaps Brooks has in mind the derivation of forlorn, according to the 
OED, from the Old English verb forléosan, or even the image from The 
Wanderer of the halls of the giants, bereft (lease) of their joyful shouts:  
Yþde swa þisne eardgeard     ælda scyppend 
oþþæt burgwara     breahtma lease 
eald enta geweorc     idlu stodon. (85-7) 
 
[Thus the maker of men wrecked the city 
until, robbed of the noise of the keep-folk, 
the ancient works of the giants stood idle.] 
The distinction that Brooks wants to make seems to hang on the 
notion that one cannot pity a place because a place cannot suffer, so 135 
“fairy lands” can hardly be “forlorn” in the same sense that the 
speaker can; in other words, forlorn must modify something that is 
{affective} (i.e., capable of affect). But what Brooks excludes here is the 
s-synthetic reading of “fairy lands forlorn” in which the assertion is 
exactly that these distant lands are not merely bereft of us but suffer 
our absence. It is just this s-synthetic reading which shows how the 
distant places in which the speaker’s flight of fancy had landed him 
turn out not to be distant after all. It is not just that the word connects 
the loneliness of the place to the speaker’s loneliness by virtue of 
having two meanings. The loneliness of the place is  the speaker’s 
loneliness, and it is for just this reason that it is “The very word” that 
“tolls [him] back from [the nightingale] to [his] sole self” (71-2). 
  If this poem attempts to bring into being a new kind of 
experience, an experience of the world as other than it is that opens 
up the possibility of the transformation of that world, it can only do so 
through language. And so it is language that calls the speaker back 
once the transcendentalized nightingale finally recedes to infinity. If 
this far-away land of the imagination still finds Ruth “in tears amid the 
alien corn,” then it is no escape from this world “Where but to think is 
to be full of sorrow.”79 The promise of turning the conceptuality of 
                                       
79 As Kenneth Muir puts it, in this poem “Keats expresses with a maximum of 
intensity the desire to escape from reality, and yet he recognizes that no escape is 
possible” (69). This fairly traditional reading is sensitive to something that is there in 
the poem (stanza three particularly), but I have tried to show that what is really at 
issue is not “escape from reality” but really experiencing the world as other than it is, 
and that as soon as the speaker aims for escape he fails. The tendency to read this 
poem as about escape almost invariably goes hand in hand with the presupposition 
that the vocation of poetry is to console us for the horrors of the world—so that we 
can climb back into the mines and breathe deep the toxic air with giddy smiles on 
our faces. This is, it seems to me, a rather dim view to take of art, and it is adapted 
directly from the logic of the culture industry: “Amusement always means putting 136 
embodied experience against concepts sours as soon as the speaker 
seeks simply to break out of that embodiment, to issue an executive 
renunciation of the materiality and finitude that suffers and dies. It is 
for this reason that materiality has its revenge in the final stanza since 
the nightingale’s “plaintive anthem,” which before was the mark of its 
immortality, now is “buried deep / In the next valley-glades.” What 
was thought deathless has died but death goes on living. And the s-
synthetic and c-synthetic constructions of the final stanza, like the toll 
me back that marks the speaker’s return to himself, rather than 
bringing together what was held asunder or opening up new modes of 
being, now merely point to the vast gulf between the world as it is and 
the world as the speaker wishes it to be. The only note of hope in this 
final return home is in the closing lines, where the speaker doubts 
even his own experiences. For in this doubt the speaker also finds the 
world to which he has returned illusory. “Do I wake or sleep?” refers 
not to the experiences he has been describing, but to his mental state 
now. And so a life of “full-throated ease” is not yet made real, but the 
unreality of this world groaning its way to the grave promises at least 
that the spell of what is may yet be broken. 
                                                                                                              
things out of mind, forgetting suffering, even when it is on display. At its root is 
powerlessness. It is indeed escape, but not, as it claims, escape from bad reality but 
from the last thought of resisting that reality” (Adorno, DE 116). This poem aims for 
more than merely to amuse. 137 
Chapter 4 
Subject & Object: ‘Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came’ 
 
This schematism of our understanding with regard to 
appearances and their mere form is a hidden art in the 
depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can 
divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only 
with difficulty. 
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (B180-1) 
 
The history of the word subject is closely tied to the history of 
metaphysics. The English word derives from the Latin subjectum, itself 
a translation of the Greek hypokeimenon (OED, s.v. “subject, n.”). The 
Greek word literally means ‘that which lies beneath,’ denoting a 
hierarchy that could be polarized in one of two ways: either to 
hypokeimenon is that which underlies, persists and remains beneath 
the merely changeable, or it is that which is subordinate to or 
dominated by that which has power and authority over it—roughly, a 
metaphysical polarity and a political one.80 It is from the latter sense 
that we get the use of the English word subject as the subject of law 
(the subject as opposed to the sovereign). In the former sense, subject 
ends up as another same for substance (as opposed to accident).81 
Descartes, for example, in the third of his Meditations, uses the word 
subjectum to refer to the actual thing about which he thinks (rather 
than his mental representations of the thing), for which reason the 
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81 For an ancient example, see Plato’s Protagoras 349b, where the issue is whether 
the cardinal virtues are just accidents of a singular Virtue or whether they have their 
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translator renders subjectum as “object” (26).82 Because of the sense of 
hypokeimenon  as the substrate of physical change (Phys.  190a-b), 
Aristotle also uses the word to refer to the grammatical subject, the 
subject of predication (Met.  1028b-29a). Within the context of 
Aristotle’s naturalism, the subject-substrate is a feature of what we 
would call the objective world, and this metaphysical position is 
reflected in the claim that the grammatical structure of a sentence will 
reflect relationships in nature, with a subject-substrate modified by a 
predicate. Our more familiar usage of subject  as subject of 
consciousness (subject as opposed to object) similarly emerges from a 
larger philosophical position, but in this case it is the metaphysical 
idealism of modern philosophy, principally Descartes (although he 
does not use the word in this way): if the I think is the real ground of 
things, then what the ancients considered in terms of the soul (psyche, 
anima) merges with to hypokeimenon. In this sense, Hegel’s declared 
aim in Phenomenology of Spirit to show that substance is subject is not 
as polemical as it might seem: to use the word subject to refer to the 
self is already implicitly to claim as a first principle that the self is the 
floor to the universe. 
  But what becomes of the grammatical subject when subject 
becomes the subject of consciousness? The subject of consciousness 
and the subject of a sentence converge in the proposition I think, and 
so we might imagine that all predications have the implicit form I think 
that x (e.g., I think that the car is green). Rather than the subject of the 
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sentence being what is really substantial, the whole proposition (the 
car is green) ends up subordinated to the thinking subject—what used 
to be the subject in the sense of being a stable, real thing (the car) 
becomes merely an object of thought and hence merely intellectual. 
The phantasmatic potential of this predicament was not lost on 
Browning, whose ‘Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came’ opens 
precisely with the assertion of a thinking I: 
My first thought was, he lied in every word, 
   That hoary cripple, with malicious eye 
   Askance to watch the working of his lie 
On mine, and mouth scarce able to afford 
Suppression of the glee, that pursed and scored 
   Its edge, at one more victim gained thereby. (1-6) 
The poem begins nearly where Descartes’ deduction begins, with I 
think  (Descartes 17). It doesn’t, though, begin in exactly the same 
place. The “thought” is Roland’s, and it is his “first,” but it is the 
thought with which we begin, not with Roland himself. And since no 
that or which follows the comma it seems like a complete expression, 
as if “was” were existential here: Roland’s first thought simply was, like 
the fiat of divine creation. But as we continue, it becomes clear that 
what follows the comma is the contents of Roland’s “first thought,” 
namely that “he lied in every word.” The pronoun he has been 
introduced here without an antecedent: we do not know who Roland 
thinks is lying, only that someone is lying, a yet-undefined object. And 
we are told that the object is deceptive, that, like the world of 
appearances or like Descartes’ all-too-malleable ball of wax, the object 
seeks to mislead us. But it is not just that this unspecified someone is 
lying; “he lied in every word.” We might breeze by this expression as 140 
just a characteristic instance of Browning’s fondness for hyperbole, 
but upon reflection it’s a strange idea: someone is lying if they tell us 
something that is not true, but presumably in order to say something 
that’s even capable of being true or false they would have to utter a 
complete sentence. A man who shouts “bunny!” or “the!” in a crowded 
supermarket may well be ushered outside, but not for uttering 
falsehoods. So how exactly does this very capable liar manage to lie “in 
every word”? It is as though the lie is so perfidious that its falsehood 
penetrates all the way down to its smallest particles, infecting even 
hitherto innocent pronouns and prepositions with its foul taint. The 
lie, then, is a lie all the way down to brass tacks, permeating even he, 
the liar himself. If Roland knows it’s a lie, then of course he is 
undeceived by this false and glittering show and knows the object in 
its very substance. 
  Presumably the contents of Roland’s “first thought” ends there, 
and with the next line we have moved on to direct description, but it’s 
worth noting that we don’t have any particularly good reason to believe 
that this is the case. “He lied in every word” could easily have been 
enclosed in quotation marks, which would have plainly closed off 
Roland’s thought with the line break. But as it stands, we can’t be 
quite sure that all of what follows, despite his claims to know the 
substance of the object, isn’t just contained in Roland’s own “first 
thought.” The That with which the next line begins invites the 
supposition that we’re going to find out just what lie the liar told. But 
That turns out to be deictic pronoun, pointing its long finger at the 
author of this fraud: “That hoary cripple.” Now the object is concrete 141 
and particularized. The liar registers his falsehood, it seems, in his 
very physiognomy, even down to the “eye” that is “malicious” all by 
itself. This Roland can tell from his interlocutor’s appearance; just as 
the lie of the liar’s sentence creeps into his “every word,” so the liar’s 
evil permeates his every part. The line break here, “with malicious eye 
/ Askance,” seems to draw us into looking sideways at the words, 
peering at the liar’s eye just as the liar peers at Roland. 
  But Roland seems to have complete access to the liar’s mental 
state, since he tells us that the liar’s “mouth” could barely suppress 
his “glee” at having deceived Roland. As the liar watches to see his lie 
go to work on Roland, so the liar labors to keep his mouth shut, a 
labor reflected in elaborate syntax of “scarce able to afford / 
Suppression” —a costly labor the liar can only barely “afford.” Thus 
Roland is not merely in the position of having full access to the world 
of appearances, not merely capable of grasping their truth or falsity in 
their very substance, but can see what is in the liar’s mind, can sense 
even the laugh the liar suppresses. Of course we are told how the liar’s 
mental state finds its way into his appearance: the glee itself seems to 
‘purse’ the liar’s mouth, as if from the inside, and it also ‘scores’ his 
mouth’s “edge,” marking it with lines from the outside. The act of 
“suppression” by itself prevents the glee from escaping, but the 
intimation of the glee still sneaks through the liar’s distorted mouth. 
And Roland knows so much about the glee that he can even discern 
that it is glee “at one more victim gained thereby.” 
  So the trajectory of the first stanza is from Roland’s “first 
thought,” to the world of perceptual appearances, in all their 142 
fickleness, to the world of essences behind those appearances, the 
liar’s malevolent “glee.” The poem thus moves very swiftly indeed from 
the sheer fact of thought to a knowledge of ‘things as in themselves 
they truly are,’ or, as Aristotle puts it in the Physics, things as they are 
“known by nature” (184a21). Despite Roland’s manifest isolation 
through most of the poem, it is not quite right to say that he’s 
alienated from his surroundings, that the object is opaque to him. But 
his ability to enter into the liar’s mind does seem to have its 
limitations: in the third stanza, Roland worries about what would 
happen “If at his counsel I should turn aside / Into that ominous tract 
which, all agree, / Hides the Dark Tower” (13-5). If “all agree” that this 
“ominous tract” is where the “Dark Tower” is, and if it is to this 
“ominous tract” that the liar has directed Roland, then the liar isn’t 
lying at all. Not only has he given Roland good directions, but Roland 
didn’t even need to ask for them since everyone seems to know where 
the Dark Tower is. We might be tempted to infer at this point that 
Roland is the one lying—lying to us—or that the “hoary cripple” is just 
in Roland’s head, or that Roland is just plain nuts. But each of these 
skeptical responses is finally unsatisfactory, since the text gives no 
hints to this effect and so becomes simply opaque as soon as we stop 
taking it seriously. Taking the poem seriously involves, among other 
things thinking through in more precise terms just what kind of 
epistemology it posits and how it performs that epistemology in its 
syntax. This epistemology is best understood in relation to the problem 
of the object and objectivity in Hegel’s attempts to overcome Kant’s 
restriction of our (theoretical) knowledge to appearances. 143 
  Kant begins his exposition in the Critique of Pure Reason by 
arguing that we should understand space and time as, roughly, 
features of our minds that make experience of objects possible rather 
than features of the world outside our minds that determine objects 
even when we don’t perceive them. One of the targets of this argument 
is empiricist philosophers such as Hume who hold that whatever 
concepts we use to classify the things we experience must be derived 
from our experiences rather than being in place before we ever have 
experiences. Given the way we usually go about learning things 
(particularly in school), this seems like a plausible supposition. But 
Kant points out that it is difficult to imagine from what experience we 
could derive, for example, the notion of space without presupposing 
space just in order to have that experience in the first place.  
For in order for certain sensations to be related to 
something outside me (i.e., to something in another place 
in space from that in which I find myself), thus in order for 
me to represent them as outside and next to one another, 
thus not merely as different but as in different places, the 
representation of space must already be their ground. 
(B38)83  
Any empirical input (intuition) we can receive, according to Kant, 
already presupposes space, without which there would be nothing for 
an object to appear in; space isn’t even a concept (a category we can 
place objects of experience under), but is an “a priori intuition,” a 
condition of perceiving an object before we have even had a chance to 
categorize it (B40).  It follows from the fact that space must be 
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presupposed in order to have an experience at all that it is a feature of 
our minds (since it is not derived from experience of the outside world), 
and it follows from the fact that space is a feature of our minds that it 
is not a feature of objects in themselves, i.e., independent of our 
perception of them. This conclusion is perhaps surprising since we 
tend to think of space as something objective, something out there in 
the world (Newton conceived it this way, and he was no fool), and the 
notion that space and time are just features of our minds almost 
makes it sound as though the world would somehow collapse if we 
weren’t here to perceive it. But Kant’s argument is not that all objects 
are just fictions of our fevered brains; he certainly thinks objects exist 
independently of our perception of them: “even if we cannot cognize 
these same objects as things in themselves, we at least must be able to 
think them as things in themselves. For otherwise there would follow 
the absurd proposition that there is an appearance without anything 
that appears” (Bxxvi). Kant argues that we cannot have knowledge of 
“things in themselves,” but this is nothing to lament since when we 
speak of “things in themselves” all we mean is things considered apart 
from their appearing to us—and if they don’t appear to us, they are no 
objects for us and so not things about which it makes sense for us to 
wish to know.84 
  The outcome of Kant’s restriction of our (theoretical) knowledge 
to appearances is a transformation in the project of epistemology: “the 
question is no longer about the community of the soul with other 
known but different substances outside us, but merely about the 
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conjunction of representations in inner sense with the modifications of 
our outer sensibility, and how these may be conjoined with one 
another according to constant laws, so that they are connected into 
one experience” (A385-6). We might broadly say that Descartes 
inaugurates the project of modern philosophy when he subjects the 
objective world to thoroughgoing doubt in the first Meditation. In doing 
so, he opens the door to a subsequent tradition that sees itself as 
having to overcome a dualism between thoughts and things in an 
attempt to rescue the possibility of our having true cognitions (where 
truth is understood in traditional terms as an adequation between 
thoughts and things). Kant’s solution to this problem is to locate the 
object (insofar as it appears) in the human mind, as the domain of 
receptivity. Kant thinks that there are things that exist independently 
of our perception of them, and he even supposes that there might be 
minds constructed differently than ours that could perceive such 
things (A27/B43), but in locating the domain of objects within the 
subject he heals the dualism that obstructs the possibility of truth.  
  For Hegel, this is both Kant’s greatest insight and, at the same 
time, manifests some of Kant’s most serious errors. The main defect of 
this approach is that, although our knowledge is restricted, the force 
of that restriction turns out to be empty because “its illusory being 
[Schein] ha[s] for content the entire wealth of the world” (SL 396). If 
everything that we would care to know is in appearance, then the 
thing in itself is reduced to nothing, and Kant’s philosophy ends up 
not being “critical” in the sense that Kant aims for it to be, where 
“critique” is the project of reminding consciousness ever and again of 146 
the limitations of its knowledge (A296-8/B353-5). The thing in itself is 
too empty for the restriction of our knowledge to have any force, but 
too full for us to be able to claim that our knowledge, limited to 
appearances, is true. Hegel is often said to be unfair to Kant in this 
regard (and others), or simply to have misunderstood Kant, or to have 
failed to read him carefully,85 and the legitimate element of this 
complaint is that the method of Hegel’s critique of Kant is, in one 
important respect, transcendent rather than immanent (that is, the 
premises of his argument against Kant aren’t derived entirely from 
Kant’s own framework, which is the philosophical procedure Hegel 
argues for at length in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit). The 
real ground of Hegel’s critique of Kant is that Hegel assumes an 
emphatic conception of truth, rather than the conception of truth as 
adequation that Kant adopts from the Scholastics and dogmatic 
metaphysics. The point of trying to rescue this emphatic conception of 
truth is that any less emphatic conception of truth isn’t a conception 
of truth at all but simply a call for consistency (something which, even 
when it does not suffer from the illusion that it is truth, Hegel still 
regards as spurious; see SL 439-43). In a sense, Hegel wants to restore 
Aristotle’s conception of truth as knowing the object as it is “by 
nature,” but within a dialectical framework. As Hegel puts it, “Only 
this self-restoring  sameness, or this reflection in otherness within 
itself—not an original or immediate unity as such—is the True. It is the 
process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its 
goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only by being worked 
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out to its end, is it actual” (PhS 10). In other words, the “nature” of the 
object is not something simply fixed and given, but is a result of an 
unfolding process at the end of which the object is “actual.” This 
language of actuality (Wirklichkeit) recalls Aristotle’s energeia, but 
Hegel’s conception of how actuality comes to be is quite different. The 
most important difference is that for Hegel the object is altered when it 
is grasped as knowledge. Rather than the object being a mere datum, 
indifferent to the subject’s attempts to know it, the object is, in a 
sense, latent knowing. In other words, if Kant is right that the subject 
has an element of objectivity in it (and this is what Hegel finds most 
appealing in Kant), then it must also be true, if it makes sense to talk 
about knowing the world at all, that the object similarly has something 
subjective in it. This is part of what Hegel has in mind when he claims 
that “everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only 
as  Substance,  but equally as Subject” (PhS 10). Appearance, as the 
subjective element of the object, is not merely something given but is 
something that becomes through the movement of thought in grasping 
the object. 
  If Kant’s innovation is to locate both sides of the dualism within 
the subject (with the noumenal world as a sort of remainder), Hegel’s 
innovation is to claim that if consciousness can think both appearance 
and essence then consciousness can think the relation between the 
two. And once consciousness can grasp the relation between thoughts 
and things within thought, then consciousness had already grasped 
the relation between itself and its objects. Consciousness just is that 
relation. 148 
For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of 
the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself; 
consciousness of what for it is the True, and 
consciousness of its knowledge of the truth. Since both 
are  for  the same consciousness, this consciousness is 
itself their comparison; it is for this same consciousness to 
know whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to 
the object or not. The object, it is true, seems only to be 
for consciousness in the way that consciousness knows it; 
it seems that consciousness cannot, as it were, get behind 
the object as it exists for consciousness so as to examine 
what the object is in itself, and hence, too, cannot test its 
own knowledge by that standard. But the distinction 
between the in-itself and knowledge is already present in 
the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. 
Something is for it the  in-itself; and knowledge, or the 
being of the object for consciousness, is, for it, another 
moment. Upon this distinction, which is present as a fact, 
the examination rests. If the comparison shows that these 
two moments do not correspond to one another, it would 
seem that consciousness must alter its knowledge to make 
it conform to the object. But, in fact, in the alteration of 
the knowledge, the object itself alters for it too, for the 
knowledge that was present was essentially a knowledge 
of the object: as the knowledge changes, so too does the 
object, for it essentially belonged to this knowledge. . . . 
the testing is not only a testing of what we know, but also 
a testing of the criterion of what knowing is. 
  Inasmuch as the new true object issues from it, this 
dialectical  movement which consciousness exercises on 
itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object, 
is precisely what is called experience [Erfahrung]. (PhS 54-
5) 
What really sets Hegel apart from Kant here is the idea that the 
criterion of knowledge could be subject to change, which is just to say 
that the structure of consciousness itself could be subject to change. 
Since appearance must be closely linked with what appears, this 
transformation also ends up affecting the object. This peculiarity of 
Hegel’s follows from his emphatic conception of truth: if true 
knowledge is knowledge of the object as it is “by nature,” if the true 149 
nature of the object is its actuality, and if that actuality just is its 
realization as an object of knowledge, then appearance isn’t the 
opposite of essence—appearance is the fulfillment and realization of 
essence. This approach reverses the traditional evaluation in modern 
philosophy (to some extent derived from Plato) that appearance, being 
mutable, is mere shadowy seeming, whereas essence is the firm 
bedrock of truth. For Hegel, essence is almost in the position of 
Aristotle’s conception of matter as mere potentiality (dynamis); essence 
that fails to appear would equally fail to be actual, and so would fail to 
have that comportment to knowledge by which it could become true. 
  Appearance, as essence rendered actual under the gaze of the 
knowing subject, is on the side of form. This converges very nicely with 
the early resonances of the Greek word for form, eidos, which is 
derived from *eido, ‘to see’ (cf. L. species from specio). In both cases, 
perceptible form is linked to the reality of the object: form is that 
which makes the object what it is (rather than remaining mere 
unformed matter), and it is also the mode in which the object appears 
to consciousness. This is why Roland’s knowledge of the “hoary 
cripple” is so visual: Roland is able to discover his inner state on the 
basis of his appearance. Essence breaks through into appearance just 
as the malicious “glee” of the “hoary cripple” breaks through his 
attempts to suppress it. In Childe Roland, all that is, appears. But the 
structure of appearance in Hegel, in which the subject’s objectivity 
allows it access to the inner truth of the object, opens up a dangerous 
possibility that Childe  Roland  exploits. If the subject can, in gazing 
upon the object, come to know its essence because it is realized, 150 
through being gazed upon, as appearance, and if this trick only works 
because the objectivity of the subject is reciprocally answered by the 
subjectivity of the object—if, in other words, substance is subject—
then this invests the object with the power to gaze back. Childe Roland 
thus begins not just with a moment of insight on Roland’s part as he 
stares at the “hoary cripple,” but also with an obsession with his 
returning gaze, the “malicious eye / Askance to watch the working of 
his lie / On mine” (3-5). Here eye gazes back upon eye, and expects it 
to be revealing since to reveal “the working of his lie” is presumably to 
reveal Roland’s mental state. Roland’s eye, appearing in the elliptical 
“mine,” is here no longer the syntactic subject of the gaze (as in the 
first words of the poem) but has become part of its syntactic object.86 
What is terrifying in Childe Roland is that the poem is not simply a 
nightmare, a series of merely subjective illusions. On the contrary, 
what is terrifying is the very autonomy of the objective world, an 
autonomy here invested not in the submissive objects of natural 
science but a “starved ignoble nature” that responds to Roland’s 
presence with savage vehemence (55). It is for this reason that so 
many features of the landscape appear to Roland so suddenly, 
suggesting the receptivity rather than the spontaneity of 
consciousness: just after he turns off the road into the plain he looks 
back towards the road to find “‘t was gone; grey plain all round: / 
Nothing but plain to the horizon’s bound,” the river he comes to in the 
middle of the poem appears “As unexpected as a serpent comes,” and 
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the Dark Tower itself comes upon him “Burningly . . . all at once” (52-
3, 110, 175).  
  But the objective world in Childe Roland, despite its autonomy, 
is also, in proper dialectical fashion, bound up with Roland’s 
consciousness. Its manifestation is tied to his experience, and the 
horrors of the landscape appear as if in response to his own 
imaginings, as when he speculates about the battered foliage in stanza 
twelve: 
If there pushed any ragged thistle-stalk 
   Above its mates, the head was chopped; the bents 
   Were jealous else. What made those holes and rents 
In the dock’s harsh swarth leaves, bruised as to baulk 
All hope of greenness? ’tis a brute must walk 
   Pashing their life out, with a brute’s intents. (67-72) 
Stanza twelve opens with a strange drama among the field greens: 
“any ragged thistle-stalk” that gets a bit too uppity “was chopped” in 
order to appease the “bents”—and “bents” here refers to a kind of 
weedy grass but also suggests broken stalks that spitefully insist on 
dragging the saucy thistle into their own condition. The passive voice 
of “was chopped” gives us no indication of who exactly does the 
chopping (presumably chopping is beyond the bents). The following 
sentence proceeds to ask just this question in connection with the torn 
dock leaves that are “bruised as to baulk / All hope of greenness.” 
Oddly, the dock leaves seem to be themselves doing the baulking, 
which suggests that they are somehow collaborating in their own 
brutalization. Nevertheless, the main culprit is finally identified as 
some kind of “brute,” who “must walk / Pashing” the “life out” of the 
innocent greenery, and “with a brute’s intents.” Before Roland has 152 
even seen the brute he already is sure of the brute’s intentions, if only 
in the somewhat tautological sense that its intentions must be brutish. 
  The next stanza, instead of immediately introducing the brute, 
returns us to the drama of the grass, anthropomorphizing it yet 
further as analogous (though not identical) to the hairs of a leper, and 
introducing through another passive construction an agent who 
kneads up the mud “with blood.” The use of this passive construction 
projects a grammatical subject as Roland’s object of inquiry, but a 
subject who is obscured, for the moment, by the syntax of the 
sentence. Then the agent of all of this malevolence, the brute who 
Roland is offhandedly stalking, suddenly appears as a grammatical 
subject: “One stiff blind horse, his every bone a-stare, / Stood 
stupified” (76-7). This seems like a strange candidate for the terrible 
brute Roland had in mind; on the contrary, the horse “Stood stupified, 
however he came there” as if he himself isn’t sure how he ended up on 
Roland’s path. By the next stanza, Roland is not even sure if the horse 
is alive: “he might be dead for aught I know.” He tells us that the 
horse’s neck is “a-strain,” but since the horse otherwise seems 
immobile it’s not clear just what the horse’s neck is straining at—it 
might just be straining to stay vertical. 
  In a sense, the objective world is very responsive to Roland here: 
he imagines a brute to fit the bruised dock leaves, and some kind of 
brute appears. This is more than happens when most of us imagine 
something. But the objective reality that appears in response to 
Roland’s imagination is not quite what he seems to have expected: not 
a brutish monster whom he could vanquish, thereby doing the dock 153 
leaves a good turn, but a sluggish, ancient and unhappy horse whose 
very vulnerability seems to inspire Roland’s disgust. “Seldom went 
such grotesqueness with such woe; / I never saw a brute I hated so; / 
He must be wicked to deserve such pain” (82-4). Roland’s ability to 
enter into the interiority of his objects here, to construe his objects as 
grammatical subjects, only reveals that the horse emphatically suffers, 
“such woe” and “such pain,” and fails to provide Roland with some 
intelligible rationale for the suffering. His rather startling reaction, 
venomous and unqualified repugnance, seems to reflect merely the 
gap between his mental state and its objects. He expects a brute, and 
since he finds nothing but mute suffering in the horse, he appeals to 
distributive justice to provide an objective framework to render his 
experience intelligible: the horse “must be wicked to deserve such 
pain.” 
  But this solution must be entirely unsatisfactory for Roland, 
given that he  immediately turns inward: “I shut my eyes and turned 
them on my heart” (85). This, of course, doesn’t get him anywhere 
either, but it is striking as the one moment in which we get something 
that really is all in Roland’s head, and in this line he correspondingly 
becomes his own syntactic object: his gaze is directed at his own 
“heart.” What he discovers, perhaps unsurpisingly, is that the horrors 
are in his head as well, and the “draught of earlier, happier sights” is 
wormwood on his tongue (87). When he opens his eyes, the horse is 
gone and the gloom is growing. Other things appear abruptly appear in 
his path, coming alive under his gaze: a “sudden little river” with its 
“suicidal throng” of willows, a patch of trampled ground in which 154 
Roland sees signs of a struggle but which has neither tracks out nor 
tracks in, an evil looking machine “fit to reel / Men’s bodies out like 
silk” that seems “to sharpen its rusty teeth of steel,” a “palsied oak” 
with “a cleft in him / Like a distorted mouth that splits its rim / 
Gaping at death, and dies while it recoils” (109, 118, 129-138, 141-2, 
145, 154-6). As the world of objects seems to follow its increasingly 
autonomous course, responding to Roland not with mimic hootings 
but with twisted, mocking echoes, Roland’s despair deepens yet 
further. 
  Then finally, in stanza thirty-one, “What lay in the midst but the 
Tower itself?” (181). As soon as Roland sees the tower, he wonders 
aloud whether he’s actually seeing it: “Not see? because of night 
perhaps?—why, day / Came back again for that!” (187-8). Roland 
doesn’t even appear as the grammatical subject of the elliptical “Not 
see?”, but the objective world is very responsive indeed, the light 
‘coming back’ in order to allow Roland to see. And again the objects 
spring to life: “The hills, like giants at a hunting, lay, / Chin upon 
hand, to see the game at bay,— / ‘Now stab and end the creature—to 
the heft!’” (190-2). Here the objective world seems to actually respond 
to Roland, to note his presence, and he himself is the mere “creature” 
that some other entity regards with loathing. And the giant hills, 
presumably addressing one another, speak in an imperative, 
introducing an implied second person grammatical subject. 
  The next stanza opens in the same syntactic form as the last, 
except this time the rhetorical question doesn’t seem to respond to our 
implicit question; we might have wondered whether he could see, given 155 
that night was coming on, but we would have no reason to suppose 
that he has gone deaf. And the announcement that he can hear is not 
even phrased as a fact about Roland: “Not hear? when noise was 
everywhere! it tolled / Increasing like a bell” (193-4). Since Roland 
knows that the noise is everywhere, we know that he can hear, but the 
point of the statement seems rather to be that everyone can hear it, 
that the experience is not merely his own but some kind of collective 
experience. And ringing out of the falling night comes a sort of epic 
catalogue: “Names in my ears / Of all the lost adventurers my peers,— 
/ How such a one was strong, and such was bold, / And such was 
fortunate” (194-7). This perhaps is the collectivity that the 
“everywhere” of the first line implied, “the Band” among whom Roland 
says early in the poem that he has “been writ” (38-9). Unlike his 
introspective attempt after seeing and loathing the horse to recall his 
fellow knights and take some solace from the thought, each adventurer 
here, though unnamed for us, receives a noble epithet. But this is a 
strange cohort, since all of them are long gone: “each of old / Lost, 
lost! one moment knelled the woe of years” (197-8).  The knell is the 
work of the “moment” itself, as if Time itself were ringing its changes 
down on Roland’s mortal clay. 
  Which brings us to the poem’s enigmatic final stanza: 
There they stood, ranged along the hills-sides, met 
   To view the last of me, a living frame 
   For one more picture! in a sheet of flame 
I saw them and I knew them all. And yet 
Dauntless the slug-horn to my lips I set, 
   And blew. ‘Childe Roland to the Dark Tower came.’  
(199-204) 156 
The valley is now thronged with ghosts, assembled to “view the last of” 
Roland. We might take this to mean that they have assembled to see 
Roland’s death, but nothing in the last stanza seems particularly to 
suggest that he dies. So it seems more plausible to take this to mean 
that they have assembled to see the remainder of him, what remains 
after the trials of his long journey. And what remains is very little 
indeed, “a living frame.” Roland is not dead, but he is only the frame in 
which the pictures are exhibited, not the pictures themselves. And 
perhaps this is why the poem begins with Roland’s “first thought” and 
not with Roland himself, because he is only the “living frame” within 
which the thought transpires. And now he is to present “one more 
picture,” a picture that has been preceded by many (hence “one more”) 
and that is to be the last (hence “one more”). 
  But by the next line, it is Roland who is doing the seeing, gazing 
upon the ghosts with a gaze that seems also to confer knowledge of 
them, placing him among them as among familiar things. It’s not clear 
whether the phrase “in a sheet of flame” modifies Roland or the ghosts 
or the act of seeing itself—it may even be the picture to fill Roland’s 
picture-frame. Like Dante passing through the fire on the far side of 
Purgatory (Pur. XXVII.49ff.), Roland emerges from the “sheet of flame” 
decisive in action. His decisiveness, however, takes the form of 
defiance,87 introduced by “And yet” rather than “And so”: “And yet / 
Dauntless the slug-horn to my lips I set, / And blew. ‘Childe Roland to 
the Dark Tower came.’” This defiance perhaps echoes the sounding of 
the horn of Roland’s namesake, a call for aid that came too late to save 
                                       
87 Cf. Langbaum 195ff. 157 
that other Roland’s armies. But here the armies are already long lost, 
and all Roland has to save is himself. 
  It’s far from clear just how he does so. Does his slug-horn speak 
in slogans, singing out the title of the poem? Or does a banner unfold 
from the end of Roland’s trumpet like a joke-shop pistol? This final 
abrupt appearance reads almost like an entry in the Anglo-Saxon 
Chronicle: ‘Here, in this year, Childe Roland to the Dark Tower came.’ 
The event of Roland’s arrival is inscribed, as it were, in the historical 
record; he is not only writ among “the Band” but emerges as the first 
among them. The Dark Tower, that opaque and distant object par 
excellence, is now in Roland’s ken, and its essence is the sheer fact of 
Roland’s arrival, a fact that returns us to the title page and reveals the 
poem in its entirety as the reality of objectivity, that Roland was an 
object all along. But he was not simply an object of nature. Even at the 
first, in the “all agree” by which we knew the liar to be telling the 
truth, an element of objectivity was there in the form of 
intersubjectivity. At the end of the poem, intersubjectivity fully unfolds 
as a pantheon of ghosts, or, to borrow Chesterton’s phrase, a 
“democracy of the dead.” But this is not the materialist collectivity of 
our 20th Century mass movements. Subject and object are reconciled 
only because a third term appears and emerges through their 
reconciliation, the tolling voices from beyond the grave, a divine 
collectivity. This calling from beyond the grave provides no answers 
and reveals no providential design: it merely looks on. But in looking 
back we see ourselves for what we are: things in a realm of things and 158 
also shades in a realm of shades. To truly dwell in Nature we must 
also dwell among the Dead. 159 
Chapter 5 
Art & Nature: My Last Duchess 
 
  ‘Verse,’ from the Latin versus, meaning ‘turn,’ originally referred 
to the turn of a plow at the end of a furrow; following the route by 
which agriculture becomes culture, it subsequently came to refer both 
to poetry in general and to the poetic line in particular. The analogy 
between plowing a field and writing a poem makes poetry seem natural 
and orderly, a characterization that enjambment in particular, that 
delirious turn against syntax, should render suspect. This etymology 
does underline, however, the way in which the status of the line is 
deeply moored to the category of poetry; simply put, poetry is language 
lineated, language which turns. Hence it is no surprise that 
enjambments in particular poems have often been subjected to critical 
scrutiny. Enjambment as such, however, has rarely been considered 
in detail, and discussion of the poetic line has suffered even greater 
neglect. Perhaps most importantly, neither discussions of enjambment 
nor of the line have taken up current work on syntax in linguistics. 
But the relationship between syntax and the line is the heart of the 
matter; the interference between these two grids is the structural 
ground of what Adorno calls the ‘enigma-character’ of poetry.88 
  The most illuminating rumination on the properties of 
                                       
88 For an extended discussion of the ‘enigma-character’ (Rätselcharakter) of artworks 
in general, see Adorno, AT, 120-131. The German word Rätsel can be translated 
either as ‘riddle’ or as ‘enigma,’ and both of these senses are at issue in Adorno’s use 
of the term: the artwork is a riddle in the sense that it demands an interpretation 
and effectively promises that there is in fact a determinate answer, but it is an 
enigma in the sense that it eludes all attempts to pin the answer down. 160 
enjambment is probably still John Hollander’s discussion of Milton’s 
line breaks in Vision & Resonance (91-116).89 A typical example of the 
kinds of effects Hollander brings out is his discussion of the opening 
lines of Paradise Lost: 
    Of Man’s first Disobedience, and the Fruit 
    Of that Forbidden Tree, whose mortal taste […]   
(I.1-2) 
As Hollander observes, the “stasis” of the symmetrical distribution of 
monosyllables and polysyllables in the first line 
is immediately disturbed by the brilliant line-ending. 
“Fruit” might well have led to something like “Thereof” in 
the following line, thus being taken in the figurative sense 
of “results”; actually, the line which follows thrusts us into 
the primary, literal sense of that fruit of that tree. 
“Disobedience” has the importance of staged centrality, 
“Fruit” the urgency of a terminal place which reveals both 
its own positional ambiguity and that of the word 
occupying it. These two impulses—the one toward 
systematic, static pattern, the other toward periodic flux 
and articulated paragraphing—are the warp and weft of 
the verse fabric of Paradise Lost. (94) 
Considering Adam’s conclusion after repenting of having eaten the 
fruit “that to obey is best” (XII.561, my emph.), this subtle ambiguity 
goes to the heart of Milton’s project in Paradise Lost; as Hollander puts 
it, “the intricately related demands of local meaning and larger vision 
are being served by the many ways in which Milton’s line endings 
variously fetter and spur the exuberance of syntactic production” (94). 
Effects such as these are achieved, not through enjambment alone, 
but through its relation to syntax, and, by way of this relation, to the 
                                       
89 For a brief survey of discussions of the line, including appropriate laments about 
the sparseness of the field, see Johnson, “Applying the Breaks.” For some 
suggestive—if sometimes merely suggestive—theoretical reflections on the line, see 
Agamben, The End of the Poem, 23-42 and 109-15. For an extremely useful 
annotated bibliography of significant books and articles on poetic syntax and 
grammar through 1980, see Brogan. 161 
larger conceptual burden of the poem. 
  Syntax itself provides many examples of analogous effects, for 
example in ‘garden-path’ sentences like The horse raced past the barn 
fell. This sentence produces momentary confusion because the 
cognitive apparatus that parses the sentence has taken raced to be the 
main verb of the sentence, only to discover that fell is thereby left out 
in the cold; the parser thus has to reconstruct the sentence such that 
raced past the barn is a reduced relative clause (meaning effectively 
‘the horse that was raced past the barn’). The analogy between these 
garden-path sentences and effects like that in the first line of Paradise 
Lost can, however, break down. If one eliminates the line break from 
Milton’s opening gambit, the effect Hollander points to disappears: Of 
man’s first disobedience and the fruit of that forbidden tree; whereas 
introducing a line break into the garden-path sentence only amplifies 
the original effect:90 
    The horse raced past the barn 
    Fell in the muddy trench. 
  The ‘momentary ambiguity’ produced by the opening of Paradise 
Lost is therefore not only a phenomenon of syntax, but depends upon 
the line break; the line break in some sense functions as if it were a 
syntactic boundary. When the line break arrives, the parser attempts 
to make sense of the line as a unit, producing an expectation which 
the continuation of the sentence on the following line denies. This 
phenomenon is also, however, distinct from structural ambiguity, as in 
                                       
90 One might argue that the line break opens the possibility of reading the second 
line as a conjoined clause, i.e., The horse raced past the barn and fell in the muddy 
trench. But, whatever other effects it might produce, the lineation does not eliminate 
the possibility of the garden-path effect at issue here. 162 
Flying planes can be dangerous, which can mean either that it is 
dangerous for one to fly planes or that one should be on the lookout 
for flying planes. In any normal communicative context this ambiguity 
will go unnoticed and will be assigned only the relevant structural 
description by both speaker and hearer. Such ambiguities are 
therefore only relevant after the fact or out of context; one has to be 
looking for the ambiguity to find it. But, since works of literature are 
not communicative,91 the effect of enjambment that Hollander is 
pointing to, like the effect of a garden-path sentence, comes into being 
in the context of reading itself—though a reader may not be 
consciously aware of it. 
  Typically, accounts of enjambment propose (or tacitly assume) 
one of two theories about how it works cognitively: either what we 
might call the ‘insertion’ theory or the ‘interruption’ theory. The 
insertion theory claims that a line break that divides a syntactic unit 
will be ‘filled in’ by the reader with some sort of hypothetical 
completion, as if the reader were to write in an ending in the blank 
space at the end of the line. A strong version of this theory quickly 
proves itself implausible. In the Paradise Lost example above, 
Hollander basically assumes the insertion theory: the reader will get to 
the end of the line, expect some completion of the phrase, and 
therefore will mentally insert a plausible completion like “Thereof.” But 
if the reader really wanted to know how the line finished, why would 
he spend time inventing a completion when he can simply read the 
following line? As a rule, linguistic processes do not perform more 
                                       
91 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this point. See also, Appendix A. 163 
work than they have to, and there is no obvious reason to imagine that 
the reader in this case would abruptly shift from reading to writing.92 
While a line ending without a syntactically complete phrase will 
certainly arouse particular expectations, it makes little sense to 
imagine that the reader actually generates a specific completion in the 
midst of reading. And if the reader could go straight to the next line 
without inserting a completion, it is unclear under this theory how she 
could experience the effect Hollander is describing. 
  The interruption theory, on the other hand, assumes that when 
the reader reaches the end of the line the processing of the sentence 
will come to a standstill, if only briefly. Christopher Ricks, citing an 
observation of Leavis’s, makes such a claim about these lines from 
Keats’ To Autumn: 
    And sometimes like a gleaner thou dost keep 
        Steady thy laden head across a brook  (19-20) 
Leavis comments that “as we pass across the line-division from ‘keep’ 
to ‘steady’ we are made to enact, analogically, the upright steadying 
carriage of the gleaner as she steps from one stone to the next,” and 
Ricks continues: “The perfect steadiness of rhythm matches the simple 
steady movement of the syntax; the sense that such steadiness has to 
be achieved, that it is laden and not just casual, is enforced by the 
                                       
92 The parser does seem to construct hypothetical structural descriptions for the 
completions of phrases during processing, but these merely mark out categories 
necessitated by the selectional features of individual lexical items, not specific 
contents (see Adger 77-96). In other words, if a line break left the incomplete phrase 
John hopes that, the parser will hypothetically construct a structure for what follows, 
in this cases some complete clause (i.e., a TP). It will not hypothetically specify a 
particular clause like John hopes that  / Sally likes Swiss cheese. The one exception 
is certain kinds of collocations (like breaking up an idiom), for which see Dillon, 
Language Processing and the Reading of Literature. The pragmatic aspects of 
linguistic processing that Dillon is interested in do not bear directly on the concerns 
of this essay (see the note after next below). 164 
line-ending, across which—it stands for the unseen brook which we 
are  not looking down at—the steady movement must be made” 
(“William Wordsworth 1” 90).93 Despite Ricks’ own skillful use of 
parenthesis to reproduce the identification of the brook with the line 
break, the interruption theory which this assumes also cannot be 
maintained in a strong form because line breaks do not actually 
substantially impede linguistic processing.94 If the line break really 
arrested the parsing of the sentence so dramatically we would expect 
that it would obstruct such phenomena as antecedent government, 
movement, control or c-command (all of which are relations between 
words that hold by virtue of syntactic structure), but the intervention 
of a carriage return seems to have no more effect on processing an 
enjambed sentence in a poem than it would in prose. The line break 
clearly has some sort of effect, but it does not interrupt processing in 
any strong sense. 
  Both theories, then, are only plausible in a very weak form 
(which is presumably the form in which Hollander and Ricks assume 
them): they cannot claim to describe precisely what is happening but 
can only serve as heuristic markers that some unknown phenomenon 
                                       
93 The implicit mimetic claim that Ricks is making here is not convincing (any more 
than any other claim which demands that some ontologically extant ‘reality’ 
intervene between the poem and its interpretation as the poem’s ‘content’), but it is 
also not necessary to his argument about Wordsworth’s enjambments, which is full 
of illuminating observations. 
94 There may well be empirical instances in which line breaks produce some small 
impedence (marginally slower processing time, for example), but it’s unlikely that 
there will substantive regularities of this kind since the effects are entirely dependent 
on pragmatics and are thus going to be affected by a wide array of extra-textual 
factors. This is an empirical question, but, since it is limited to the pragmatics of 
reading, would tell us more about the reader than about the poem, and hence may 
not be a relevant empirical question for my purposes.  165 
=x is making interesting meanings. For this reason, we should search 
for a theory that could hold in a strong sense. One clue is that both 
the insertion theory and the interruption theory are explicitly theories 
of enjambment, and therefore have nothing to say about an end-
stopped line, which they regard as the dull unmarked instance. But we 
can see a similar effect to those above in this typical couplet from 
Pope’s Essay on Man, in which the line break can hardly be considered 
prominently enjambed: 
    Virtuous and vicious ev’ry Man must be, 
    Few in th’extreme, but all in the degree.  (II.231-2) 
Having read only the first line, the reader is bound to think that the 
speaker is urging a flatly impossible proposition: that virtue and vice, 
presumably mutually exclusive states of the spirit, not only can 
cohabit but in fact do cohabit in every human being alive. The paradox 
is ameliorated in the following line, but the sense of an absurd 
incongruity (not to mention a whisper of the impossibility of virtue) 
still clings to our understanding of humanity. This very typical 
example of Pope’s wit relies heavily on the line break, without which 
we would have no reason to imagine the first clause to be a complete 
thought, and the effect is similar to the telescoping of Milton’s “Fruit” 
from the abstract and metaphorical to the concrete and literal. 
Approaching the problem in terms of enjambment, then, already 
construes the issue too narrowly; what is really at issue in these 
phenomena is the line itself. 
  The effect in the Pope couplet, unlike in Milton’s blank verse, 
also seems to rely on rhyme. As W.K. Wimsatt has observed, rhymes 
“impose upon the logical pattern of expressed argument a kind of 166 
fixative counterpattern of alogical implication” in which “the greater 
the difference in meaning between rhyme words the more marked and 
the more appropriate will be the binding effect” (153, 164). What 
rhyme accomplishes in Pope (as opposed to Chaucer, on Wimsatt’s 
account) is to bind together unlike things so that, however implausible 
the equation may be, the rhyme gives it the ring of necessity. The 
function of rhyme thus seems to be similar to that of line breaks in the 
sense that both create a tension between syntactic structure and some 
other kind of structure. As Wimsatt suggests, the structure which 
rhyme counterposes to syntax, and the means by which the rhyme 
bears on meaning, is the line itself: “It may be said, broadly, that 
difference in meaning of rhyme words can be recognized in difference 
of parts of speech and in difference in functions of the same part of 
speech, and that both of these differences will be qualified by the 
degree of parallel or obliquity appearing between the two whole lines of 
a rhyming pair” (157). This should be no surprise, since end-rhyme, 
for someone listening to an oral performance of a rhymed poem, 
establishes the line breaks. Other forms of phonetic patterning, e.g., 
alliteration in strong stress verse, also can serve the same function, 
and the same goes for meter or, especially in free verse, typography. 
Part of the effect of rhyme, then, is mediated by the line, and is 
meaningful only due to the relation between the line and the syntax. 
Of course rhyme, and phonetic patterning more generally, can simply 
associate two or more words, as well as marking the line; but, if such 
associations are meaningful, this will be because the words thus 
associated already bear meaning due to their syntactic context and 167 
function. Either way, syntax is the bridge between rhyme and 
meaning, and the bridge between rhyme and syntax is either the 
association of individual words or the line. 
  Since poems are made of language, and language is a mental 
property, some aspects of the cognitive processes involved in reading 
will bear directly on how we understand poetic structure. The two 
functions of rhyme mentioned above, associating individual words or 
marking the line, differ based upon where they arise in cognition. If, as 
mentioned above, the effects of line breaks arise at the level of 
processing95 (like the effects of garden-path sentences), then rhyme 
must also stake out the line at the level of processing; likewise, the 
association of individual words will only have semantic effects to the 
extent that the words already have meanings determined by the 
syntax, and as such association (like structural ambiguity) must 
operate at the level of reflection. By ‘processing,’ I mean the activities of 
the ‘language faculty’ as it is understood in current linguistic theory, 
i.e., as a discrete system of the mind/brain, largely isolated from other 
systems except for the two it directly interfaces with: the ‘articulatory-
perceptual system’ (which turns a sentence into sounds, or gestures in 
the case of sign language) and the ‘conceptual-intentional system’ 
(which takes the basic meaning assigned to a sentence by the 
language faculty and construes its significance in terms of context, 
beliefs and expectations about the world, &c., and puts it to use in 
                                       
95 I am not using this term in a technical sense derived from the linguistics 
literature, though the sense in which I am using it resembles Fodor’s “input systems” 
in The Modularity of Mind. 168 
various ways—one such way being literary interpretation).96 
‘Reflection,’ then, is associated with the ‘conceptual-intentional 
system,’ about which we know virtually nothing of substance except 
that it is distinct from the language faculty. One indicator of this 
distinction is the difference between tacit and explicit knowledge. Every 
native speaker of (Modern Standard) English knows that you can say 
Who did Sally go to the theatre with? but not *Who did Sally go to the 
theatre and?, or that you can say He sneezed but not *Himself 
sneezed; but a native speaker does not know this in the sense of 
consciously employing an explicit rule. Few of us know explicitly what 
the mechanics of breathing or digesting a crumbly muffin are, but 
thankfully we know tacitly how to do these things. Knowledge of 
language is, in this sense, tacit knowledge.97 
                                       
96 A fairly detailed and accessible (if slightly dated) outline of the fundamental nature 
and organization of the language faculty can be found in Chomsky, Knowledge of 
Language, 1-50. More recent work typically assumes the model outlined in Chomsky 
1995. The best current introductory textbook in the field is Adger. In the absence of 
a more fully elaborated account of processing, it is difficult to say how line breaks 
might fit into the picture. If my hypothesis is correct that line breaks are registered 
at the level of processing, it seems plausible that, since they assume linear order, 
line breaks are marked at PF (Phonological Form, the representation at the 
articulatory-perceptual interface); in order for them to affect the meaning of a 
sentence, they must also be registered at LF (Logical Form, the representation at the 
conceptual-intentional interface), though clearly they would arrive there as benign 
stowaways on the derivation. A fully elaborated account would thus also require a 
clear understanding of the relationship between phonological phrase structure and 
syntax (among other things, phonological phrase structure seems to be a crucial 
determinant of the level of markedness, or ‘strength,’ of an enjambment). If this 
hypothesis turns out to be even partially accurate, it would mean that processing 
lineated language is a fundamental feature of the genetic endowment of the species, 
that poetry, in other words, is a fundamental feature of what it means to be human. 
The widespread appearance of rhymed or otherwise lineated language use among 
children in different cultures may be at least an anecdotal hint that this is the case. 
97 This analogy is not entirely facetious: according to Chomsky, both the language 
faculty and the digestive system are possible objects of ‘naturalistic’ inquiry. The idea 
that they are qualitatively different objects of inquiry is, in Chomsky’s view, 
grounded in a spurious distinction between ‘mind’ and ‘body’ that is bound to a 
definition of ‘body’ based on the mechanistic physics that Newton effectively 
demolished. Without a meaningful definition of a ‘body,’ we are not in a position even 169 
  By ‘processing,’ then, I mean essentially syntax, the theory of 
mental representations in the language faculty (which includes aspects 
of both ‘form’ and ‘meaning,’ under current theory); ‘reflection’ falls 
under the category of pragmatics, the theory of language use 
(Chomsky, New Horizons, 26). To clarify the distinction, consider the 
sentence John expects to like him.98 If we hear this sentence, we take 
John and him to refer to different people. But if it is embedded in 
Guess who John expects to like him, then him could refer either to John 
or to someone else. All native speakers tacitly know this difference 
between the two cases (though they would not be able to provide an 
explanation of it unless they happened to be linguists) because it is a 
matter of syntax, which is just to say that it is a result of the 
interaction of fixed principles and parameters of the language faculty 
with properties of these lexical items. The resolution of the ambiguity 
between the two interpretations of him in the second example (as 
referring either to John or to someone else) will be accomplished by 
context (and in most contexts it will be quite clear, e.g., one might be 
talking about how self-conscious John is or one might be speculating 
about John’s assessment of Ted), and will thus be a matter of 
pragmatics. At present, we do not know much about pragmatics, apart 
from the fact that we will need to have syntax fairly well nailed down 
before we will be able even to formulate the right questions (and it is 
possible that pragmatics could turn out to be simply impossible to 
                                                                                                              
to specify what the ‘mind/body problem’ is. For further discussion, see Chomsky, 
New Horizons, 108ff. 
98 This example and most of the discussion of it is adapted from Chomsky, New 
Horizons, 142. 170 
study through a ‘naturalistic’ mode of inquiry, in the sense that 
Chomsky uses the term). 
  Considerations of this kind arise in relation to the poetic line 
because the sorts of effects that Hollander, for example, discusses are 
phenomena not of the poem as an inert object but as an event in the 
mind of a reader. Moreover, since the goal is interpretation, we must 
distinguish mental events at the level of processing from those at the 
level of reflection because the former will arise in every instance of 
reading, performing, or hearing a poem, whereas the latter may arise 
in many instances but also may not. Our object of inquiry is, first and 
foremost, whatever is the case in every instance of reading; this is 
what we mean by referring to ‘the poem’ as something separate from 
its physical instantiations in particular books or performances.99 Only 
properties which are, in that sense, necessarily linked to the poem as 
such can have a necessary link to interpretation; other properties are 
neither uninteresting nor finally eliminable, but are nevertheless 
secondary and can be analytically separated out at the level of theory 
(though not, perhaps, at the level of critical practice).100 Only 
properties of the poem which are events at the level of processing have 
a necessary connection to interpretation; events at the level of 
                                       
99 For a discussion with many useful arguments but, in my view, an erroneous 
conclusion, see Wellek and Warren, 142-157. The correct conclusion is, as Adorno 
puts it, that “in the artwork the subject is neither the observer nor the creator nor 
absolute spirit, but rather spirit bound up with, preformed and mediated by the 
object” (AT 166). 
100 This claim must be carefully distinguished from the claim that literature is simply 
reducible to universal properties of the human mind, or that literary criticism is 
simply reducible to linguistics; to the extent that criticism and linguistics are in 
tension, that tension is necessary and productive. The liquidation of the universal 
and constant is just as dangerous as the liquidation of the particular and ephemeral. 171 
reflection have only a contingent connection to interpretation.  
  The phenomena we are concerned with here can thus be 
separated into two groups based upon whether they are phenomena of 
processing or of reflection. The phenomena of reflection are: (1) 
structural ambiguity,101 (2) rhyme (insofar as it simply associates two 
words), (3) meter (insofar as it produces metrical tension), and (4) 
typography (in shape poems and the like). The phenomena of 
processing are (1) syntactic constructions that produce parsing 
problems (e.g., garden-path sentences or center-embedded 
constructions like The child whom the spider whose web broke startled 
screamed102), (2) rhyme (insofar as it stakes out the line), (3) meter 
(insofar as it stakes out the line), and (4) typography (insofar as it 
stakes out the line, e.g., in vers libre). All of the phenomena of 
processing, in other words, either stake out the line or have to do with 
parsing the syntax. And, as we discovered above, the line itself only 
bears on interpretation through its relation to syntax. The question of 
the line is thus not merely what is really at issue in discussions of 
enjambment, but is at the heart of the nature of the experience of 
poetry and of poetry as such. 
The question of the line poses the problem of poetic form at its 
most acute. Syntax itself is not merely a matter of form (not, say, 
                                       
101 The processing of structurally ambiguous phrases does seem to involve producing 
both of the possible structural descriptions, but at some point one of the alternatives 
is thrown out and the relevant structural description selected. This all happens 
below the level of reflection; the product of processing is a single structural 
description, and this is all reflection has to go on unless the reader consciously 
examines the text looking for an ambiguity. Hence ambiguity exists at the level of 
processing, but it also ceases to exist at the level of processing and therefore cannot 
bear on interpretation unless consciously invoked through reflection. 
102 This example is adapted from Austin (39). 172 
merely a matter of the sequence of words), but turns out to be 
immanently contentive; syntax marks the necessary intertwinement of 
form and content.103 The line, by comparison, seems like a purely 
formal aspect of poetic structure; among other things, there are no a 
priori restrictions on what elements can make up a line.104 But this 
arbitrariness of the line, its sheer formal blankness, can, as we have 
seen, nevertheless have effects on meaning by virtue of its extrusion of 
syntax. Such effects cannot be produced by syntax alone, and the line 
simply cannot exist without syntax; the two are irretrievably bound up 
with one another. As the Paradise Lost example shows, the line can 
create effects that seem, in principle, to exceed its capacities; it can 
produce the semblance of being more than it is. This mere particular 
appearance which points beyond itself partakes of the fundamental 
structure which Aristotle imputed to poetry in the Poetics: poetry is a 
form of thinking—cognition of the universal—mediated by the 
particular (1451b). But a line does not have just the particularity of a 
concrete instance; it has the particularity of what is blank, apparently 
nugatory, what cannot be grasped by the Concept. Even at the level of 
form, the exigency of the line is a challenge to thought, which must 
                                       
103 Current syntactic theory includes much of what was hitherto regarded as the 
domain of semantics (see chapter 2).  
104 That is, apart from a more or less pragmatic constraint on line length (it would be 
implausible to consider Vanity Fair a single line of verse) and the fact that line 
breaks probably can only occur above the level of the syllable, i.e., you can’t have a 
line break like “pesterin / g”; there are a number of plausible reasons for this, but 
the most obvious is that it would be unpronounceable since “ng” represents a single 
phoneme, namely /ŋ/. This latter claim is only true if it can be empirically 
demonstrated that all inputs to the language faculty are mediated, to some 
meaningful extent, by phonological form, which may turn out not to be the case. In 
that event, this constraint would only hold for spoken performances of a poem, and 
reading may be subject to different constraints. 173 
think by means of concepts what is aconceptual. In short, the line is a 
cipher of the non-identical which binds itself to thought; it is a 
creation of meaning ex nihilo, but it always threatens to drag 
everything back into the vortex of mere seeming; it calls forth what 
thought lives on, and by living denies.105 Poetry turns language, the 
medium of thought, against itself in order to prevent thought from 
coming to rest. 
This suggests a preliminary answer to an old quandary: the 
relation between poems and (normal, prose) statements. To say that 
the two are simply unrelated, to declare poetic language absolutely 
autonomous of the world or of thought, or to confine the poetic to the 
sphere of mere feeling, would fail to account for the obvious sense in 
which poems depend upon the extra-aesthetic world, without which 
the words would not be meaningful. But to erect the opposite 
principle, that poems simply are statements and only a self-indulgent 
aesthete would think otherwise, is to neglect the fact that people have 
little trouble consistently distinguishing the two (if John tells Sally he’s 
been thinking about buying new shoes, she might reasonably expect 
him to actually buy shoes; if he recites a sonnet on the joys of new 
shoes, she will expect nothing of him, apart from more such silliness 
or a career in advertising). Poems, unlike statements, are enigmas; 
and as Adorno observes, “in enigmas, the answer is both hidden and 
demanded by the structure. This is the function of the work’s 
immanent logic, of the lawfulness that transpires in it, and that is the 
                                       
105 Cf. Adorno, AT 127: “[The artwork’s] enigmaticalness [Rätselcharakter] goads it to 
articulate itself immanently in such a fashion that it achieves meaning by forming its 
emphatic absence of meaning.” 174 
theodicy of the concept of purpose in art. The aim of artworks is the 
determination of the indeterminate” (AT 124). The line demands 
interpretation in the very gesture that obstructs it. The fact that poems 
and statements are both grounded in syntax marks their similarity; 
lineation makes the poem an enigma.106 The absence of an adequate 
theory of the line has thus not only limited criticism’s descriptive 
capabilities but has rendered vital interpretive issues inaccessible. 
But the effects of the line are always local, and for this reason 
(as well as Aristotle’s dictum, referred to above) criticism must proceed 
from inside the particular, from the minutiae of local effects. In 
practical terms, this means that instead of critics only taking an 
interest in line breaks they should also take an interest in lines, 
especially since the latter topic opens up new fields of inquiry even in 
strongly end-stopped verse. The effects which critics attribute to line 
breaks (e.g., in accordance with the interruption or insertion theories) 
are in fact effects of the line itself; if the reader gets to the end of the 
first line of Paradise Lost and has a particular expectation about what 
will follow, it is not because the blank space on the page calls out to be 
filled in but because the line itself implies what may follow it (either 
because of syntactic restrictions on what may follow a given 
construction or because of pragmatic inferences based upon what is 
being said, or both). If what follows on the second line is a surprise, 
that is due to what is in the second line, and its relationship to what is 
                                       
106 Strictly speaking, this is only true of good poetry; but that qualification is, in my 
view, unnecessary, since the fact that one goes to the trouble to write about a poem 
entails a prior evaluation in its favor. For this reason, evaluation is both ineliminable 
from and superfluous to criticism. 175 
in the first line; the line break in itself is irrelevant.107 For some kinds 
of questions, this theory amounts mainly to a more precise use of 
terminology; for example, it does not dramatically change questions 
about the relationship between two halves of a syntactic phrase sitting 
on two different lines, though it puts the pursuit of such questions on 
a more systematic basis. But it does open up entirely new questions: 
instead of merely asking why a phrase has been broken in half, we 
might ask what happens when two sentence fragments are glued 
together on a line. It is easy enough to invent silly examples in which 
straightforward effects can be achieved, as in 
    It is cheese that 
    She wants. To leave 
  Is  to  relent. 
But in particular cases in good poems, the effects are bound to be 
subtle and complex, and we can hardly propose to work out in 
advance what their nuances will be. 
  One of the oddest aspects of Hollander’s discussion of Milton’s 
enjambments is that he often seems to suggest that Milton, if he did 
not invent these effects, was the first major poet in English to employ 
them, and that they were not really out in force again until the 20th 
Century, apart from Blake. But Hollander’s insights illuminate much 
more than just Milton’s poetic practice. As a point of comparison, 
consider Robert Browning’s My Last Duchess: given that this poem has 
been so much discussed,108 if we can make new discoveries about it 
                                       
107 To put it in Hegelese, the line break is relevant for the line but not in itself; the 
line break is in an exclusively negative relation to the individual lines, and never has 
positive content. 
108 This poem has even occasioned a book-length explication (Berman’s Browning’s 
Duke) which, though sometimes extremely speculative, is very useful and covers a 
remarkable range of then extant criticism. 176 
from the perspective I have suggested, then we know we are on to 
something. This poem is particularly illuminating both because of its 
extremely conspicuous enjambments (students often don’t even notice 
that the poem is in rhymed couplets) and because it is extremely self-
conscious about both the problems of interpretation (a painting, in 
this case) and about the relationship between art and nature, lineation 
and language. To begin with, we will have to be very precise about the 
syntax of individual lines, and only then can we draw forth the subtle 
effects of their lineation and the interrelation of those effects with 
other aspects  of the interpretation of the poem as a whole. The poem 
is so complex that, for reasons of economy, I will focus primarily on 
the first four lines: 
    That’s my last Duchess painted on the wall, 
    Looking as if she were alive; I call 
    That piece a wonder, now: Frà Pandolf’s hands 
    Worked busily a day, and there she stands.109 
The first line consists of a main clause, “That’s my last Duchess,” and 
an adjunct small clause, “painted on the wall.”110 An adjunct is a kind 
of optional modifier, like the second (bracketed) prepositional phrase 
in The student of Physics [with red hair]; both prepositional phrases 
seem, on the face of it, to be syntactic equals, but if we invert them the 
phrase becomes ungrammatical: *The student [with red hair] of 
Physics. What this demonstrates is that of Physics is more closely tied 
                                       
109 In order to underscore the way in which these first four lines form a plausible 
unit to treat as a monad, I am following the punctuation in the first, 1842 edition of 
the poem (see Longman Poems); for the 1888-9 (final) version of the poem, see the 
Oxford Poetical Works: 186-8. This is, in the end, largely a cosmetic issue; from the 
standpoint of syntax, punctuation is entirely irrelevant. 
110 “Painted on the wall” could also be analyzed as a reduced relative clause; for the 
purpose of this discussion it doesn’t matter which it is because the salient properties 
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to the Noun Phrase the student than with red hair; the former is 
optional in the sense that if you omit of Physics you’re saying 
something different, but if you omit of red hair you’re just providing 
less information.111 A ‘small clause’ is a verbless clause following a 
main clause of which it is not a constituent but with which it 
nevertheless has a subject-predicate relationship, as in they appointed 
her head of the department, in which head of the department is 
predicated of her but is neither the subject nor the object of the main 
verb ‘appoint.’112 Similarly, “painted on the wall” seems at first glance 
to be predicated of “my last Duchess” even though it is neither object 
nor subject of the main verb (and hence is a small clause); it is also an 
optional modifier which provides additional information about what it 
modifies. 
  As a consequence of the fact that “painted on the wall” is an 
adjunct, it stands outside the main statement of the sentence. For 
example, if someone said Mary tickled John naked, and someone else 
asked him Are you sure it was Mary? that question will be understood 
as Are you sure it was Mary who tickled John? and not Are you sure it 
was Mary who was naked? The sentence thus presupposes the 
nakedness while it explicitly makes an argument about the tickling. A 
further complication is that adjunct small clauses are ambiguous as to 
                                       
111 Figuring out the exact structure of adjuncts has been a persistent problem in 
syntax; the old analysis in X-bar theory, which just added another maximal 
projection, always had something of an ad hoc flavor. Since the minimalist program 
has done away with X-bar theory entirely, it is still more unclear how adjuncts are to 
be described. In any event, my interpretation relies only on well-attested descriptive 
facts about adjuncts, so the question of structural description shouldn’t have any 
catastrophic effects on it. 
112 For an extended discussion within the government-binding framework, see Aarts. 178 
whether they modify the subject or the object of the main clause. For 
example, in Mary tickled John naked, we do not know whether is was 
Mary or John who was naked during the tickling. “Painted on the wall” 
thus slips in as a presupposition of the statement made by the main 
clause, a presupposition that either modifies the deictic pronoun 
“That” (the grammatical subject) or “my last Duchess” (the object). This 
ambiguity opens up two subtly distinct readings, depending on 
whether “That” (the painting) or “my last Duchess” (the person) is, by 
virtue of association with the small clause, the focus of the main 
clause.113 The first is analogous to That, which is painted on the wall, 
is my last Duchess, a reading which posits the painting first, then 
asserts the Duchess as its content. The second reading is analogous to 
That’s my last Duchess, who is painted on the wall, positing the 
Duchess first, then identifying her with the painting. In the first 
reading, the Duchess is just a passive object, the mere matter which 
the painting has as its theme; in the second reading the Duchess is 
implicitly an agent and the painting just a means whereby she comes 
into being.  
  The second line begins with another adjunct small clause, 
                                       
113 I am using the term ‘focus’ here in the sense of Chomsky’s essay “Deep Structure, 
Surface Structure, and Semantic Interpretation” (see in particular 199ff.), wherein he 
makes a distinction between what he calls the ‘focus’ and the ‘presupposition’ of a 
sentence: “The focus is a phrase containing the intonation center; the 
presupposition, an expression derived by replacing the focus by a variable” (205). For 
example, if the sentence Is it John who writes poetry? is uttered with normal 
intonation (i.e., with John as the intonation center), the response No, it is Bill who 
writes poetry will seem more natural than No, John writes only stories. In the 
absence of contrastive or emphatic stress, in other words, ‘John’ will be understood 
as the focus of the sentence and the fact that someone writes poetry will be 
understood as presupposed by the sentence. Chomsky’s use of ‘presupposition’ does 
not quite coincide with the usual use of it in formal semantics or logic (nor with my 
use of it above), so I have avoided employing it here. 179 
“Looking as if she were alive,” associated with the same main clause. 
The syntactic relationship is the same, but there is one crucial 
difference: the pronoun “she” probably refers to the Duchess and not 
the painting (because inanimate objects, with rare exceptions, are 
referred to with neuter pronouns in English). The ambiguity which the 
first line opened up (between “That” as focus and “my last Duchess” as 
focus) is thereby resolved in favor of “my last Duchess” as focus, and 
hence in favor of the Duchess-as-subject reading through the presence 
of the pronoun ‘she.’ The verb ‘look’ is also ambiguous as to whether it 
makes its grammatical subject an agent or an object; in Sally looks at 
her watch, Sally is the agent of the action of looking, whereas in Sally 
looks happy, Sally is the object of the action of looking. “Looking as if 
she were alive” can thus mean either that ‘to us she appears alive’ or 
‘she is looking at something as she would look at it if she were alive.’ 
Given the immediate context, the reader is likely to favor the former, 
non-agentive reading, in which the gaze is directed at her, but the 
Duke very quickly ventures into an elaborate account of her “earnest 
glance” (8), i.e., the Duchess becomes the agent of looking (though this 
follows line 5, in which the Duke asks the Count’s flunky, “Will’t 
please you sit and look at her?”). For the moment, the pronoun ‘she’ is, 
of the two ambiguities, the only one that strongly argues for agency, 
but the ambiguity of ‘look’ engenders a possibility that the poem goes 
on to fulfill, effectively bringing the Duchess back from the grave. The 
second line ends, however, with the incomplete expression “I call,” 
where ‘call,’ given the context, means ‘to give as name or title to; to 180 
name.’114 The line brackets this expression with “Looking as if she 
were alive,” emphasizing that the Duke is effectively resurrecting the 
Duchess and at the same time subtly underscoring his agency in the 
resurrection.115 
  This effect of the line brings us to the traditional interpretive 
dilemma of the poem:116 given the dramatic context (the Duke is 
speaking to the Count’s flunky on the evening in which he intends to 
affiance the Count’s daughter, should the dowry prove adequate), why 
would the Duke choose to tell a story which presumably does him no 
credit? His story plainly makes the Count’s flunky uncomfortable 
(surely it is the flunky’s attempt to re-establish an appropriate 
distance between them that inspires the Duke’s polite condescension: 
“Nay, we’ll go / Together down, Sir!” [53-4]), and given the Duke’s 
cleverness (indicated by traditional rhetorical disavowals, most 
importantly in lines 35-6) such behavior seems strangely out of 
character. The key to the puzzle is the Duke’s concern that the 
Duchess did not distinguish him from other people, which is just to 
say that she did not confer recognition on him:117 
                                       
114   OED,  s.v. “call, v.,” def. II.11.a. 
115 And as W. David Shaw quite rightly notes, “I call” also evokes the “fiat of divine 
creation” (Dialectical Temper 95). Shaw’s illuminating account of the poem in that 
book is analogous to mine in that he sees the Duke as “restag[ing] the uneven drama 
of his domestic life in the form most flattering to his producer’s ego” (94), though 
Shaw proceeds from there in a quite different direction. 
116 See Berman for a survey of the literature on this issue. 
117 I am drawing on Hegel’s concept of “Recognition”  in Phenomenology of Spirit 
(111), though the situation of the poem is not analogous at all points to the “Dialectic 
of Lordship and Bondage.” Hegel’s formulation is useful to the extent that it draws 
together recognition by an individual other and a socially-mediated form of 
recognition (hence the Duke’s emphasis on his “nine hundred years old name” [33]). 
The Duchess’ recognition of him is essential because she is the only person in a 
position to confer recognition on the Duke in both senses, her status as Duchess 181 
She had 
A heart…how shall I say?…too soon made glad, 
Too easily impressed; she liked whate’er 
She looked on, and her looks went everywhere. 
Sir, ‘twas all one! 
(21-5) 
The Duchess failed, in his view, to determinately recognize the Duke, 
only registering his “favor” as one aspect of an undifferentiated totality 
of pleasurable affects. Moreover, her relation to those affects is purely 
passive—they are “impressed” on the mere material of her “heart”—
and this too prevents her from being able to confer recognition upon 
him; she must act autonomously in order for her recognition to be 
substantive, and for this reason he cannot “stoop” to imposing the 
necessary differentiations upon her (37-43). As a result, the conclusion 
of the events he narrates, his “commands” which presumably result in 
her death (45-6), is entirely unsatisfactory: being dead, she is even 
more emphatically unable to confer recognition. And so he is obliged to 
resurrect her in order that they might play out a struggle to the death 
along the lines of Hegel’s ‘Dialectic of Lordship & Bondage’ and thus 
demonstrate his mastery.118 But this is a low-risk version of the 
struggle, a game he is sure in advance to win since he is holding her 
cards as well as his own. What makes this sleight of hand possible is 
the mode of her appearance in the artwork, which brings the past into 
a present that still does not amount to actual presence. The 
                                                                                                              
designating both a personal (husband/wife) relationship and a public 
(Duke/Duchess) relationship.  
118 PhS 111-19. For the ‘trial by death,’ see 113-5. One could easily proceed to a 
psychoanalytic reading on this basis with the addition of Lacanian premises—and 
several critics have—but such additional premises do not, it seems to me, increase 
explanatory force to any appreciable extent and they involve importing assumptions 
about human consciousness that are, to put it mildly, arguable. 182 
doubleness of the painting, through its formation in the dialectic of 
lineation, is thus at the heart of what makes this poem function. 
  As we have seen, the opening line of the poem is ambiguous as 
to whether the Duchess is subject or object, but the second line 
resolves this ambiguity in favor of the Duchess-as-subject, thus 
making her an autonomous agent. She has been negated in life by the 
Duke’s “commands,” preserved in the painting and sublated in the 
Duke’s interpretation. But the Duke cannot do without the Duchess-
as-object reading, because she must not become agent enough to 
constitute an actual threat. This restricted, finite economy of 
significance is the opposite of actual love, which Hegel describes well 
in a fragment in his Early Theological Writings: 
The lover who takes is not thereby made richer than the 
other; he is enriched indeed, but only so much as the 
other is. So too the giver does not make himself poorer; by 
giving to the other he has at the same time and to the 
same extent enhanced his own treasure (compare Juliet in 
Romeo and Juliet [ii.1.175-77: “My bounty is as boundless 
as the sea, My love as deep;] the more I give to thee, The 
more I have.”). This wealth of life love acquires in the 
exchange of every thought, every variety of inner 
experience, for it seeks out differences and devises 
unifications ad infinitum; it turns to the whole manifold of 
nature in order to drink love out of every life. (307) 119 
For the Duke, this economy is bound to a logic of exchange whose 
perverse quid pro quo reflects his complicity with a social order that 
reduces people to things (and in this sense, as in so many others, this 
poem is about the present, not merely an historical curiosity about the 
Renaissance). My Last Duchess, then, is a sort of negative love poem, 
indicating through its destitution what the fullness of amorous 
                                       
119 This passage is cited with useful commentary in Hamacher’s Pleroma. 183 
experience would be. 
  The painting, mediating the relation between Duke and Duchess 
as both scrim and screen, performs the function the Duke requires 
only because of the interpretation he imposes on it. This puts us as 
readers in the position of thinking that we can pronounce moral 
judgment on the Duke because we can accuse him of misreading, but 
that very gesture reveals the way in which we are already bound by the 
poem’s nexus: the Duke pronounces moral judgment on the Duchess 
by interpreting the painting, and we pronounce moral judgment on the 
Duke by interpreting the poem. Thus disillusioned, we find ourselves 
no longer in the position of moral ascendancy which would allow us to 
judge the Duke’s misreading.120 
  We find ourselves at the brink of an abyss, an infinite regress (or 
what Hegel calls a ‘bad infinity’ [SL 138ff.]) which seems to put the 
categories of the True and the Good on unending deferral—a situation 
essentially at odds with the very concept of Truth. This predicament is 
characteristic of dramatic lyric generally; just as Browning’s view of 
the Incarnation requires that we cannot directly access God through 
cognition of the universal but only through entering into the 
                                       
120 I am indebted, as we all are, to Robert Langbaum’s pioneering treatment of the 
dramatic monologue in The Poetry of Experience (1957). Although he speaks a good 
deal about the “tension between sympathy and judgment” (92), he strangely says of 
“My Last Duchess,” “Moral judgment is in fact important as the thing to be 
suspended, as a measure of the price we pay for the privilege of appreciating to the 
full this extraordinary man” (83). But as W. David Shaw points out, “The intellectual 
sympathy that allows Browning to understand a point of view so different from his 
own also allows him to uncover its internal contradictions” (Dialectical Temper 103). 
Langbaum’s position all too often falls into relativism, which is not only an 
undesirable position but one which is impossible to actually occupy: if all truth is 
relative, then that principle itself must be relative, and it therefore falls into 
performative contradiction. See also Adorno, ND 45-8. 184 
particular, so the dramatic monologue requires us to sympathetically 
enter into the particular consciousness of the individual (an individual 
who is often odious or elusive in Browning’s monologues) in order to 
think the universal. 121 To put it another way, the dramatic monologue 
is the poetic analogue of immanent critique, which dwells on the 
particular until it reflects what is beyond itself. The truth content of 
My Last Duchess would vanish if it did not, through the device of the 
painting, reveal its object as mediated within itself, if it did not come 
into being as its own metacritique. 
  The undialectical element of the poem, which puts its dialectic 
in motion, consists in the presence of third terms which are not 
reducible to negative extremes. Each of the poem’s three temporalities 
presents us with a triad of (1) a person doing the representing, (2) a 
person represented, and (3) an observer: in the diegetic past of the 
Duke’s narrative, the representer is Frà Pandolf, the represented is the 
Duchess, and the observer is the Duke; in the diegetic present of the 
Duke’s speech, the representer is the Duke, the represented is the 
Duchess, and the observer is the Count’s flunky; in the (non-diegetic) 
present of the reader of the poem, the representer is Browning qua 
author-function, the represented is the Duke, and the observer is the 
reader. The painting is what makes possible the homology between the 
diegetic past and the diegetic present which the Duke needs to 
resurrect the Duchess; the poem is what makes possible the homology 
                                       
121 For example, in the “Epilogue” to Dramatis Personae, Browning  seems to be 
explaining his method when he writes: “Take the least man of all mankind, as I: / 
Look at his head and heart, find how and why / He differs from his fellows utterly” 
(69-71). 185 
between the diegetic present and the non-diegetic present of 
reading.122 
  We can begin to see the way the former homology functions in 
the third line, which consists of three Noun Phrases, the first two 
being the direct object and predicate nominative123 of “call” from the 
previous line, and third being the subject of “worked” in the following 
line. In the middle of the line sits a conspicuous “now,” set off on 
either side by punctuation but seemingly gluing the diegetic present of 
“call” to the diegetic past of “worked.” If the painting is a wonder now, 
then presumably it was not always a wonder.124 It is a wonder now 
because it breathes life into the Duchess, the life she takes on in the 
second line, but in order for this to serve the Duke’s purpose this 
semblance of life can only come into being with death as its context 
and condition. According to the Duke’s narrative, the immediate origin 
of the Duchess’ “earnest glance” (8) is some remark of Frà Pandolf’s, a 
“courtesy” (15-21). Hence the painting is guilty, blushing evidence of 
the Duchess’ wandering heart, the particular trace which certifies the 
general guilt. The painting was not a wonder before because it testified 
to the source of the Duke’s displeasure; Frà Pandolf was, in this 
instance, a culpable accessory to a crime against vanity—no doubt the 
Duke had wondered, given “that spot / Of joy,” if Frà Pandolf’s hands 
                                       
122 For a different reading that draws intriguing consequences from a distinction 
between the temporality of “verbal art” and that of “plastic art,” see Martin 100-5. 
123 This predicate nominative (“a wonder”) is also a small clause. 
124 It is also possible that this now is just a sort of rhetorical interjection (as in OED, 
s.v. “now, adv., conj., n. and a.,” def. 7a), but reading it that way now becomes just a 
filler word and is thereby stripped of any substantive effect on interpretation. In 
general, it should be a rule of thumb, whenever one is trying to choose between two 
readings that cannot be read together, that one ought to choose whichever reading 
makes the poem more interesting. 186 
had been caressing only brushes. In line 3 those hands, bloodied with 
the Duchess’ blush, are isolated from their verb, stranded in stasis, 
linked to the painting only by the joint of that imperious “now,” 
testifying to the evaporation of that life which the painting sought to 
capture—and captured only too well. The Duke exhibits not merely the 
pigmented sarcophagus of his wife, but the hands of her alleged lover 
as well, severed by lineation. 
  The structure of the Duke’s bid for mastery is also potentially 
registered at the level of reflection in the metrical peculiarities of these 
lines. The poem consists of entirely metrical iambic pentameter, but of 
the disyllabic words in the first four lines, four constitute bracketing 
mismatches:125 “Duchess” and “painted” in line 1, and “wonder” and 
“Pandolf” in line 3, the former word in each pair being a stronger 
mismatch as it crosses over at the highest level of metrical structure 
(the division between the second and third feet in iambic pentameter). 
“Duchess” and “wonder,” as well as “painted” and “Pandolf,” are linked 
vertically through lineation, suggesting the autonomy of the Duchess 
and the agency of the painter, respectively. Through syntax (that is, 
horizontally) these relations are destroyed, linking “Pandolf” statically 
to “wonder” as elaborated above, and linking the “Duchess” to her 
status as a merely “painted” thing, the product of someone else’s 
action. Pandolf’s agency is exhausted in the object he has made, 
unwittingly serving the Duke’s malicious whims, a fact registered in 
                                       
125 A ‘bracketing mismatch’ is when word boundaries in the rhythm of the line violate 
the abstract divisions of the meter. I am assuming the theory of meter in Kiparsky’s 
“The Rhythmic Structure of English Verse”; see Appendix B for an overview of the 
theory. 187 
the partial rhyme between “painted” and “Pandolf” (they share onset 
and coda of the first syllable, and the onsets of their second syllables 
differ only in voicing). 
  The fourth line both separates the painter’s hands from their 
activity, as observed before, and it brackets the now-subjectless active 
verb with the active but intransitive “she stands.” The antecedent of 
the pronoun “she” is ambiguous, just like the same pronoun in line 2, 
but this time the painting, not the Duchess, seems like the more 
plausible antecedent since it is explicitly the making of the painting 
that is at issue. The line thus makes the painting effectively an agent 
of its own manifestation, as if it resulted from its own work, 
Satanically self-created. This odd state of affairs is rendered stranger 
still by the missing preposition before “a day,” which could be 
understood as either for or on. The former seems more intuitive, but it 
is difficult to imagine such a portrait being painted in a single day.126 
If we take the missing preposition to be on, indicating only one of the 
days on which the painter exerted himself in the service of his art and 
his patron, what distinguishes this particular day? Given that the 
specific descriptions of the making of the painting are limited to 
(probably fantasized) descriptions of something like a flirtation, this 
might refer to the day on which something slightly more than painting 
                                       
126 The note to this line in the Longman edition proposes that the portrait is a fresco, 
not a painting, thus making the time frame more plausible. But as Berman points 
out, the “completion [of the portrait] in several hours, one ‘day,’ is unlikely from at 
least two major considerations: portraits painted in the Renaissance generally 
occupied the artist two to three weeks or longer—and even the extremely few fresco 
portraits took at least a week for completion; and the Duke of Ferrara’s wanting an 
extremely hasty work would be most inconsistent with, even antipodean to, both his 
familial pride and the superior artistic sensibilities that he believes he has” (34-5; see 
also his ‘Appendix B,’ 103-14). 188 
went on—a day, perhaps, on which the Duke could not be present to 
observe the fulfillment of his commission. But this knowledgeable 
declaration effectively inserts the Duke into the diegetic past, a gesture 
which allows him to take over the position of representer and thus to 
bring the past into being, this time on his own terms. 
  The Duke eventually fails because the bridge he makes between 
the diegetic present and the diegetic past opens up an analogous 
course for the reader, allowing us to enter into the space which the 
Duke must control absolutely in order to triumph. The bridge that we 
cross is the poem itself, and the space which allows us in, which 
opens the possibility of both interpretation and judgment, is the 
enigma-character of the line, the turning of the Duke’s language 
against itself. Once we have entered into the scene of the Duke’s 
triumph, its hollowness becomes evident. In resurrecting the Duchess 
through art, she becomes not less autonomous but more so, not 
dehumanized but more than human. His mastery depends upon the 
reduction of the artwork to absolute determinacy,127 and to the extent 
he succeeds the artwork becomes a mere dead thing, unable through 
its elusiveness to bring the Duchess into being—“There she stands / 
As if alive” (46-7, my emph.).128 To the extent that he masters the 
                                       
127 Herbert Tucker reaches a similar conclusion in his illuminating discussion of the 
poem, observing that “‘My Last Duchess’ may be considered a study in the reductive 
study of poetry, with the face of the Duchess as a highly figured text and the Duke 
as a ‘reader’ of ‘that pictured countenance,’ a student impatient of uncertainties who 
would fix the meaning of a text beyond doubt, regardless of the cost to its vitality” 
(182). In Tucker’s view, the enigma is the Duchess herself, not the artwork, but it 
seems to me that the Duchess, since she dwells in the undifferentiated pleasure of 
living joy, is not enigmatic at all, and becomes so only through the enigma-character 
of the artwork. 
128 As W. David Shaw observes, this enjambment invokes her ghostly presence only 
to abruptly shove her back into her framed tomb (Origins of the Monologue 21). 189 
painting, like Neptune “Taming a sea-horse” (55), the poem exposes 
the violence of that mastery, a violence which turns against itself 
because even to vanquish the dead he must recall and perform the 
sins for which they are punished. Were there no painting, any story 
would do, the Duchess could be entombed beyond remembrance, the 
Duke would be free from possible remorse through determination 
without remainder. Instead, the work of art persists as an indelible 
trace of the workings of objective Spirit,129 unfolding through the turn 
of verse. Only the enigma-character of the line makes it possible for 
the poem to exceed mere reification, to perform the immanent 
metacritique that raises it to a moment of absolute Spirit, drawing us 
toward the possibility of Love even in a world where life itself is no 
longer possible. 
                                       
129 “Objective Spirit” is Hegel’s term for social reality (insofar as it inhabits the minds 
of individuals). The finitude of objective Spirit is contrasted with the infinite 
character of the next stage of development, “absolute Spirit,” which is also a kind of 
intersubjectivity dwelling in the individual, but extended beyond the merely social 
(and hence national) to encompass absolute totality (Hegel associates absolute Spirit 
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Chapter 6 
Transcendence & Immanence: An Epistle Containing  
the Strange Medical Experience of Karshish, the Arab Physician 
 
According to Auguste Comte, father of sociology and self-
proclaimed Pope of Positivism, the history of “the human mind” can be 
divided up into three “states” or phases: “the theological or fictitious 
state, the metaphysical or abstract state, and the scientific or positive 
state” (1). In his essay on Milton of 1825, Macaulay echoes this 
classification, preserving much the same evaluations, with Comte’s 
“fictitious state” appearing here as the “poetical”:  
In a rude state of society men are children with a greater 
variety of ideas. It is therefore in such a state of society 
that we may expect to find the poetical temperament in its 
highest perfection. In an enlightened age there will be 
much intelligence, much science, much philosophy, 
abundance of just classification and subtle analysis, 
abundance of wit and eloquence, abundance of verses, 
and even of good ones; but little poetry. Men will judge 
and compare; but they will not create. (153) 
But as an account of history, Comte’s schema is not very plausible; 
among other things, all three of these, theology, metaphysics and the 
natural sciences, have coexisted at least since Aristotle; over time, 
their configurations have shifted, but history has abolished none of the 
three. What is useful about Comte’s schema is that its implicit 
narrative suggests a close relationship between the three stages: 
theology is secularized into metaphysics when the blessed gods of the 
Greek pantheon are metamorphosed into Plato’s Forms (with the Form 
of the Good as the pater omnipotens), and Plato’s forms are brought 
down to earth by Kant as properties of human Reason, midwifing the 191 
transformation of perceptions into thoughts. It should be no surprise 
that the three turn out to be related, considering that in certain 
respects they are difficult to distinguish. Metaphysics and theology are 
both concerned with transcendental objects (i.e., things which are not 
possible objects of sensory experience). But though they share an 
object, they differ considerably in their epistemological orientation. 
Theology seeks to know the transcendental through revelation, which 
is just to say the mind of God; metaphysics seeks to know the 
transcendental through reason, which is just to say the mind of Man. 
The two projects are thus not radically separate but are, in a sense, 
the same project conducted along different axes. Positivism denies the 
project entirely, and thus becomes part of it: it transcendentally rejects 
the transcendental, thereby drifting not only into metaphysics but into 
a deeply dogmatic metaphysics.  
One of the reasons that theology, metaphysics and positivism 
appear to be inseparable is that they share a central problem: the 
relation between the subject and transcendence. In the last chapter, I 
explored the way in which the negativity of the poetic line functions in 
My Last Duchess to allow us to think human relations differently, to 
think the possibility of love out of the very brokenness of actual 
human relations. In this chapter, I want to continue our inquiry into 
the functions of the poetic line;130 but the poem that will concern us 
here, Browning’s Karshish, is about the relation between the subject 
and transcendence—a significantly different but related problem. In 
                                       
130 For the purposes of this chapter, I will simply assume the account given of the 
linguistic structure of the line in the previous chapter. 192 
order to clarify what is at stake in the negative re-thinking of theology 
that  Karshish  undertakes, it will be useful to consider the ways in 
which the theological functions in Adorno’s philosophy, since his 
ambivalence about theology recasts it in a usefully negative form. As 
we will see, Karshish exploits the relationship between lineation and 
syntax to deploy theological categories in such a way that they do not 
merely dogmatically affirm an Absolute in the beyond (a merely 
transcendent deity) but also do not devolve into a simplistic pantheism 
(God is in all things, therefore all things are divine). The theological 
here is the presence of the divine in all things, but only negatively, and 
it therefore does what metaphysics cannot do, yet without going over 
into the dogmatism of religion. 
  In the opening of Adorno’s 1965 Metaphysics lectures, he goes to 
some trouble to distinguish metaphysics from theology on both 
theoretical and historical grounds. On theoretical grounds, he 
distinguishes theology from “metaphysics in the traditional sense” by 
saying that metaphysics “does not derive the absolute dogmatically 
through revelation, … it determines the absolute through concepts” 
(MCP 7). Metaphysics, then, is on the side of reason against revelation, 
of critique against dogma. On historical grounds, adapting Comte’s 
three stages, he describes metaphysics as, in some sense, a later stage 
of development that secularizes theological categories. This project of 
secularization is now, according to Adorno, historically condemned; so, 
for example, Heidegger can be criticized for “the surreptitious attempt 
to appropriate theologically posited possibilities of experience without 
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this moment in history, but attempts to appropriate it are doomed in 
their turn. In light of such claims, we would hardly expect Adorno 
himself to deploy theological categories in his own metaphysical 
project. And yet, theological categories and theological terminology are 
a pervasive feature of Adorno’s work as a whole, particularly categories 
drawn from Christianity.131 Since theological categories and 
terminology tend to appear in the company of some of Adorno’s most 
ambitious claims, I do not think that Adorno can be fully secularized 
without his philosophy entirely losing its traction. In other words, 
removing the theology from Adorno’s thought is not like removing a 
mole; it’s like removing a finger. To anticipate a bit, I want to show 
that Adorno is not trying to squeeze the rational kernel back into the 
mystical shell, that his use of theology is, paradoxical as it may seem, 
bound up with the most practical elements of his philosophy, and that 
grasping the theological in Adorno can help us understand why the 
aesthetic should have such a central place in that conception of 
practice. This, in turn, will throw related motifs in Karshish into relief. 
  During the period in which Adorno delivered his lectures on 
Metaphysics he was at work on the manuscript of his late masterpiece, 
Negative Dialectik. In the final pages of that work, he argues that 
metaphysics now is “not merely the secularization of theology in the 
concept” but that “it preserves theology in the critique of theology, 
                                       
131 I should say by way of clarification, that Christian or Christianity in this paper 
refer to the teachings of Jesus as redacted in the synoptic gospels plus such 
corroborating extra-canonical materials as the Gospel of Thomas and the Gospel of 
Mary; the remainder of New Testament literature, and all historical churches, I will 
designate with the terms Christendom. The doctrine of Christianity is summarized in 
the Sermon on the Mount; the doctrine of Christendom is summarized in the Nicene 
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whilst it opens to human beings as a possibility that to which theology 
compels them, and which theology thereby damages” (ND 389). In 
what follows, I want to consider this passage in light of a few 
significant moments in two of his other most important works, the 
early Minima Moralia and the late Aesthetic Theory. But to begin with, 
we might reasonably suppose that “preserv[ing] theology in the critique 
of theology” just means that all that ought remain of theology is the 
argument against God (that is, the preservation of theology as  the 
critique of theology). But if theology is to be preserved, something of it 
must persist, enough to open a possibility; after all, even the mere 
hope that world might be otherwise has some  positive content. We 
might get somewhere by reversing the question: what is it about 
theology that prevents us from just replacing metaphysics with it? 
What stands in need of critique? The problem is the compulsion to 
which theology subjects human beings. When, for example, 
Christendom demands a profession of faith in what Adorno calls “the 
core of the positive religions, the hope of a beyond” (ND 390), this can 
only serve to underwrite the present: to believe the redemption of the 
world  inevitable  is to renounce one’s obligation to bring that 
redemption about. A hope that is unalloyed with despair is not hope at 
all but certainty. As Adorno puts it in Minima Moralia, “Hope is soonest 
found among the comfortless” (MM 223), just as it is the one lost sheep 
the shepherd pursues not the ninety-nine who never stray (Mtt. 18.12-
3). 
  Of course “the comfortless” in the immediate context of that 
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passage we have been considering from Negative Dialectic moves so 
swiftly from theology to art: 
Any given expression of hope, as it emanates more 
powerfully from great works of art even in the epoch of 
their falling silent than it does from the theological texts 
which have been handed down, is configured with the 
hope of the human; nowhere more unequivocally than in 
moments of Beethoven. That which signifies that not 
everything is in vain is, through sympathy with the 
human, the self-awareness of nature in subjects; only in 
the experience of its own nature-like aspect does genius 
extend beyond nature. (ND 389-90) 
The movement from the theological category of redemption to the 
utopian aspects of art doesn’t seem like much of a leap, but it’s not 
entirely clear why this movement should be mediated by, on the one 
hand, the subject (and the genius as the exemplary human), and, on 
the other, by “nature.” In order to make sense of these two mediations 
we must turn to Minima Moralia and Aesthetic Theory. 
  Minima Moralia is the closest we have to an ethics from Adorno. 
Its stated aim is to return philosophy to its “true field,” namely, “the 
teaching of the right life,” and to do so “from the standpoint of 
subjective experience” (MM 15,18). Just as the word ethics, with its 
Greek root in ethos, ‘personal character,’ begins with the individual, so 
Adorno attempts to think the right life through the individual’s 
predicament. His focus is usually on the things that obstruct the 
individual’s attempt to live rightly: 
The predicament of private life today is shown by its 
arena. Dwelling, in the proper sense, is now impossible. … 
The best mode of conduct, in face of all this, still seems an 
uncommitted, suspended one: to lead a private life, as far 
as the social order and one’s own needs will tolerate 
nothing else, but not to attach weight to it as to something 
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even part of my good fortune not to be a house-owner,” 
Nietzsche already wrote in the Gay Science. Today we 
should have to add: it is part of morality not to be at home 
in one’s home [nicht bei sich selber zu Hause zu sein]. This 
gives some indication of the difficult relationship in which 
the individual now stands to his property, as long as he 
still possesses anything at all. The trick is to keep in view, 
and to express, the fact that private property no longer 
belongs to one, in the sense that consumer goods have 
become potentially so abundant that no individual has the 
right to cling to the principle of their limitation; but that 
one must nevertheless have possessions, if one is not to 
sink into that dependence and need which serves the 
blind perpetuation of property relations. But the thesis of 
this paradox leads to destruction, a loveless disregard for 
things which necessarily turns against people too; and the 
antithesis, no sooner uttered is an ideology for those 
wishing with a bad conscience to keep what they have. 
Wrong life cannot be lived rightly. [Es gibt kein richtiges 
Leben im falschen.] (MM 38-9) 
It is tempting to read a passage such as this as an elaborate apology 
for inaction: it begins by asserting that the best approach is “an 
uncommitted, suspended one,” and concludes on a note of unremitting 
despair: “Wrong life cannot be lived rightly.” We seem to be so 
thoroughly prevented from acting rightly that even our inaction is 
culpable. This passage seems like clear evidence that Adorno is, in 
fact, just a pessimist. The initial thesis of the passage (that we should 
take “an uncommitted, suspended” approach) precipitates in a piece of 
practical advice (keep your property, but don’t fall under its spell), but 
the passage then proceeds to dialectically explode this advice. Either it 
leads to a self-congratulatory asceticism that thinks it can free itself of 
moral responsibility through charity, or it leads to a shameless apology 
for accumulation (I must preserve my privileges so that I can continue 
to fight the good fight against privilege). The point here is to 197 
demonstrate that inaction is in fact the same thing as despair. This 
does not mean, of course, that the answer is to heroically leap into the 
fray. If “Wrong life cannot be lived rightly” then nothing which 
presupposes wrong life can ever be right. And so it is life itself that we 
must change. Adorno’s argument here not only doesn’t counsel 
inaction, it demonstrates that the impasse that faces both action and 
inaction is a demand that the conditions of action themselves be 
transformed. This demand has the same extremity as Jesus’s 
injunction in the Sermon on the Mount: “Be ye perfect as your Father 
in heaven is perfect” (Mtt. 5.48). This cannot simply be a regulating 
ideal since it’s not an injunction to try to be perfect, any more than 
Adorno’s argument allows one to simply try to act rightly. It is not 
enough, according to Jesus’s reasoning, simply to do no wrong, nor 
simply to repress one’s impulse to do wrong for the benefit of society: 
one must become the sort of person to whom it never even occurs to 
do wrong, a sort of person that does not yet exist. 
  Adorno and Christianity seem to coincide here, and I do not 
think it’s a coincidence. Surprisingly frequently in Minima Moralia 
Adorno approvingly cites theological concepts, even the strange 
doctrine of Christendom concerning the resurrection of the flesh (MM 
242). But often the text silently appropriates Christianity in such a 
way that it can be easily missed, as when Adorno advises philosophers 
that “they should try always to lose the argument, but in such a way 
as to convict their opponent of untruth” (MM 70). This is plainly an 
application to the sphere of intellectual life of the Christian doctrine of 
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order to convict the violent in the court of their own hearts. The 
Christian doctrine concerning property produces much the same 
difficulties as Adorno’s argument about private life in passage number 
two, and it is similarly susceptible of misreading. A man comes to 
Jesus and asks what he must do in order to enter the Kingdom of God, 
given that he keeps the commandments: “What,” he says, 
“do I still lack?” Jesus said to him “If you wish to be 
perfect, go, sell your possessions, and give the money to 
the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; then come, 
follow me.” When the young man heard this word, he went 
away grieving, for he had many possessions. 
  Then Jesus said to his disciples, “Truly I tell you, it 
will be hard for a rich person to enter the kingdom of 
heaven. Again I tell you, it is easier for a camel to go 
through the eye of a needle than for someone who is rich 
to enter the kingdom of God.” (Mtt. 19.20-4) 
This piece of advice seems straightforward: only those with nothing 
will be saved. But if that is true, then giving all that one has to the 
poor necessarily involves condemning those whom you are attempting 
to help. In light of this, it seems almost better to hoard one’s 
possessions at the cost of one’s salvation rather than to propagate the 
pestilence of wealth. Even if one did set about to give everything away, 
it would be impossible to achieve the condition of having nothing at all 
without actually becoming nothing. In other words, we might see this 
as a variant of the paradox of the heap, that a merely quantitative 
subtraction is supposed to free one of the qualitative state of being 
rich. Hence, “When the disciples heard this, they were greatly 
astounded and said, ‘Then who can be saved?’ But Jesus looked at 
them and said, ‘For mortals it is impossible, but for God all things are 
possible’” (Mtt. 19.25-6). In other words, we are right to think that 199 
even giving everything away would not be enough.132 Here again, both 
leaping into action and resigning ourselves to riches prove to be 
catastrophically inadequate to our moral obligations. And here, as in 
Adorno, those moral obligations are a product of the sheer fact that 
others are poor. As Adorno says elsewhere in Minima Moralia, in trying 
to describe what an emancipated society would look like, “There is 
tenderness only in the coarsest demand: that no-one shall go hungry 
any more” (MM 156). But the most important thing that connects these 
two arguments is that a question that seems to be a matter of personal 
right, and which is confined in the present to the sphere of private life, 
is in fact burdened with the weight of an absolute demand. In other 
words, ethics is inhabited by theology. 
  The question, then, is how it is possible to meet this demand. 
We can hardly just glue together a metaphysics that seeks to open “to 
human beings as a possibility that to which theology compels them” 
and a morality for which we must do what it is only possible for God to 
do. Minima Moralia itself opens with a declaration that its project is to 
do philosophy “from the standpoint of subjective experience” but then 
ends with a declaration that “The only philosophy which can be 
                                       
132 The orthodox misreading of this statement sees it as emphasizing, in Paulist 
fashion, the primacy of gratia gratis data over justitia ex operibus. The point, 
however, is not Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten, but rather that salvation can only 
come about through the agency of the Absolute (which is not some being dwelling in 
the beyond or the Being of beings or any such paganism, but realized Spirit—the 
content of free collectivity), whereas right action is the proper domain of the 
individual. We need not choose between nature and grace; we need only realize that 
we may act rightly on our own but that we can redeem the world only by acting 
collectively, and, since right action is bound up with redemption, ethics (as ethos, 
personal virtue) must become morality (as mores, collective virtue). The truth of the 
human being is in the negativity through which it exceeds itself. Or, to put it another 
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responsibly practiced in the face of despair is the attempt to 
contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the 
standpoint of redemption” (MM 18, 247). If we are to make sense of 
Minima Moralia, we must find a way to reconcile those two 
standpoints, to wear, so to speak, both the tiny uncomfortable shoes 
of man and the enormous clown shoes of God.  
  In the midst of criticizing Nietzsche for blind devotion to the 
category of genuineness, Adorno claims that “The self should not be 
spoken of as the ontological ground, but at the most theologically, in 
the name of its likeness to God. He who holds fast the self and does 
away with theological concepts helps to justify the diabolical positive, 
naked interest” (MM 154). To speak of the self “theologically” just is to 
speak of it “in the name of its likeness to God”—a likeness that the 
syntax of this construction presupposes. If the redemption of the world 
is linked to what is divine in human beings (or to the manner in which 
theology inhabits practice), then the crux to which this passage points 
is the relation between the human and the divine, a relation identified 
with the image (Bild) and thereby perhaps to the aesthetic. 
  One significant strand of the argument of Aesthetic Theory is the 
attempt to negotiate between a subject-aesthetics concerned with the 
perceiver of art and an object-aesthetics concerned with the artwork 
itself. Kant is particularly important for Adorno in terms of the former: 
“What is revolutionary in the Critique of Judgment is that without 
leaving the circle of the older effect-aesthetics Kant at the same time 
restricted it through immanent criticism; this is in keeping with the 
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objective effort to save objectivity through the analysis of subjective 
elements” (AT 10). Kant, on Adorno’s account, attempts to think what 
is objective about the subjective experience of art, thus pushing 
subject-aesthetics towards object-aesthetics. Hegel, by virtue of his 
insistence on conceiving substance as subject, pushes object-
aesthetics reciprocally back towards subject-aesthetics. The missing 
element in this attempt to draw man-made things closer to man is that 
which is neither, namely Nature, which Hegel excludes from aesthetics 
up front and which Adorno seeks to reintroduce. Through the category 
of nature (and natural beauty), Adorno tries to think through what in 
the object is opaque to subjectivity, what in Negative Dialectic and 
elsewhere he calls the non-identical. The alienness of nature, on 
Adorno’s account, contains the promise of something other than what 
is, however fragile that promise might be: “Natural beauty is the trace 
of the nonidentical in things under the spell of universal identity. As 
long as this spell prevails, the nonidentical has no positive existence. 
Therefore natural beauty remains as dispersed and uncertain as what 
it promises, that which surpasses all human immanence” (AT 73). If 
nature “promises . . . that which surpasses all human immanence,” 
then nature’s promise is essentially transcendental, which is just to 
say theological. This shows why Adorno’s theology cannot take an 
affirmative form (for example, a proof of the existence of God); theology 
in Adorno always marks the moment in which immanence is ruptured 
by something undialectical, and it is crucial for Adorno that this 
breaking-through is a breaking-out from within, not a messianic 202 
interruption from elsewhere. Adorno goes on to link natural beauty to 
the experience of art:  
Involuntarily and unconsciously, the observer enters into 
a contract with the work, agreeing to submit to it on 
condition that it speak. In the pledged receptivity of the 
observer, pure self-abandonment—that moment of free 
exhalation in nature—survives. Natural beauty shares the 
weakness of every promise with that promise’s 
inextinguishability. . . . Contrary to that philosopher of 
identity, Hegel, natural beauty is close to the truth but 
veils itself at the moment of greatest proximity. This, too, 
art learned from natural beauty. The boundary 
established against fetishism of nature—the pantheistic 
subterfuge that would amount to nothing but an 
affirmative mask appended to an endlessly repetitive 
fate—is drawn by the fact that nature, as it stirs mortally 
and tenderly in its beauty, does not yet exist. The shame 
felt in the face of natural beauty stems from the damage 
implicitly done to what does not yet exist by taking it for 
existent. The dignity of nature is that of the not-yet-
existing; by its expression it repels intentional 
humanization. (AT 73-4) 
So nature appears in both the experience of art, on the side of subject-
aesthetics, and in the work of art itself, on the side of object 
aesthetics. In the end Adorno is interested in art, not nature, but 
through the category of nature he is able to get at what in art is alien 
to cognition. Artworks are made by human beings, and so can never 
be nature, but nature nevertheless emerges in art. This can take the 
form of the “genius” who appears in the passage from Negative 
Dialektik with which we began, who is able to bring into being “the 
self-awareness of nature in subjects,” or it can take the form of the 
aesthetic observer in this passage from Aesthetic Theory who is willing 
to indulge in “pure self-abandonment,” to lose his life in order to save 
it (Mtt. 16.25). As Adorno says earlier in Aesthetic Theory, “Human 203 
beings are not equipped positively with dignity; rather, dignity would 
be exclusively what they have yet to achieve” (AT 62). Nature, then, 
whose “dignity . . . is that of the not-yet-existent” already has dignity 
but it does not have existence; human beings have only existence, and 
the element of nature calls out to them to achieve dignity, to realize 
what nature can only promise. Just so, Jesus emphasizes the 
immanence of the kingdom of God: “The kingdom of God is not coming 
with things that can be observed; nor will they say, ‘Look, here it is!’ or 
‘There it is!’ For, in fact, the kingdom of God is within all of you [entos 
humōn]” (Lk. 17.20-1). There is no world beyond or behind this one, no 
life beyond this life, no messiah swooping down to rescue us on 
glittering pinions—to become other than we are is the entirety of our 
task. It is this possibility that metaphysics holds open by preserving 
theology. 
  If the vocation of philosophy is the teaching of the right life, then 
the vocation of art is to spur the transformation of consciousness that 
could bring that life into being. Art’s promise dwells in its very opacity, 
since thinking the non-identical can hardly leave the thinking subject 
untransformed. Theology designates both the absoluteness of the 
demand that suffering come to an end as well as the hope that lies in 
becoming other than we are—the hope, we might say, in despair itself. 
If part of the lesson of Adorno’s work is that it is not possible to escape 
metaphysics if one wants to think, then I would add that it is equally 
not possible to escape theology if one wants to act. Theology’s vocation 
for Adorno is to function as the undialectical lever that teaches 
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preserving its negativity, as the infinite demand and the concrete 
enigma, to see in the very brokenness of the world some intimation of 
how it might be otherwise. And the vocation of poetry is to embody this 
consummate negativity of thought, for poetic language is essentially 
negative. 
  The language of Browning’s poetry, if our discussion in the last 
chapter of My Last Duchess was any indication, embodies this 
negativity in a very emphatic way. And it is no coincidence that this 
negativity of Browning’s poetic language cohabits with his persistent 
interest in the transcendental. The word transcendental was even one 
of the main sticks with which contemporary critics were keen to beat 
him. Carlyle’s version of metaphysics bore much of the responsibility 
for the currency of the word transcendentalism, and one Browning 
biographer even suggests, though surely with tongue parked in cheek, 
that “Browning was not far from being a poetic Carlyle” (Irvine and 
Honan 84). 
For Carlyle, of course, transcendentalism was a good thing, but 
it was no so with Browning’s critics. One reviewer complained that 
Browning’s long early poem Sordello “carries us too far into regions of 
transcendentalism” (Athenaeum, 30 May 1840); ten years later, “the 
Athenaeum critic of [Browning’s] Christmas-Eve and Easter-Day 
censured the double-poem as ‘highly transcendental’, ruling that 
‘transcendentalism delivered in doggerel verse has … the effect of a 
discord’” (Browning, Oxford ed. 468; Athenaeum, 6 Apr. 1850). 
Transcendental, in other words, was more often than not a calumny 
against Browning’s subject matter, and was often coupled with the 205 
accusation that his style was needlessly esoteric. As G.K. Chesterton 
observes: 
There had been [before then] authors whom it was fashionable 
to boast of admiring and authors whom it was fashionable to 
boast of despising; but with Sordello enters into literary history 
the Browning of popular badinage, the author whom it is 
fashionable to boast of not understanding. (20-1) 
In later years, from the members of the Browning Society, Browning 
received a more sympathetic audience—really too sympathetic an 
audience, since their praise put the man himself on edge. But 
Browning’s reputation thus swung round entirely: from being accused 
of propounding transcendental blather in doggerel to being praised as 
one of the great Sages of the era. Both the abuse and the encomium 
are, of course, wrong-headed in their confusion between the properties 
of the poems and the mental states of the author (Browning did, after 
all, go to considerable trouble to emphasize that the speakers in his 
monologues were not him), but they provide a useful perspective for 
understanding just how negative a relation Browning’s poems had 
with their historical moment. 
  One pair of recurring ideas in Browning’s poetry is particularly 
illuminating on this point. According to G.K. Chesterton, who derives 
much of what he says from his understanding of Saul and book X of 
The Ring & the Book, it 
may be expressed in two comparatively parallel phrases. 
The first was what may be called the hope which lies in 
the imperfection of man[:]…the idea that some hope may 
always be based on deficiency itself[.]…The second of the 
great Browning doctrines requires some audacity to 
express. It can only be properly stated as the hope that 
lies in the imperfection of God. That is to say, that 
Browning held that sorrow and self-denial, if they were the 
burdens of man, were also his privileges. He held that 206 
these stubborn sorrows and obscure valours might, to use 
a yet more strange expression, have provoked the envy of 
the Almighty. If man has self-sacrifice and God has none, 
then man has in the Universe a secret and blasphemous 
superiority. (105) 
To put it in the terminology we began with, Browning’s poetry has two 
cognitive vectors, both of them, in a crucial sense, negative: a 
metaphysics which points to theology, and a theology which points to 
metaphysics.  
The ideal poetic form for reflecting on the imperfection of man is, 
of course, the dramatic monologue, the kind of lyric Browning is 
primarily known for and which he refined as no-one else has. The 
point of the dramatic monologue form is that one can attain to the 
truth of a whole drama through the fragmentary perspective of a single 
character, addressing a usually silent auditor. This notion is already 
implicit in Aristotle’s observation in the Poetics that, although poems, 
like all artworks, are concrete particulars, “poetry is something more 
philosophic and of graver import than history, since poetry rather 
speaks universally [katholou], whereas history speaks the particular 
[hekaston]” (1451b5-7, my trans.). Poetry is thus not like philosophy, 
which articulates the realm of the Concept through abstract 
propositions, but it is also not merely particular: it gets at the 
universal  through the particular—the negativity of the particular’s 
particularity. Since language is necessarily conceptual, poetry must 
turn language against itself in order to form a particularity irreducible 
to statement which nevertheless says something. And for this reason, 
we must turn to the subtle nuances of Browning’s language if we are 207 
to have any hope of articulating the thought which unfolds through 
his poems. 
  An Epistle Containing the Strange Medical Experience of 
Karshish, the Arab Physician is a piece of fictional New Testament 
apocrypha modeled on Paul’s epistles. The year is 66AD and Karshish, 
a travelling Arab physician of genial temperament and highly rational, 
empirical cast of mind, is writing to his teacher Abib about his recent 
travels in the vicinity of Jerusalem, enumerating various diseases, 
cures, and medicines he has come across; in the midst of this, he 
mentions the subject which quickly dominates the contents of the 
letter: the curious case of a Jew he met who claimed to have been 
brought back to life by a physician of his tribe after he had been stone 
dead for three whole days. Karshish’s diagnosis is that 
‘T is but a case of mania—subinduced 
By epilepsy, at the turning-point 
Of trance prolonged unduly some three days (79-81) 
a condition which the “learned leech” (247) must have cured by some 
unknown medical means. He attempts to end the letter there, and 
repeatedly declares that he’s going to stop writing and send it off, but 
he keeps returning to his conversation with this man Lazarus and his 
friends. Karshish finds the medical details intriguing, but even more 
so the strange things that Lazarus has said to him: 
This man so cured regards the curer, then, 
As—God forgive me! who but God himself, 
Creator and sustainer of the world, 
That came and dwelt in flesh on it awhile! (267-70) 
Karshish dwells himself on the case of Lazarus for a while, and the 
poem ends, somewhat ambivalently, on the brink of conversion. Most 
of the poem’s 300-odd lines are taken up with Karshish’s observations 208 
about the strange things that Lazarus says and does, and it’s 
understandable that Lazarus would be an interesting subject, both for 
Karshish and for Browning: he is brought back from the dead, mainly 
as a windup to Jesus declaring himself “the resurrection and the life” 
(Jn. 11:25), and, having experienced Heaven for himself, is now stuck 
waiting around until the Day of Wrath so that he can get back. The 
poem puts us in Karshish’s shoes, giving us an estranged perspective 
on these strange Biblical events.  
The name “Karshish” is apparently derived from an Arabic word 
meaning “one who gathers,” especially sticks; he translates his own 
name in the first line of the poem: “Karshish, the picker-up of 
learning’s crumbs.” This is usually taken as an allusion to Matthew 
15:27, in which “a non-Israelite woman claims help from Jesus, 
saying: ‘yet the dogs eat of the crumbs which fall from the masters’ 
table’” (Jack and Smith ed., 89). But a more illuminating Biblical 
parallel comes from the Acts of the Apostles, in which Paul, during his 
visit to Athens, is called by some Epicurean and Stoic philosophers a 
spermologos, which is usually translated as “babbler” (Acts 17:18). The 
Greek word in its literal sense refers to birds who pick up seeds (Gk. 
sperma), but is used metaphorically to refer to “one who picks up 
scraps of knowledge” (Liddell and Scott). This similarity of epithets 
suggests an analogy between Paul and Karshish, which is plausible 
considering that Paul also wanders around the ancient near east, 
periodically suffering beatings, imprisonment and expulsion from cities 
for his teachings. Similarly, Karshish writes: 
Twice have the robbers stripped and beaten me, 
And once a town declared me for a spy. (32-3) 209 
 The analogy only goes so far, since Karshish is looking to learn things 
and Paul is looking to teach them, but Karshish functions in this poem 
as something of an apostle to us positivist moderns, just as Paul is the 
apostle to the Gentiles. Karshish is, like many of Browning’s 
contemporaries, vaguely theistic (in the second line, he calls himself 
“The not-incurious in God’s handiwork”) but in substance he is a 
materialist, deeming what can be experienced by the senses the 
primary criterion of truth. He functions, then, as a point of 
identification for the Victorian Zeitgeist. Karshish also differs from Paul 
in that he does not speak directly of Christ, but of Lazarus, who in 
turn speaks of Christ, thus adding another link in the chain of 
mediations, a further remove from any affirmative theological 
declarations. 
  To a very similar extent, there’s an analogy in the poem between 
Lazarus and Christ, most importantly in that both are figures for 
mediation. The mediation represented by Christ is at the very heart of 
Christianity: the incarnation. For Browning, the incarnation and 
crucifixion fulfill “the hope that lies in the imperfection of God”: once 
God has suffered and died on the cross, man no longer has this “secret 
and blasphemous superiority.” Christ is, for Browning, the realization 
of divine love, the mediating element in the trinity of God the father, 
who represents power, and the holy spirit, who represents knowledge. 
Christ thus mediates not just the relation between God and man but 
the relation between God and himself. Just as Christ as mediator 
addresses “the hope that lies in the imperfection of God,” Lazarus 
addresses “the hope that lies in the imperfection of man.” But Lazarus 210 
is very far from preaching either like Jesus or like Paul: Karshish 
writes, 
Hence, I perceive not he affects to preach 
The doctrine of his sect whate’er it be, 
Make proselytes as madmen thirst to do: 
How can he give his neighbor the real ground, 
His own conviction? (213-7) 
Lazarus’ inability to provide “the real ground” suggests that if he is a 
figure for mediation, it must be a mediation which is very different 
from Christ’s, somehow incomplete.  
One section of the poem is especially illuminating of the nature 
of Karshish’s position, and it constitutes a sort of lens through which 
the rest of the poem comes into focus: 
He holds on firmly to some thread of life— 
(It is the life to lead perforcedly) 
Which runs across some vast distracting orb 
Of glory on either side that meagre thread, 
Which, conscious of, he must not enter yet— 
The spiritual life around the earthly life: 
The law of that is known to him as this, 
His heart and brain move there, his feet stay here. 
So is the man perplext with impulses 
Sudden to start off crosswise, not straight on, 
Proclaiming what is right and wrong across, 
And not along, this black thread through the blaze— 
‘It should be’ baulked by ‘here it cannot be.’ (178-90) 
One line that stands out right away is the second (179), a 
parenthetical interjection that is the only moment in the passage that 
smacks of editorializing. It is conspicuous if for no other reason than 
that the more you look at it the less clear its meaning is. One way to 
understand it is on analogy with constructions like It is the car to drive 
or It is the way to go. Both of those suggest that there are available 
alternatives, other cars and other ways, but that the specified 211 
alternative is the best of these; so Browning’s line might be glossed as 
‘It is the life one should lead,’ suggesting that, even if this isn’t the best 
of all possible worlds, this is the best of all possible lives. This reading 
implies, however, that Lazarus has some sort of choice, that he can 
choose another life, but the fact that this is not so is enforced by the 
odd word “perforcedly,” which means something like ‘of necessity.’ In 
other words, the line does not mean ‘It is the life one should lead,’ but 
rather ‘It is the life one must lead.’ The word ‘perforce,’ deriving from 
the Middle French par force, literally ‘by force,’ originally meant, 
according to the OED, “by application of physical force or violence,” 
and was later weakened to “by constraint of circumstances.” This 
peculiar adverbial form of the word, perforcedly, is listed in the OED 
with only a single citation—this poem. What it suggests is that Lazarus 
is not so much leading as being led, dragged along violently by God 
and circumstance. He is trapped in the sphere of immanence, which 
obviously, if he did have a choice, he would get out of but quick, and 
the necessity that binds him is both earthly and divine. This is exactly 
the opposite of Jesus, the pathos of whose self-sacrifice comes from 
his willingness to suffer and die. 
  But although Lazarus is thus penned into immanence, he 
cannot reconcile himself to it because of the “vast distracting orb / Of 
glory” that he is “conscious of.” One thing which this passage 
dramatically underscores, and which I will come back to presently, is 
the figure of the poetic line itself, identified at various points with the 
“thread of life” that Lazarus “holds on firmly to.” Here the “orb / Of 
glory” runs over the line break, connecting through syntax what the 212 
lineation interrupts, and thereby suggesting the fullness of 
transcendent meaning to which Lazarus is denied access. The “orb / 
Of glory,” in other words, can’t be contained either by the line of life or 
by the line of verse. He is nevertheless conscious enough of that 
sphere to be tormented by its inaccessibility. The word distract 
originally meant “to rend into parts or sections; to divide,” and here it 
indicates not just the fact that Lazarus is pulled in different directions 
but that his torment is the consciousness of the gulf between 
immanence and transcendence. 
  This divide finds explicit form in line 183: “The spiritual life 
around the earthly life,” a balanced and symmetrical line, verbless and 
static. Moreover, it is not syntactically related to either the previous or 
to the following lines, and no nearby verb applies to it: it is suspended, 
hanging on nothing like Lazarus’s “thread of life” itself. The split 
between transcendence and immanence that it names is complicated, 
however, in the following line, which only implicitly symmetrical: “The 
law of that is known to him as this.” The most plausible reading of this 
line is, assuming that the deictics refer to the entities in the previous 
line: ‘The law of the spiritual life is known to him as the law of the 
earthly life.’ But the ellipsis of words that would qualify “this” opens 
the possibility of other readings, like ‘The law of the spiritual life is 
known to him as the earthly life itself.’ One reading suggests that the 
transcendent law gives the rule to immanence; the other reading 
suggests that the sphere of immanence is his only access to the 
transcendent law. On top of marking the gulf between transcendence 
and immanence, this line thus also brings into play an ambiguity 213 
about whether Lazarus has access to transcendence immediately or 
only mediated through this world—and it’s a matter of some 
importance because the latter reading can always slide into the 
justification of this world, imagining that the world with all its horrors 
is as it should be. The tension between transcendence and immanence 
is thus linked to the tension between Ought and Is. 
  In the following line, this gulf is registered in Lazarus himself, as 
if he were a monad of the divided cosmos: “His heart and brain move 
there, his feet stay here.” The asymmetry and movement introduced 
through the ambiguity of the previous line is fully realized here in the 
explicit opposition between move and stay and in an asymmetrical 
division of the self in which one side has two terms, “heart and brain,” 
and the other has only “feet.” The transition from asymmetrical, 
hypotactic constructions in the first five lines to symmetrical, 
paratactic constructions in the following three is thus internally 
reversed within those three by an increasing drift toward internal 
asymmetry. The tripartite division in Lazarus’s internal constitution 
even roughly mirrors Browning’s trinity of knowledge, love and power, 
though power finds incomplete expression in Lazarus’s immobile 
“feet.” The love and knowledge that correspond to Lazarus’a “heart and 
brain” are stranded in transcendence, unable, so it seems, to come 
down to earth and allow Lazarus “to give his neighbor the real ground 
/ [of] His conviction.” 
  But the following line, which swiftly drags us back into 
hypotaxis, shows how knowledge and love, even though inaccessible, 
continue to affect him: “So is the man perplext with impulses / 214 
Sudden to start off crosswise.” These “impulses” that perplex him 
seem to have crossed the gulf between transcendence and immanence, 
but they appear as prodigies, marked by the peculiar line break: 
“Sudden” is an adjective modifying “impulses,” but the two have been 
both inverted and divided by the line break, injecting a jagged energy 
that directs him “to start off crosswise,” against the grain of the 
“thread of life” to which he clings “perforcedly” as it sweeps him into 
the current. The twisting and rupture the lineation presents here is 
underscored by the use of the word perplex, which in English 
originally had an abstract, psychological meaning, viz., “to fill (a 
person) with uncertainty as to the nature or treatment of a thing by 
reason of its involved or intricate character,” but later developed the 
concrete meaning of “render[ing] (a thing) intricate or complicated in 
character and hence difficult to understand” and “caus[ing] to become 
tangled.” The Latin word which it derives from, perplexus, followed 
exactly the opposite trajectory, referring originally to things being 
“interwoven, entangled, involved, intricate” and moving toward the 
abstract psychological meaning of perplexity. The intervention of the 
transcendent in the person of Lazarus has the effect of tangling his 
line of life and tangling the lines of verse, dragging the reader against 
the current of the syntax. 
  These interwoven lines continue to describe the divine impulses 
to which Lazarus is subject as specifically moral, impelling Lazarus to 
proclaim “what is right and wrong across, / And not along, this black 
thread through the blaze.” The internal rhyme between “wrong” and 
“along” associates the morally defective with the sphere of immanence, 215 
the habit of proceeding along the “thread of life” as if it were the only 
reality. The impetus to violate this condition, to remake the world as 
Heaven or to demand that it be so remade, remains merely an 
impetus; Lazarus cannot fulfill the command in action as Christ fulfills 
the plan for salvation in undergoing the crucifixion. He remains bound 
to “this black thread through the blaze,” the sphere of immanence 
whose tightly woven net is registered in the rigid equivalences of 
alliteration: “this” and “the,” “thread” and “through,” “black” and 
“blaze.” The movement of his “heart and brain” cannot be realized, and 
for this reason, the “thread of life” becomes “this black thread,” a body 
which absorbs the divine light without remainder. Thus the passage 
ends with another assertion of the gulf between transcendence and 
immanence, Ought and Is, but this time, unlike “The spiritual life 
around the earthly life,” the line has a verb, which leaves the world 
abject and horrifying, untouched by heavenly fire: “‘It should be’ 
baulked by ‘here it cannot be.’” 
  Lazarus is here seemingly the opposite of Christ, bearing the 
seal not of hope but of despair. But as Adorno observes in Negative 
Dialektik, “Consciousness could not even despair over the grey, did it 
not harbor the notion of a different color, whose dispersed traces are 
not absent in the negative whole” (370). Lazarus could not suffer 
despair at all had he not seen Heaven first-hand; he could not lament 
the course of the world were he not painfully conscious of the way the 
world should be. Lazarus suffers from the demand of theology that the 
world be redeemed, without finding any comfort in theology’s 
promises—not “the hope that lies in the imperfection of man” but ‘the 216 
hope that lies in the despair of redemption.’ He is a figure for fruitless 
waiting, and embodies the position of metaphysics, which gazes across 
the gulf at what should be the case but which it cannot think, much 
less bring into being by Divine fiat. Lazarus’ ‘thread of life’ that ‘runs 
across some vast distracting orb / Of glory,’ his ‘impulses / …to start 
off crosswise, … / Proclaiming what is right and wrong across’—all of 
these, drifting outward in the course of the passage, echo that other 
cross which symbolizes the paradox and conflict at the heart of 
Christianity—an infinite demand to which only God can be adequate 
but to which we must nevertheless strain, always falling short. We 
ourselves are, so to speak, nailed to the cross of metaphysics. 
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Appendix A 
Micrological Theses 
 
Critical Maxims 
 
  The aim of art is to induce thought; the aim of entertainment is to 
discourage thought. 
  A poem is, in itself, quite useless; for readers, its use is to make 
them think. 
  Poetry is true to the world as it is by being true to the world as it 
might be. 
  Poems are immanently historical but transcendentally ahistorical. 
  Poems demand interpretation but elude interpretations. 
  Interpretations are made, not found. 
  There are many true interpretations, in a vast sea of false ones. 
  The one true meaning of a poem is in the conflict of its many true 
meanings. 
  The critic learns what to argue by arguing, just as the swimmer 
learns to swim by swimming. 
  The true critic does not think about herself through the poem; the 
true critic allows the poem to think about itself through her. 
  Criticism is the art of fine distinctions. 
  Criticism sees the individual in the general; Science sees the general 
in the individual. 
  Criticism moves from the inside out, Science from the outside in. 
  Science wants to know what will happen; Criticism wants to be 218 
surprised. 
  Science sees the simple in the complex; Criticism sees the complex 
in the simple. 
 
Critical Theses 
 
AXIOM: The method of literary criticism must be an immanent rather 
than a transcendent method, i.e., its methodology is to discover its 
interpretive method within the work itself, rather than arriving at the 
work with a prior interpretive method. 
  Remark 1. This axiom follows of necessity from the fact 
that the status of a poem as a poem is linked to its 
particularity (which prevents it from being a possible 
object of science). As Aristotle says in Poetics 1451b5-7: 
“Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver 
import than history, since poetry rather speaks universally 
[katholou], whereas history speaks the particular 
[hekaston]” (my translation) [dio kai philosophôteron kai 
spoudaioteron poiêsis historias estin: hê men gar poiêsis 
mallon ta katholou, hê d’historia ta kath’hekaston legei]. 
Literature is thus not philosophy (which speaks the 
universal universally) or history (which speaks the 
particular particularly) because its universality is 
mediated by particularity. See also, Wimsatt, “The 
Concrete Universal,” in The Verbal Icon. 219 
  Remark 2. To come to a work of literature with a positive 
interpretive methodology (i.e., a methodology with any   
particular content) is to presume to read the work in 
advance of reading it. Immanent criticism is not as 
difficult as it sounds, since it is, in truth, what most of us 
do in practice (who decides to write an essay on a work 
they have never read?). The question is not whether or not 
to do immanent criticism, but whether or not one will do it 
knowingly, deliberately, and rigorously. 
  Remark 3. This stricture does not preclude a strictly 
descriptive methodology (namely, linguistics), since 
description does not presume to know the particularity of 
the work but only presumes to know the language the 
work is in—which indeed one must know in advance of 
reading since one would otherwise be unable to read the 
work. 
  Example. If a critic came to a work with the presumption 
that it was bound to subvert the prevailing ideologies of 
the time in which it was written, the critic would presume 
to know the work in advance of knowing it and the critic 
would find only his own reflection on the opaque surface 
of the work. 
  Reference. See Adorno, “Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft” in 
Prismen, and “Der Essay als Form” in Noten zur Literatur. 
See also Hegel, PhS 54ff. 
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THE FOUR CAUSES: Aristotle argues that there are four kinds of ‘why’ 
questions we can address to a thing, four kinds of ‘causes’ we might 
seek (‘cause’ is aition, which can mean something more like 
explanation than cause): (1) The Formal Cause: What kind of thing is 
it? (2) The Material Cause: What is it made of? (3) The Efficient Cause: 
Who made it as it is? (4) The Final Cause: What is it for? 
  Reference 1. “Now that we have established these 
distinctions, we must proceed to consider causes, their 
character and number. Knowledge is the object of our 
inquiry, and men do not think they know a thing till they 
have grasped the ‘why’ of it (which is to grasp its primary 
cause). So clearly we too must do this as regards both 
coming to be and passing away and every kind of natural 
change, in order that, knowing their principles, we my try 
to refer to these principles each of our problems. 
    “In one way, then, that out of which a thing comes 
to be and which persists, is called a cause, e.g. the bronze 
of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the genera of 
which the bronze and silver are species. 
    “In another way, the form or archetype, i.e. the 
definition of the essence, and its genera, are called causes 
(e.g. of the octave the relation of 2:1, and generally 
number), and the parts in the definition. 
    “Again, the primary source of the change or rest; 
e.g. the man who deliberated is a cause, the father is 221 
cause of the child, and generally what makes of what is 
made and what changes of what is changed. 
    “Again, in the sense of end or that for the sake of 
which a thing is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking 
about. (‘Why is he walking about?’ We say: ‘To be healthy’, 
and, having said that, we think we have assigned the 
cause.) The same is also true of all the intermediate steps 
which are brought about through the action of something 
else as means toward the end, e.g. reduction of flesh, 
purging, drugs, or surgical instruments are means toward 
health. All these things are for the sake of the end, though 
they differ from one another in that some are activities, 
others instruments.” (Arist. Physics 194b16-195a3) 
  Reference 2. “Evidently we have to acquire knowledge of 
the original causes (for we say we know each thing only 
when we think we recognize its first cause), and causes 
are spoken of in four senses. In one of these we mean the 
substance, i.e. the essence (for the ‘why’ is referred finally 
to the formula [λόγος], and the ultimate ‘why’ is a cause 
and principle); in another the matter or substratum, in a 
third the source of the change, and in a fourth the cause 
opposed to this, that for the sake of which and the good 
(for this is the end of all generation and change).” (Arist. 
Metaphysics 983a24-34) 
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I. THE FORMAL CAUSE: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE AESTHETIC? 
  1. Natural objects have their formal causes within themselves. 
  Example.  An acorn becomes a tree by virtue of the nature 
of the acorn; nothing about the sun or the water which 
make this change possible determines that the acorn 
specifically become a tree, or indeed that it change at all. 
  Remark.  Linguistic development is similarly inner-
directed, and so it must be defined in terms of its essential 
properties not in terms of environment, which precludes a 
behaviorist conception of language—it would be just as 
plausible as a behaviorist theory of how an acorn becomes 
an oak. As Chomsky says, it would actually make more 
sense to talk about ‘language growth’ than to talk about 
‘language learning’ (“Language and Nature” 13-5). 
  Reference. See Aristotle, Physics 192b9ff. 
  2. Artificial objects have their formal causes outside of 
themselves. 
  Example.  Wood becomes a coffin or a coffer because an 
external agent, the carpenter, makes it a coffin or a coffer. 
  Remark.  With both natural and artificial objects, their 
efficient causes are outside themselves, and the efficient 
cause is a sufficient explanation only of the object’s bare 
existence not, for example, its significance or its ousia. 
  3. Aesthetic objects are non-instrumental (autotelic) artificial 
objects (see IV below). 223 
  4. Works of literature are aesthetic objects made of language (see 
II below). 
 
II. THE MATERIAL CAUSE: WHAT IS LITERATURE MADE OF? 
  1. Literature is made of language. More precisely, Literature is 
made of sentences. 
  Remark 1. A random string of words, however amusing, 
might be a work of art of some kind, but it could not be a 
poem or a work of prose fiction. The term literature is 
misleading in this sense, since for most of its history it 
refers to anything written, i.e., composed in letters, litteræ. 
The otherwise attractive German term Wortkunst is also 
misleading since literature is not really word-art but 
sentence-art. 
  Remark 2. The fact that literature is made out of sentences 
distinguishes works of literature from other kinds of 
aesthetic objects (which might be made out of granite or 
paint or noise), but it lumps literature together with some 
communicative acts, which is a source of much confusion 
about the meaning of literary works (see III below). 
  Remark 3. The fact that literature is made of language 
means that linguistics is a necessary prerequisite to 
literary study in a way that even history is not: we can 
imagine a theory of literature that denied that works of 
literature had any historical content whatsoever, however 
mistaken such a theory would be, whereas we cannot even 224 
imagine a theory of literature that denied that it was made 
of language. It follows that we are all doing linguistics, in 
the sense of presupposing and employing a theory of 
language, and the only question is whether we are going to 
do linguistics well or to do it badly (i.e., have plausible or 
implausible views about how human languages work). 
  Reference. See also Kiparsky, “The Role of Linguistics in a 
Theory of Poetry”: “the linguistic sames that are potentially 
relevant in poetry are just those which are potentially 
relevant in grammar.” For an accessible discussion of the 
premises of the current theory of language, see the first 
two chapters of Chomsky, Knowledge of Language: Its 
Nature, Origin, and Use (1986). 
  2. Poems are made of lineated sentences. 
  Remark. The fact of being broken up into lines is the sole 
feature that distinguishes poetry from prose fiction, and it 
follows that many syntactic phenomena that are of 
independent interest (e.g., ungrammaticality and 
ambiguity) will be just as significant in prose as in poetry. 
Poetry adds the additional problem of lineation, which 
produces a complex dialectic between syntactic and non-
syntactic units. There is some evidence that producing 
lineated language is a fundamental feature of the genetic 
endowment of the species, and in most cultures the bulk 
of the literary tradition—if not its entirety—is verse. Prose 225 
fiction is not thereby a lesser form, but it should be 
understood in its proper historical place. 
Remark 2. In some ways poetry is a misleading term since 
it has often had a normative force that allowed it to 
encompass various works that were not lineated and to 
exclude various works that were. The most appropriate 
terms is clearly verse, since it designates lineation both 
etymologically and as commonly used, but that word has 
the limitation of lacking a form that corresponds to poem. 
  3. Lineation can be constituted by one or more of the following 
determinations: 
  Remark.  These four can constitute the line, as well as 
performing other functions, but their bearing on 
interpretation will be exhaustively mediated by the line. A 
particular rhyme, for example, will not have significance 
independent of the sentences and lines in which it 
appears; its significance will unfold only through those 
sentences and lines. 
  a. Phonological Patterning (i.e., meter; see Appendix B) 
Reference. Kiparsky, “The rhythmic structure of English 
verse,” Linguistic Inquiry 8.2 (1977). 
  b. Phonetic Patterning (e.g., rhyme or alliteration) 
Remark. This is the one area in which there is much to be 
learned from the structuralist tradition, e.g., Jakobson 
and Levi-Strauss’s essay on Baudelaire’s Les Chats. The 
reason for this is that, despite the failure of structuralism 226 
to produce a plausible theory of human language in 
general, structuralism can be credited with some of the 
most important developments in phonetics in this century, 
particularly the feature system. 
 c.  {Typography} 
 Remark.  This only effectively constitutes the line, 
obviously, when the text is written; in an oral 
performance, this distinction would be lost, so this is not a 
systematically reliable means of constituting the line. 
 d.  {Performance} 
  Remark. One could certainly mark line breaks with pauses 
in a performance, but one could always perform a poem 
without such line breaks, so this is not a systematically 
reliable means of constituting the line (hence the 
prominence of phonological and phonetic patterning in 
every literary tradition). 
 
III. THE EFFICIENT CAUSE: WHAT OF THE AUTHOR? 
  1. In communicative uses of language, the linguistic facts are 
strictly instrumental and therefore contingent and eliminable. 
 Remark. Communication isn’t even necessarily linguistic, 
so the linguistic medium is in fact radically contingent. A 
person who is trying to communicate uses language, if at 
all, just to cause a mental representation (of some kind) to 
arise in the mind of her interlocutor that corresponds (in 
some sense) to a mental representation in her own mind. 227 
  2. In works of literature, the linguistic facts are necessary and 
ineliminable: the work just is a specific set of sentences (with line 
breaks, if verse). 
  Remark.  In practice, we do not have any difficulty 
distinguishing a paraphrase of a poem from the poem 
itself. If we run across a sentence that reads, “I don’t know 
whether to live or die, sink or swim, piss or get off the pot,” 
we may be reading something with its own manner of 
charm but we are not reading Hamlet. 
  3. Therefore, by modus tollens, works of literature cannot be 
communicative uses of language. 
  Remark.  Or to put it another way, the linguistic facts 
about a poem are not merely instrumental in relation to 
the poem (whereas the linguistic facts about an utterance 
are merely instrumental in relation to a communicative 
act). In this sense, poems are autotelic  (see section IV 
below). 
  4. In communicative uses of language, the utterances or 
expressions mean just what their author intends them to mean, 
regardless of what the sentences mean independently: a correct 
interpretation corresponds to what the author intended to 
communicate. 
  Remark. The word mean conceals an equivocation here. 
When we say Sally meant that she was sorry, we use the 
word mean to refer to Sally’s intention, not the meaning of 
the words she used; whereas when we say ‘diurnal’ means 228 
‘daily’ we refer to the meaning of the word regardless of 
what anyone might have intended to communicate by 
using it. 
  Example. If Sally from San Francisco says, while standing 
knee-deep in a snow bank, Lovely weather you have here 
in Ithaca, we are surely correct if we understand the 
meaning of her communicative act to be that the weather 
is horrible, even though the sentence she actually uttered 
says the opposite. The criterion of correctness for the 
interpretation of a communicative act is the intention of its 
author, regardless of whether or not we have any access to 
the information that would be salient to determining 
whether a given interpretation satisfies that criterion. In 
most cases, we are obliged to rely on guesswork to 
interpret communicative acts, and it is difficult to imagine 
a circumstance in which we could be absolutely certain 
that we have interpreted a sentence correctly—but it is the 
author’s intention that we are trying to guess. 
  Remark. One interesting consequence of this fact is that a 
sentence  qua communicative act cannot be ambiguous, 
even if it is formally so. In any actual communicative use, 
a sentence like Someone at every tomato will be taken in 
only one sense and the hearer will probably not even 
notice that it is formally ambiguous. Even if a hearer 
misunderstood what was being communicated because of 
a formal ambiguity and later corrected himself, he would 229 
still in each case be dealing only with a single meaning. At 
no point in a communicative act does a sentence have 
more than one mutually exclusive meaning for a particular 
hearer. There’s nothing ambiguous about Archie Bunker’s 
“What’s the difference?”; both he and his wife understand 
the sentence in only one way, and the difference between 
their interpretations marks their failure to communicate, 
not any deep complexity in language. Yeats’s “How can we 
know the dancer from the dance?”, however, is in fact 
ambiguous, and is, in itself, both rhetorical and non-
rhetorical at the same time in the sense that it can 
legitimately license both readings; to understand the poem 
itself, then, we must interpret the conflict of 
interpretations it produces. See DeMan, “Semiology and 
Rhetoric” in Allegories of Reading, and Cavell, “The Politics 
of Interpretation (Politics as Opposed to What?)” in Themes 
Out of School. 
  5. Since works of literature are not communicative uses of 
language, and since the linguistic facts that constitute the work of 
literature are necessary and not contingent, works of literature mean 
what their sentences mean, regardless of what their author intended 
them to mean: textual evidence and valid inferences therefrom are the 
sole criteria of the truth of an interpretation. 
  Remark 1. The comparison of poems with communicative 
acts involves some inherent equivocation since an 
interpretation of a communicative act can only be correct 230 
or incorrect not true or false, whereas an interpretation of a 
work of literature can be true  or false but not correct or 
incorrect, where truth has metaphysical content (as the 
unfolding of actuality). 
  Remark 2. If the author’s views are not the criterion of 
meaning, it follows that the author’s personal defects do 
not vitiate the value of his work as art. Wagner’s repulsive 
anti-Semitism or David Mamet’s shameless apologetics for 
the Jews-only state, neither renders their works politically 
suspect unless those works are politically suspect in 
themselves (as with the explicitly anti-Semitic elements of 
Parsifal). 
Reference. The classic statement of the anti-intentionalist 
position is Wimsatt and Beardsley’s “The Intentional 
Fallacy” in Wimsatt’s The Verbal Icon, though I prefer the 
formulations in Wimsatt’s later essay, benefiting as it does 
from hindsight, “Genesis: An Argument Resumed” in Day 
of the Leopards. As he puts it there: “the intention of a 
literary artist qua intention as neither a valid ground for 
arguing the presence of a quality or a meaning in a given 
instance of his literary work nor a valid criterion for 
judging the value of that work” (12). 
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IV. THE FINAL CAUSE: WHAT IS LITERATURE FOR? 
  A. The End of Literature: Interpretation 
    1. In themselves (that is, immanently) artworks do not have an 
external end (III.1), but for a reader (that is, transcendently) they do 
have an external end, namely interpretation.  
Remark  This point is analogous in certain respects to 
Kant’s claim in the third critique that artworks have 
“purposiveness without purpose” (5:236), though Kant’s 
account has to do with the experience of art rather than 
the interpretation of it or the reflection on it, which is why 
he has such trouble attributing cognitive content to 
artworks. This point is also closely related to Adorno’s 
account of the Rätselcharakter (‘enigma-character’) of art, 
for which see AT 118-36. 
    2. Works of literature are inherently particular (I.rem1), but if 
meaning depends on universality then they must be have a orientation 
towards universality, a universality mediated by particularity, by 
virtue of which it can be an object of interpretation. 
    3. The criterion of truth of an interpretation is the text itself 
(axiom), and it follows that interpretation is an objective (rather than a 
subjective) matter—its truth or falsity is an objective feature of the 
text. But different critics notice different things, and bring the 
objective features of the text to bear on each other in unique ways, 
possibly an unbounded number of unique ways. And since 
interpretation is a transcendent, rather than an immanent, feature of 
the text, it must be a phenomenon of the critic. Thus interpretation is 232 
objective, but it is a kind of objectivity mediated by the critic’s 
subjectivity: the self-reflection of the object, which only criticism 
makes possible. 
    4. Poems are only instantiated temporally, in an act of reading, 
recitation or recollection (a poem’s physical, written form is really only 
potentially an instance of the poem, a potentially heavily dependent on 
readers). This means that poems, even when instantiated, are not 
things that persist through time but events that become. Nevertheless, 
we can speak of a poem as a coherent object insofar as it is 
constituted as a set of linguistic facts (even though this is an 
abstraction from any particular instantiation). In this sense, the poem 
can only be an object in retrospect; or, to put it another way, the 
poem, as a whole object, is never read but only recollected (in Hegel’s 
sense of erinnert, ‘interiorized’). The poem as a set of linguistic facts in 
recollection is all the unity a poem has or needs. 
    5. If the criterion of truth is the text of the poem itself (axiom), 
then the only information relevant to the text would be information 
that is in the text already. But the meaning of the text’s words will 
usually depend on the world outside the text (e.g., Marvell’s Horatian 
Ode does not explain who Cromwell is, but the accurate interpretation 
of the poem depends on extra-textual information). Some kind of 
extra-textual information will therefore be relevant, and we need, 
therefore, a criterion of salience to judge particular cases. The criterion 
of salience is the same as the criterion of truth: the text itself. 
Criticism remains immanent, as long as the text is the final criterion. 
Cromwell is relevant to Marvell’s Horatian Ode because Cromwell is 233 
what the poem is about. There may even be cases in which a 
systematic (rather than an accidental) omission may make something 
determinately not mentioned in the poem relevant. There is no way to 
know in advance what will turn out to be relevant, and in each case an 
argument must be presented to justify a particular piece of 
information’s claim to salience. 
 
 
  B. The End of Interpretation: Reflection & Social Transformation 
    1. In order to act effectively, one must act in accordance with a 
rule (what Kant calls practice) rather than just acting randomly or 
acting on impulse (what Kant calls a mere doing) (8:275). If, therefore, 
we are to create a world better than the present one, we must have 
some rule to guide our actions toward the creation of that world. This 
means that any practice presupposes reflection and deliberation. 
Thought is the precondition of right action. 
    2. If works of literature are, by nature, enigmatic (that is, they 
are so constructed as to demand thought on the part of a reader), then 
it follows that they can have a direct impact on thought and thus an 
indirect impact on the creation of a better world. Literature and 
literary study are often lamented for their failure to transform the 
world, but the lament is simply mistaken: literature transforms the 
world by transforming individual minds, one by one. Even minute 
transformations in a single mind—a tiny clinamen  of thought—may 
have enormous and far-reaching implications. And the immediate 234 
effect of literature is the demand of thought, which is intrinsically 
morally improving. 
    3. Moreover, the transformation of the individual consciousness 
is not just something that must take place in order for the world to 
change; that transformation is the change in the world that we seek. 
Human beings have developed an advanced technological society that, 
unlike the condition of nature, makes it possible to put an end to 
suffering and exploitation. But suffering and exploitation continue as 
human creations, not merely as a consequence of our subjection to 
nature. Therefore it is the human consciousness that must be 
changed—beginning with one’s own. 
    4. More specifically, the individual must, through reflection, 
recognize itself as socially constituted—not as individual  in the 
etymological sense (where it translates the Greek atom) but as a 
creature of reflection, a creature made to exceed itself, to stand outside 
of itself and look in. This means that there is no such thing as 
individual freedom, but only collective freedom, that freedom can only 
be predicated of the social whole: humanity is free or unfree, not 
humans. 
Remark  The libertarian individualist (who thinks that 
freedom is the highest good, but thinks freedom is a 
property of individuals) is committed to the idea that the 
master is free though his slave is in chains. The slave, in 
his view, is also free in a sense—free to rise up, free to 
break his bonds—but deserves his chains if he does not 
seize his freedom. But if the slave breaks his bonds and 235 
flees,  the master will chase him. This is because the 
master’s freedom (not just his mastery) is bound to the 
slave’s unfreedom, and so the master is in fact unfree, 
chained to domination. The slave is unfree as well, but in 
a very trivial sense: the slave dominates no-one, which 
why, when the slave breaks his bonds, he may run 
wherever he wants. The master thought to make himself 
free, but he has made himself a slave; to be free, he need 
only cease to be a master. When the time comes, the rich 
will burn their own yachts, and their hearts will be filled 
with joy.  
    5. This property of the individual—that its reflection is an 
exceeding of itself—is what is divine in human beings (i.e., what is not 
the mere finitude of sex or race but is pure homo cogitans). Just as in 
Hegel, the absolute is that in particularity that is more than merely 
particular (not, for example, something above or beyond the 
particular), so the divine in the human is becoming more than oneself. 
Since literature arrives as the demand of thought, literature is not 
merely a stimulus to the precondition of right life (where the demand 
of thought must come before the demand of action), but is a means by 
which human beings make themselves into realizations of the absolute 
through the realization of their innate negativity. Literature makes us 
other than we are, the world other than it is. Such is the divine life 
that shatters the malevolent social system formed by those enemies of 
the human race, states and corporations (or coercive social 
institutions of any kind). There are two outcomes in this conflict 236 
between states & corporations and the human race: either we 
exterminate them (nonviolently rescuing the humans who collaborate 
with states and corporations from their error) or they exterminate us. 
The aim of politics is therefore simple: a world without bosses and 
without borders. The means are many, but the vocation of criticism is 
to be one of them. 237 
Appendix B 
A Brief Guide to Generative Metrics 
 
 The  name  generative metrics is a source of confusion, and at this 
point should probably just be jettisoned. Unfortunately, it is the usual 
name given to any theory of meter which includes claims about 
phonology based on current linguistics, and so I have been obliged to 
use it here. One problem with the name is that it calls to mind the 
“generative phonology” that Noam Chomsky and Morris Halle proposed 
in The Sound Pattern of English (1968), a set of proposals that were not 
as successful as Chomsky’s “generative” approach to syntax. The 
name generative metrics is thus misleading in that most of the theories 
of meter it is supposed to designate do not, in fact, presuppose 
Chomsky & Halle’s generative phonology. The main theory that does 
actually deserve the name generative metrics, then, is Halle and 
Keyser’s  English Stress (1971), since it does presuppose generative 
phonology. The theory of meter described in this handout, on the other 
hand, assumes the phonological theory of Liberman and Prince 
(associated with tree-type representations), which is one of the two 
main theories that are current in metrical phonology (the other being 
associated with grid-type representations).133 
  The other problem with the name is that the word generative 
suggests something like a theory of creation or production, i.e., that a 
“generative” theory of syntax would be a theory of how sentences are 
“generated” by speakers of a language, an so analogously a 
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“generative” theory of meter would be an account of composing or 
performing metered verse. Chomsky’s use of the term in the 1950s and 
60s, however, was derived from formal systems (not from biology), and 
in essence it just meant explicit—neither generative syntax nor the 
theory of meter described here purports to be an account of the actual 
mechanism of processing linguistic objects. Chomsky has since largely 
abandoned the use of the term, and it rarely appears in work under 
the current framework in syntax (the “minimalist program”).134 The 
term generative, in other words, was just supposed to indicate that the 
theory seeks to satisfy one of the basic conditions for being a scientific 
theory; those conditions are (1) explicitness (i.e., the theory must have 
no undefined terms, unstated assumptions, &c.), (2) generality (i.e., it 
must have the largest scope possible within a natural kind; a theory of 
meter that accounts for every poet writing in a particular language is 
better than a theory that only works for Swinburne poems beginning 
with the letter L), (3) falsifiability,  in the sense elaborated in Karl 
Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery (i.e., it must be possible in 
principle to prove the theory’s claims false by appeal to some kind of 
independent evidence),135 and (4) economy  (if two theories are 
equivalently successful in every other respect, then we choose the 
                                       
134 See the Introduction for a brief overview of recent developments in theoretical 
linguistics. 
135 In case this term isn’t familiar, here are a few examples: All cows are mortal is 
both falsifiable and true (since we both have access to salient evidence and the 
evidence does in fact bear out the claim); All cows have 700 legs is falsifiable but 
false (since we have access to salient evidence and the evidence contradicts the 
claim); All cows are happy is not falsifiable, and therefore we cannot determine 
whether it is true or false (since we don’t have access to salient evidence). 
Falsifiability is, of course, a weaker condition than verifiability; for more details, see 
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simpler of the two). A theory of phonology must meet these criteria, as 
must a theory of meter (where a theory of meter is a descriptive 
account of metrical patterns in linguistic objects, not a methodology 
for interpretation or an account of writing or reading).  
  A theory of meter also should meet a few additional criteria, 
namely (1) independent motivation (i.e., any terminology, concepts or 
theories used to describe linguistic facts should be legitimated by the 
study of language in general, not merely by the study of verse, which is 
just to say that one’s phonology should be up to date and that one’s 
linguistic descriptions should be consistent with the findings of 
current phonology),136 (2) descriptive adequacy (i.e., the theory must 
accurately predict the relevant intuitions of native speakers; in other 
words, it must designate as unmetrical all and only the lines that are 
in fact unmetrical), (3) syntactic salience (i.e., its formalizations ought 
to be as close as possible to the formalizations of syntax, since putting 
the theory to use in interpretation will depend upon the relation 
between phonological and syntactic structure),137 and (4) economy (as 
above; an inordinately complex theory of meter is likely to be wrong 
since people perceive metrical patterns unconsciously, with relative 
ease, and in the absence of explicit training). 
                                       
136 See Kiparsky, “The Role of Linguistics in a Theory of Poetry” for some useful 
reflections on this point, though I take issue with some of what he says in my 
Chapter 2 above. 
137 See Chapter 5 for further discussion of the line and its relationship to meter. This 
requirement is part of what makes Kiparsky’s theory (based on the Liberman and 
Prince tree-type phonology) preferable to the new theory offered by Halle and Keyser 
(in “On Meter in General and on Robert Frost’s Loose Iambics in Particular”), which 
is based on a grid-type phonology whose formalizations are more remote from those 
of syntax. 240 
  The aim of a theory of meter is to provide a descriptive account 
of phonological regularities in versified language. When we say that a 
poem has a meter, what we mean is that there are rhythmic 
(phonological) regularities among two or more lines.138 It is important 
to note that meter is a property of the poem, not a property of the 
reader or the performer of the poem. In order for a theory of meter to 
provide an objective account of English meter (rather than something 
like a phenomenology of the experience of verse rhythm, which would 
be a legitimate but completely different exercise),139 it must give an 
account of the rhythmic regularities that would obtain in any 
performance that didn’t violate the rules of English phonology. We 
might say, to put it more strongly, that in order for there even to be 
such a thing as English meter, there must be such regularities.  
The phonology of English, however, allows considerable variation 
in the rhythmic structure of any particular sentence. So, for example, 
a sentence like The cheese is on the table, if performed as neutrally as 
possible, will have its strongest stress on the first syllable of table, and 
another stress on cheese, but the rest of the words in the sentence will 
be essentially unstressed. But it is perfectly possible to add contrastive 
or emphatic stress to, say, the word on, which would change the 
semantics of the utterance such that the point of the sentence would 
                                       
138 It follows from this, of course, that a single line has no meter (in much the same 
way that a single syllable has no stress). 
139 Derek Attridge’s well-known book, The Rhythms of English Poetry, for example, 
fails to distinguish between these two projects, and this, combined with Attridge’s 
utter failure to be sufficiently explicit (what is a “beat” anyway?) or sufficiently 
methodical (when the scansion doesn’t work, just “promote” or “demote” one of the 
offending syllables—a bizarre assimilation of the language of Management) results in 
a theory that is not sufficiently intelligible or rigorous to be either true or false.  241 
not just be that the cheese is on the table but that it is on the table 
rather than being under  the table or beside the table—the cheese’s 
orientation to the table would then be the important thing. Similarly, 
we could say “the cheese” (not just any old cheese), or “is on the table” 
(despite your ridiculous assertion that it isn’t!—the French si), or “is 
on the table” (not just any old table). The possibilities of contrastive or 
emphatic stress allow us a very wide array of variant performances, 
each of which gives a different rhythmic structure to the sentence. But 
there are limits: we cannot, for example, put a stress on the second 
syllable of table rather than the first—doing so doesn’t just sound like 
a strange performance of an English word, is sounds like something 
that isn’t English at all. And it is a general feature of the phonology of 
the language that the stress contour of every polysyllabic word is 
lexically fixed, and it therefore must be pronounced in only one way. If 
this were not the case, we would invariably end up confused over 
words that have different meanings when stressed differently (permit, 
the noun, and permit, the verb). In a language like English, we would 
therefore expect the meter, if it is going to have a structure that 
obtains with all performances, will have to regulate the polysyllables 
and leave the monosyllables alone. An accentual-syllabic meter (that 
is, a meter concerned with stress for which the number of unstressed 
positions matters) will therefore consist of a regularity among two or 
more lines of verse in terms of the distribution among a fixed number 
of positions of its polysyllables. 
But before we go on, it is worth clarifying just what is meant by 
the term stress. Stress is a combination of three properties, which are, 242 
in order of importance, (1) pitch, (2) loudness, and (3) duration. In 
other words, a stressed syllable is always higher in pitch, and typically 
louder and longer as well, than an unstressed syllable. Notice that the 
stress of syllables in English is a relational property, which means that 
stress is not a property that a syllable can have by itself; when we say 
that a particular is syllable is stressed, what we mean is that it is more 
stressed (i.e., higher in pitch, &c.) than an adjacent syllable, which is 
therefore less stressed. Stress does not, of course, work the same way 
in all languages; Latin meters, for example, do not regulate the stress 
of syllables (stress assignment being a fairly pedestrian matter in 
Latin) but rather their length (i.e., duration, sometimes called syllable 
‘weight’), and length is not a relational property. It follows from these 
facts that in English verse, unlike Latin verse, there are only binary 
feet—in fact, only two binary feet: [WS] (i.e., as unstressed, or ‘weak,’ 
syllable followed by a stressed, or ‘strong,’ syllable) and [SW].140 To see 
why there cannot be binary feet in English, consider a case in which 
you have a sequence of three syllables (call them A, B and C) where A 
is the most stressed and C is the least stressed. We could then say 
that A is stressed and C is unstressed, but B would be indeterminate: 
it would be stressed in relation to C but unstressed in relation to A, 
and the theory would thereby fail to assign a stress value to B. This is 
not the case, of course, in languages like Latin, since syllable length is 
an absolute, not a relative, property. It is for this reason that 
                                       
140 It is also theoretically possible to have a [SS] foot or a [WW] foot, as long as a 
phonological phrase boundary intervenes in the middle of the foot, but this 
circumstance is vanishingly rare and so will not delay us here. See Hogg & McCully 
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traditional approaches to English meter, which derive their 
terminology and theoretical apparatus from the study of classical 
verse, are so inadequate to the linguistic realities of English verse; the 
two languages are fundamentally different, and the kinds of meter in 
the two are fundamentally incompatible.141 For the sake of 
convenience, I will continue to use some of the traditional terminology, 
namely: iambic for a foot that is [WS], trochaic for a foot that is [SW], 
and the traditional terms for the number of feet in a line (trimeter, 
tetrameter, pentameter, &c.). 
To recap: a poem is METERED when we perceive a regular 
rhythmic pattern across its lines. A particular line is thus METRICAL to 
the extent that its rhythm (its actual stress contour) conforms with 
this abstract pattern and UNMETRICAL to the extent that it does not. 
One of the basic things that a theory of meter should be able to do is 
to consistently distinguish the metrical from the unmetrical lines, and 
this gives us an empirical basis for testing proposed theories. The 
pattern in question cannot be too restrictive, since all of the lines of 
any given sonnet, say, are not by any means rhythmically identical, 
and it must be present in any performance of the poem that doesn’t 
violate English phonology. It follows from the fact that only 
                                       
141 This does not, of course, mean that it is impossible to construct lines of English 
verse whose rhythm resembles a classical meter if performed in specific ways. It is in 
the nature of the case, by virtue of the phonology of English, that it will be easy to 
perform such verse (like Clough’s experiments with classical forms) so that the 
classical metrical pattern will not be present. Moreover, it is often possible to scan 
poems attempting to imitate classical meters as in fact instances of normal, 
accentual-syllabic English meters. It is unsurprising that poets, even when 
consciously attempting to write in a classical meter, would naturally drift in the 
direction of meters that are more amenable to the language they are writing in. See 
Kiparsky & Hanson for a suggestive account of how different languages parameterize 
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polysyllables have a lexically fixed rhythm (as explained above), that 
meters must regulate polysyllables. 
Following Kiparsky’s account in “The Rhythmic Structure of 
English Verse,”142 we might think of the abstract pattern as a 
sequence of abstract POSITIONS, and we could then understand the 
meter as providing an associated set of REALIZATION RULES that 
determine which positions the stressed syllables in polysyllabic words 
may occupy. The abstract metrical form for iambic pentameter is 
 
    W S   W S   W S   W S   W S 
 
and its primary realization rule is that stressed syllables in 
polysyllabic words must occupy strong (S) positions and may not occupy 
weak (W) positions. The following is thus a metrical line of iambic 
pentameter (stresses are indicated with italics): 
 
meter:    W    S  W  S    W   S  W   S     W      S 
rhythm:  True Wit is Na•ture to ad•van•tage dress’d 
 
Note that only the stresses in the polysyllabic words are regulated by 
the meter, so the stressed monosyllable ‘true’ beginning the line does 
not violate the meter. This accounts for the fact observed previously 
that the rhythm, the actual stress contour, of a metrical line will not 
exactly conform to the pattern of the abstract meter most of the time, 
                                       
142 The remainder of this appendix is mostly a summary of Kiparsky, and many of 
the examples are taken from Fabb, Linguistics and Literature. 245 
except in the placement of its polysyllabic words. This line from 
Shakespeare’s Sonnet 106 is a rare instance of a line whose rhythm is 
identical to the abstract meter of the poem: 
 
    W    S     W   S   W  S   W  S    W   S 
  Of  hand, of foot, of lip, of eye, of brow 
 
What makes a given use of meter interesting is the location and quality 
of the tension between its rhythm and the abstract meter, what we 
might call METRICAL TENSION. Great poets will use this tension in very 
sophisticated ways; for example, note the emphasis on ‘aches’ in the 
following line from Keats: 
 
    W     S       W      S   W   S    W     S      W      S 
  M y   heart aches, and a drow•sy numb•ness pains 
    My sense, as though of hemlock I had drunk… 
 
Emphasis is only one of many effects that can be achieved through 
metrical tension (e.g., note the use of rising vs. falling polysyllables in 
“Awake, arise, or be forever fallen!”). Individual poets will also differ 
generally in how much metrical tension they are after. Donne seems 
bent on maximizing it (even to the point of outright unmetricality, as in 
the opening line of Twicknam Garden); Spenser, on the whole, sets out 
to minimize metrical tension (this is an aspect of his mellifluousness), 
and the liberties he takes are largely in eccentricities of word choice 
(as in his dodgy archaisms). Even Spenser, however, allows certain 246 
supplements to the above fundamental realization rule. The below are 
the basic additional rules for English (accentual-syllabic) verse 
generally. It should also be noted that the additional rules are not 
random or merely conventional deviations but are possible because of 
the properties of English phonology, i.e., facts about the rhythms of 
speech. 
 
I. INVERSION 
 
Virtually all poets in the English tradition allow an inversion in the 
first foot, i.e., they allow the primary stress in a polysyllabic word to 
occupy the initial weak position, e.g., 
 
    (That thou, light-winged Dryad of the trees…) 
 
  W    S  W   S     W   S   W    S     W     S 
  Sing•est of sum•mer in full-throa•ted ease 
 
Most poets also allow inversions at the beginnings of PHONOLOGICAL 
PHRASES (for the most part, phonological phrase boundaries coincide 
with major syntactic divisions, so most places where a comma or other 
punctuation mark appears count as phonological phrase boundaries): 
 
    (By night he fled, and at midnight returned) 
 
      W      S   W     S     W     S        W     S    W   S 247 
  From  com•pa•ssing the Earth—cau•tious of day 
 
This is because of a general rule in the rhythmic structure of common 
speech to the effect that phonological rules apply less strictly at the 
beginnings of phonological phrases and more strictly at the ends. 
 
II. RESOLUTION 
 
In common speech, two unstressed syllables between two stressed 
syllables are often run together so that, for rhythmic purposes, they 
behave like a single syllable. This also appears in verse, e.g., this 
iambic tetrameter line from Frost: 
 
      W      S    W     S       W     S   W     S 
  Two roads di•verged {in a} ye•llow wood 
 
This rule is something of a necessity, because otherwise certain words, 
like ‘fortification’, could never be deployed in verse; Shakespeare was 
thus saved by resolution in the following (which also contains two 
instances of extrametricality, for which, see below): 
 
     W     S    W    S   W     S   W               S    W   S 
  T h i s   for•{ti•fi}•ca•tion gent•le•[men], shall we see [it]? 
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III. ELISION 
 
Some words will lose a syllable in common speech unless they are very 
carefully enunciated; thus, ‘experience’ can either have four syllables 
or three, depending on whether the ‘i’ is pronounced as a vowel (like 
the ‘ee’ in ‘flee’) or a glide (like the ‘y’ in ‘yellow’). Three common 
elisions are as follows: 
 
  i.  The elimination of an unstressed vowel following a 
stressed vowel-GLIDE sequence (the two ‘glides’ in English are ‘y’ as in 
‘yellow’ and ‘w’ as in ‘wicked’), e.g., ‘voyage’ can be either two syllables 
or one. 
 
  ii.  The first of two unstressed vowels can be eliminated when 
only the liquid  nasal ‘r’ (as in ‘ribbon’) intervenes, e.g., 
‘lingering’®‘ling’ring.’ 
 
  iii.  A high unstressed vowel (the high vowels in English are 
the ‘ee’ in ‘beet’ and the ‘oo’ in ‘boot’) immediately followed by another 
vowel may reduce to a glide, e.g., the ‘i’ in ‘envious’ can either be like 
the ‘ee’ in ‘flee’ or like the ‘y’ in ‘yellow,’ and thus the word can have 
either three syllables or two.  
 
Since these words can be pronounced either way, poets often (though 
not always) mark reductions they expect you to follow, e.g., ‘ling’ring.’ 
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IV. DIACRITICALLY MARKED LEXICAL VARIATION 
 
Many poets will alter the fixed stress contour of a word for metrical 
purposes; this is most common with words containing an -ed suffix, 
almost always marked with a diacritical mark, as in ‘vanishéd’ or 
‘vanishèd’, and with ‘the’+Noun combinations, e.g., ‘th’Earth’. Other 
than words with -ed suffixes, there are a few other reductions that 
don’t appear in modern common speech but have become naturalized 
in poetic discourse through usage, e.g., ‘e’en’ for ‘even,’ ‘heav’n’ for 
‘heaven’ and ‘’tis’ for ‘it is’ (making them monosyllables). The following 
line from Donne is a fairly extreme example: 
 
    W    S       W   S     W     S       W  S 
  So {to’in}•ter•graft our hands, as yet 
    Was all our means to make us one… 
 
V. EXTRAMETRICALITY 
 
As was shown in the example from Shakespeare in section (II) above, 
an extra weak syllable can appear at the end of a phonological phrase 
in iambic verse. These are more common at the ends of lines, as in 
 
    W  S   W   S  W  S    W   S  W     S 
  T o   be, or not to be, that is the Ques•[tion] 
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but can also appear at the ends of phonological phrases in other 
positions, as in 
 
    W  S    W  S  W      S                  W       S    W     S 
  A   sam•ple to the youn•[gest]; {to the} more ma•ture 
 
By a similar principle, an iambic line can have a completely 
unoccupied initial weak position. It should be noted that an iambic 
pentameter line with an empty initial position and an extrametrical 
syllable at the end could just as easily be scanned as a trochaic 
pentameter line. This may seem like a problem with the theory in the 
sense that it does not uniquely describe such a line, but it is in fact 
the case that such a line will be read (and hence should be scanned) 
such that it conforms to the rhythmic regularities of the poem in 
which it appears. Indeed, it is one of the necessary demands on a 
theory of meter that it account for the fact that some lines can appear 
just as easily in a predominantly iambic context as in a predominantly 
trochaic context (and in each case will not stand out as marked in 
relation to the rest of the poem). This is also further evidence that a 
meter is not a property of a line (indeed, an isolated line has no meter), 
but a property of a poem; a line of the sort just mentioned is simply 
not definitively scannable without an immediate rhythmic context. 
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METRICAL TENSION 
 
As pointed out above, much of the interest (and interpretive 
usefulness) of scanning verse resides not merely in drawing the 
conclusion that a line is metrical or not, but in considering the ways in 
which the rhythm departs from the meter (while still being in 
accordance with the realization rules of the latter). To be of any real 
use to the literary critic, a theory of meter is thus obliged to provide 
useful ways of specifying the properties of these departures.  
 
There are two kinds of such departures, two sources of what we have 
called ‘metrical tension,’ that can be formalized in abstract terms: 
LABELLING MISMATCHES and BRACKETING MISMATCHES. A labeling 
mismatch is when a stressed monosyllabic word appears in a weak 
position in the meter or when an unstressed monosyllable appears in a 
strong position in the meter (if it is a polysyllabic word, then it would 
push the line into unmetricality—something which Donne, as 
mentioned before, is not above doing). Under normal circumstances 
(i.e., circumstances in which there is no contrastive or emphatic 
stress), monosyllables will be either stressed or unstressed depending 
on their category (part of speech). Linguists distinguish between 
‘functional words’ or ‘functors’ (which are intrinsically unstressed) and 
‘lexical words’ (which are intrinsically stressed); as a rule of thumb, 
lexical words are referential (they refer to things in the world, e.g., 
nouns, proper names, verbs, adjectives and certain kinds of adverbs 
and particles) and functional words have only a syntactic or logical 252 
function (e.g., articles, conjunctions, prepositions, copular verbs, 
auxiliary verbs, wh-words, and, in most circumstances, pronouns). In 
some cases the distinction can be variable (the preposition ‘up’, for 
example, is unstressed in ‘He climbed up the tower’ but stressed when 
it is a particle as in ‘John broke up the game’), and in such instances, 
in the absence of detailed training in syntax, the critic will have to go 
by his or her ear. Consider, for example, the following line: 
 
(There are more things in Heaven and earth, Horatio,) 
 
  W     S       W     S W   S     W  S  W   S 
Than are dreamt of in your phi•lo•so•phy. 
 
This line is metrical, since the primary stress in the only polysyllable, 
‘philosophy’, occupies a strong position in the meter. The lexically 
stressed monosyllable, ‘dreamt’, on the other hand, occupies a weak 
metrical position; this does not cause the line to be unmetrical, but, at 
the very least, it puts considerable emphasis on the word dreamt.  
 
A bracketing mismatch arises when a phonological grouping of 
syllables (into words or into phonological phrases) in the line violates 
the groupings inherent in the abstract meter. The meter is not just a 
series of ten positions, but a series of binary pairs (not unlike the 
traditional notion of the ‘foot’, but independently motivated by the fact 
that the phonology of English stress [namely, that stress is a relational 253 
property] requires a set of binary groupings), themselves grouped into 
a group of two and a group of three; this can be represented as follows: 
 
[ [WS] [WS] ]  [ [WS] [WS] [WS] ] 
 
One of the reasons why traditional foot scansion seems, at least 
heuristically, plausible is that some of its claims are correct: namely 
that the meter is divided into five groups of two and that there is a 
natural division between the second and third such groups. 
Traditional prosody, however, is plainly wrong in suggesting that the 
rhythm of the line is obliged to observe these boundaries. For example, 
the word boundaries in the following, quite metrical, line do not match 
up to this pattern: 
 
    W    SW  S W     S    W      S    W    S 
  T h e   lion dying thrusteth forth his paw 
 
Each of the disyllabic words in the line crosses the binary groups of 
the abstract meter, and the word ‘dying’ also crosses the larger 2/3 
division. What we intuitively sense as something ‘trochaic’ about this 
legitimately iambic line is the result of its bracketing mismatches, and 
‘dying’ seems to be particularly conspicuous in this respect (it would 
likely appear even more so in the context of a regularly iambic poem). 
 
It should be said for the sake of clarity that linguistics can provide no 
algorithm for producing interpretations out of any of these facts; they 254 
are formal observations—no more, no less. If they are significant, it is 
only because the critic manages to make them so, and the 
responsibility for that task is well beyond the purview of the linguists. 
But if one is to make claims about the meaning of poems, there must 
be some kind of agreement on the facts about the poem upon which 
such claims are based. This, in turn, requires an account of poetic 
form solidly grounded in objective empirical research. Happily for 
literary critics, much of that research has already been done by 
linguists; it is a resource which is all too often left untapped in favor of 
more familiar modes of formal description—a complacency that gazes 
through a glass darkly instead of looking on the thing directly as it 
speaks through its minute evasions. Only when one sees clearly can 
one perceive an enigma; an enigma in a fog is not an enigma at all, 
just more fog. 255 
Appendix C 
Texts of the Poems 
 
THOMAS HARDY: The Workbox 
 
“See, here’s the workbox, little wife,  
   That I made of polished oak.”  
He was a joiner, of village life;  
   She came of borough folk.  
 
He holds the present up to her  
   As with a smile she nears  
And answers to the profferer,  
   “’Twill last all my sewing years!”  
 
“I warrant it will. And longer too.  
   ’Tis a scantling that I got             10 
Off poor John Wayward’s coffin, who  
   Died of they knew not what.  
 
“The shingled pattern that seems to cease  
   Against your box’s rim  
Continues right on in the piece  
   That’s underground with him.  
 
“And while I worked it made me think  256 
   Of timber’s varied doom;  
One inch where people eat and drink,  
   The next inch in a tomb.             20 
 
“But why do you look so white, my dear,  
   And turn aside your face?  
You knew not that good lad, I fear,  
   Though he came from your native place?” 
 
“How could I know that good young man,  
   Though he came from my native town,  
When he must have left far earlier than  
   I was a woman grown?” 
 
“Ah, no. I should have understood!  
   It shocked you that I gave             30 
To you one end of a piece of wood  
   Whose other is in a grave?” 
 
“Don’t, dear, despise my intellect,  
   Mere accidental things  
Of that sort never have effect  
   On my imaginings.” 
 
Yet still her lips were limp and wan,  
   Her face still held aside,  257 
As if she had known not only John,  
   But known of what he died.            40 258 
JOHN KEATS: To Autumn 
 
Season of mists and mellow fruitfulness,  
   Close bosom-friend of the maturing sun;  
Conspiring with him how to load and bless  
   With fruit the vines that round the thatch-eves run;  
To bend with apples the moss'd cottage-trees,  
   And fill all fruit with ripeness to the core;  
      To swell the gourd, and plump the hazel shells  
With a sweet kernel; to set budding more,  
   And still more, later flowers for the bees,  
   Until they think warm days will never cease,       10 
      For Summer has o'er-brimm'd their clammy cells.  
 
    2  
 
Who hath not seen thee oft amid thy store?  
   Sometimes whoever seeks abroad may find  
Thee sitting careless on a granary floor,  
   Thy hair soft-lifted by the winnowing wind;  
Or on a half-reap'd furrow sound asleep,  
   Drows'd with the fume of poppies, while thy hook  
      Spares the next swath and all its twined flowers:  
And sometimes like a gleaner thou dost keep  
   Steady thy laden head across a brook;         20 259 
   Or by a cyder-press, with patient look,  
      Thou watchest the last oozings hours by hours.  
 
    3  
 
Where are the songs of Spring? Ay, where are they?  
   Think not of them, thou hast thy music too,—  
While barred clouds bloom the soft-dying day,  
   And touch the stubble-plains with rosy hue;  
Then in a wailful choir the small gnats mourn  
   Among the river sallows, borne aloft  
      Or sinking as the light wind lives or dies;  
And full-grown lambs loud bleat from hilly bourn;     30 
   Hedge-crickets sing; and now with treble soft  
   The red-breast whistles from a garden-croft;  
      And gathering swallows twitter in the skies. 
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JOHN KEATS: Ode to a Nightingale 
 
    I  
 
My heart aches, and a drowsy numbness pains  
   My sense, as though of hemlock I had drunk,  
Or emptied some dull opiate to the drains  
   One minute past, and Lethe-wards had sunk.  
’Tis not through envy of thy happy lot,  
   But being too happy in thine happiness –  
      That thou, light-wingèd Dryad of the trees,  
         In some melodious plot  
   Of beechen green, and shadows numberless,  
      Singest of summer in full-throated ease.       10 
 
    I I  
 
Oh, for a draught of vintage that hath been  
   Cooled a long age in the deep-delvèd earth,  
Tasting of Flora and the country green,  
   Dance, and Provençal song, and sunburnt mirth!  
Oh, for a beaker full of the warm South,  
   Full of the true, the blushful Hippocrene,  
      With beaded bubbles winking at the brim,  
         And purple-stainèd mouth;  261 
   That I might drink, and leave the world unseen,  
      And with thee fade away into the forest dim—    20 
 
    III 
 
Fade far away, dissolve, and quite forget  
   What thou among the leaves hast never known,  
The weariness, the fever, and the fret  
   Here, where men sit and hear each other groan;  
Where palsy shakes a few, sad, last gray hairs,  
   Where youth grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies;  
      Where but to think is to be full of sorrow  
         And leaden-eyed despairs; 
   Where Beauty cannot keep her lustrous eyes,  
      Or new Love pine at them beyond to-morrow.     30 
 
    I V  
 
Away! away! For I will fly to thee,  
   Not charioted by Bacchus and his pards,  
But on the viewless wings of Poesy,  
   Though the dull brain perplexes and retards. 
Already with thee! Tender is the night,  
   And haply the Queen-Moon is on her throne,  
      Clustered around by all her starry fays;  262 
         But here there is no light,  
   Save what from heaven is with the breezes blown  
      Through verdurous glooms and winding mossy ways.   40 
 
V 
 
I cannot see what flowers are at my feet,  
   Nor what soft incense hangs upon the boughs,  
But, in embalmèd darkness, guess each sweet  
   Wherewith the seasonable month endows  
The grass, the thicket, and the fruit-tree wild – 
   White hawthorn, and the pastoral eglantine;  
      Fast-fading violets covered up in leaves;  
         And mid-May's eldest child,  
   The coming musk-rose, full of dewy wine,  
      The murmurous haunt of flies on summer eves.     50 
 
    V I  
 
Darkling I listen; and, for many a time  
   I have been half in love with easeful Death,  
Called him soft names in many a musèd rhyme,  
   To take into the air my quiet breath;  
Now more than ever seems it rich to die,  
   To cease upon the midnight with no pain,  263 
      While thou art pouring forth thy soul abroad  
         In such an ecstasy.  
   Still wouldst thou sing, and I have ears in vain – 
      To thy high requiem become a sod.         60 
 
    V I I  
 
Thou wast not born for death, immortal bird!  
   No hungry generations tread thee down;  
The voice I hear this passing night was heard  
   In ancient days by emperor and clown:  
Perhaps the self-same song that found a path  
   Through the sad heart of Ruth, when, sick for home,  
      She stood in tears amid the alien corn;  
         The same that oft-times hath  
   Charmed magic casements, opening on the foam  
      Of perilous seas in faery lands forlorn.       70 
 
    VIII 
 
Forlorn! The very word is like a bell  
   To toll me back from thee to my sole self!  
Adieu! The fancy cannot cheat so well  
   As she is famed to do, deceiving elf.  
Adieu! adieu! Thy plaintive anthem fades  
   Past the near meadows, over the still stream,  264 
      Up the hill-side; and now ’tis buried deep  
         In the next valley-glades:  
   Was it a vision, or a waking dream?  
      Fled is that music…Do I wake or sleep?       80 
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ROBERT BROWNING: ‘Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came’ 
 
(See Edgar's song in "Lear.") 
 
    I  
 
My first thought was, he lied in every word,  
   That hoary cripple, with malicious eye  
   Askance to watch the working of his lie  
On mine, and mouth scarce able to afford  
Suppression of the glee, that pursed and scored  
   Its edge, at one more victim gained thereby.  
 
    I I  
 
What else should he be set for, with his staff?  
   What, save to waylay with his lies, ensnare  
   All travellers who might find him posted there,  
And ask the road? I guessed what skull-like laugh    10 
Would break, what crutch 'gin write my epitaph  
   For pastime in the dusty thoroughfare,  
 
    III 
 
If at his counsel I should turn aside  
   Into that ominous tract which, all agree,  266 
   Hides the Dark Tower. Yet acquiescingly  
I did turn as he pointed: neither pride  
Nor hope rekindling at the end descried,  
   So much as gladness that some end might be  
 
    I V  
 
For, what with my whole world-wide wandering,  
   What with my search drawn out thro' years, my hope    20 
   Dwindled into a ghost not fit to cope  
With that obstreperous joy success would bring,— 
I hardly tried now to rebuke the spring  
   My heart made, finding failure in its scope. 
 
    V  
 
As when a sick man very near to death  
   Seems dead indeed, and feels begin and end  
   The tears and takes the farewell of each friend,  
And hears one bid the other go, draw breath  
Freelier outside, ("since all is o'er," he saith,  
   "And the blow fallen no grieving can amend;")      30 
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    V I  
 
While some discuss if near the other graves  
   Be room enough for this, and when a day  
   Suits best for carrying the corpse away,  
With care about the banners, scarves and staves:  
And still the man hears all, and only craves  
   He may not shame such tender love and stay.  
 
    V I I  
 
Thus, I had so long suffered in this quest,  
   Heard failure prophesied so oft, been writ  
   So many times among "The Band"—to wit,     
The knights who to the Dark Tower's search addressed   40 
Their steps—that just to fail as they, seemed best,  
   And all the doubt was now—should I be fit?  
 
    VIII 
 
So, quiet as despair, I turned from him,  
   That hateful cripple, out of his highway  
   Into the path he pointed. All the day  
Had been a dreary one at best, and dim  
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Was settling to its close, yet shot one grim  
   Red leer to see the plain catch its estray.  
 
    I X  
 
For mark! no sooner was I fairly found  
   Pledged to the plain, after a pace or two,       50 
   Than, pausing to throw backward a last view  
O'er the safe road, 't was gone; grey plain all round:  
Nothing but plain to the horizon's bound.  
   I might go on; nought else remained to do. 
 
    X  
 
So, on I went. I think I never saw  
   Such starved ignoble nature; nothing throve:  
   For flowers—as well expect a cedar grove!  
But cockle, spurge, according to their law  
Might propagate their kind, with none to awe,  
   You'd think; a burr had been a treasure-trove.     60 
 
    X I  
 
No! penury, inertness and grimace,  
   In some strange sort, were the land's portion. "See  
   "Or shut your eyes," said Nature peevishly,  269 
"It nothing skills: I cannot help my case:  
"'T is the Last Judgment's fire must cure this place,  
   "Calcine its clods and set my prisoners free."  
 
    X I I  
 
If there pushed any ragged thistle-stalk  
   Above its mates, the head was chopped; the bents  
   Were jealous else. What made those holes and rents  
In the dock's harsh swarth leaves, bruised as to baulk    70 
All hope of greenness? 't is a brute must walk  
   Pashing their life out, with a brute's intents.  
 
    XIII 
 
As for the grass, it grew as scant as hair  
   In leprosy; thin dry blades pricked the mud  
   Which underneath looked kneaded up with blood.  
One stiff blind horse, his every bone a-stare,  
Stood stupefied, however he came there:  
   Thrust out past service from the devil's stud!  
 
    X I V  
 
Alive? he might be dead for aught I know,  
   With that red gaunt and colloped neck a-strain,    80 270 
   And shut eyes underneath the rusty mane;  
Seldom went such grotesqueness with such woe;  
I never saw a brute I hated so;  
   He must be wicked to deserve such pain.  
 
    X V  
 
I shut my eyes and turned them on my heart.  
   As a man calls for wine before he fights,  
   I asked one draught of earlier, happier sights,  
Ere fitly I could hope to play my part.  
Think first, fight afterwards—the soldier's art:  
   One taste of the old time sets all to rights.      90 
 
    X V I  
 
Not it! I fancied Cuthbert's reddening face  
   Beneath its garniture of curly gold,  
   Dear fellow, till I almost felt him fold  
An arm in mine to fix me to the place,  
That way he used. Alas, one night's disgrace!  
   Out went my heart's new fire and left it cold.  
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    X V I I  
 
Giles then, the soul of honour—there he stands  
   Frank as ten years ago when knighted first.  
   What honest man should dare (he said) he durst.    
Good—but the scene shifts—faugh! what hangman-hands   100 
Pin to his breast a parchment? His own bands  
   Read it. Poor traitor, spit upon and curst!  
 
    XVIII 
 
Better this present than a past like that;  
   Back therefore to my darkening path again!  
   No sound, no sight as far as eye could strain.  
Will the night send a howlet or a bat?  
I asked: when something on the dismal flat  
   Came to arrest my thoughts and change their train. 
 
    X I X  
 
A sudden little river crossed my path  
   As unexpected as a serpent comes.        110 
   No sluggish tide congenial to the glooms;  
This, as it frothed by, might have been a bath  
For the fiend's glowing hoof—to see the wrath  
   Of its black eddy bespate with flakes and spumes.  272 
 
    X X  
 
So petty yet so spiteful! All along,  
   Low scrubby alders kneeled down over it;  
   Drenched willows flung them headlong in a fit  
Of mute despair, a suicidal throng:  
The river which had done them all the wrong,  
   Whate'er that was, rolled by, deterred no whit.     120 
 
    X X I  
 
Which, while I forded,—good saints, how I feared  
   To set my foot upon a dead man's cheek,  
   Each step, or feel the spear I thrust to seek  
For hollows, tangled in his hair or beard!  
—It may have been a water-rat I speared,  
   But, ugh! it sounded like a baby's shriek.  
 
    X X I I  
 
Glad was I when I reached the other bank.  
   Now for a better country. Vain presage!  
   Who were the strugglers, what war did they wage,  
Whose savage trample thus could pad the dank      130 273 
Soil to a plash? Toads in a poisoned tank,  
   Or wild cats in a red-hot iron cage— 
 
    XXIII 
 
The fight must so have seemed in that fell cirque.  
   What penned them there, with all the plain to choose?  
   No foot-print leading to that horrid mews,  
None out of it. Mad brewage set to work  
Their brains, no doubt, like galley-slaves the Turk  
   Pits for his pastime, Christians against Jews.  
 
    XXIV 
 
And more than that—a furlong on—why, there!  
   What bad use was that engine for, that wheel,      140 
   Or brake, not wheel—that harrow fit to reel  
Men's bodies out like silk? with all the air  
Of Tophet's tool, on earth left unaware,  
   Or brought to sharpen its rusty teeth of steel.  
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    XXV 
 
Then came a bit of stubbed ground, once a wood,  
   Next a marsh, it would seem, and now mere earth  
   Desperate and done with; (so a fool finds mirth,  
Makes a thing and then mars it, till his mood  
Changes and off he goes!) within a rood— 
   Bog, clay and rubble, sand and stark black dearth.    150 
 
    XXVI 
 
Now blotches rankling, coloured gay and grim,  
   Now patches where some leanness of the soil's  
   Broke into moss or substances like boils;  
Then came some palsied oak, a cleft in him  
Like a distorted mouth that splits its rim  
   Gaping at death, and dies while it recoils.  
 
    X X V I I  
 
And just as far as ever from the end!  
   Nought in the distance but the evening, nought  
   To point my footstep further! At the thought,  
A great black bird, Apollyon's bosom-friend,      160 
Sailed past, nor beat his wide wing dragon-penned  
   That brushed my cap—perchance the guide I sought. 275 
 
    XXVIII 
 
For, looking up, aware I somehow grew,  
   'Spite of the dusk, the plain had given place  
   All round to mountains—with such name to grace  
Mere ugly heights and heaps now stolen in view.  
How thus they had surprised me,—solve it, you!  
   How to get from them was no clearer case.  
 
    XXIX 
 
Yet half I seemed to recognize some trick  
   Of mischief happened to me, God knows when—    170 
   In a bad dream perhaps. Here ended, then,  
Progress this way. When, in the very nick  
Of giving up, one time more, came a click  
   As when a trap shuts—you 're inside the den!  
 
    XXX 
 
Burningly it came on me all at once,  
   This was the place! those two hills on the right,  
   Crouched like two bulls locked horn in horn in fight;  
While to the left, a tall scalped mountain . . . Dunce,  276 
Dotard, a-dozing at the very nonce,  
   After a life spent training for the sight!        180 
 
    XXXI 
 
What in the midst lay but the Tower itself?  
   The round squat turret, blind as the fool's heart,  
   Built of brown stone, without a counterpart  
In the whole world. The tempest's mocking elf  
Points to the shipman thus the unseen shelf  
   He strikes on, only when the timbers start.  
 
    X X X I I  
 
Not see? because of night perhaps?—why, day  
   Came back again for that! before it left,  
   The dying sunset kindled through a cleft:  
The hills, like giants at a hunting, lay,         190 
Chin upon hand, to see the game at bay,— 
   "Now stab and end the creature—to the heft!  
 
    XXXIII 
 
Not hear? when noise was everywhere! it tolled  
   Increasing like a bell. Names in my ears  
   Of all the lost adventurers my peers,— 277 
How such a one was strong, and such was bold,  
And such was fortunate, yet each of old  
   Lost, lost! one moment knelled the woe of years.  
 
    XXXIV 
 
There they stood, ranged along the hill-sides, met  
   To view the last of me, a living frame        200 
   For one more picture! in a sheet of flame  
I saw them and I knew them all. And yet  
Dauntless the slug-horn to my lips I set,  
   And blew. "Childe Roland to the Dark Tower came." 
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ROBERT BROWNING:  My Last Duchess 
 
Ferarra 
 
That’s my last Duchess painted on the wall,  
Looking as if she were alive. I call  
That piece a wonder, now: Frà Pandolf’s hands  
Worked busily a day, and there she stands.  
Will’t please you sit and look at her? I said 
“Frà Pandolf” by design, for never read  
Strangers like you that pictured countenance,  
The depth and passion of its earnest glance,  
But to myself they turned (since none puts by  
The curtain I have drawn for you, but I)        10 
And seemed as they would ask me, if they durst,  
How such a glance came there; so, not the first  
Are you to turn and ask thus. Sir, ’t was not  
Her husband’s presence only, called that spot  
Of joy into the Duchess’ cheek: perhaps     
Frà Pandolf chanced to say “Her mantle laps  
“Over my lady’s wrist too much,” or “Paint  
“Must never hope to reproduce the faint  
“Half-flush that dies along her throat:” such stuff  
Was courtesy, she thought, and cause enough      20 
For calling up that spot of joy. She had  
A heart—how shall I say?—too soon made glad,  279 
Too easily impressed; she liked whate’er  
She looked on, and her looks went everywhere.  
Sir, ’t was all one! My favour at her breast,    
The dropping of the daylight in the West,  
The bough of cherries some officious fool  
Broke in the orchard for her, the white mule  
She rode with round the terrace—all and each  
Would draw from her alike the approving speech,    30 
Or blush, at least. She thanked men,—good! but thanked  
Somehow—I know not how—as if she ranked  
My gift of a nine-hundred-years-old name  
With anybody’s gift. Who’d stoop to blame  
This sort of trifling? Even had you skill   
In speech—(which I have not)—to make your will  
Quite clear to such an one, and say, “Just this  
“Or that in you disgusts me; here you miss,  
“Or there exceed the mark”—and if she let  
Herself be lessoned so, nor plainly set        40 
Her wits to yours, forsooth, and made excuse,  
—E’en then would be some stooping; and I choose  
Never to stoop. Oh sir, she smiled, no doubt,  
Whene’er I passed her, but who passed without  
Much the same smile? This grew; I gave commands;   
Then all smiles stopped together. There she stands  
As if alive. Will’t please you rise? We’ll meet  
The company below, then. I repeat,  280 
The Count your master’s known munificence  
Is ample warrant that no just pretence        50 
Of mine for dowry will be disallowed;  
Though his fair daughter’s self, as I avowed  
At starting, is my object. Nay, we’ll go  
Together down, sir. Notice Neptune, though,  
Taming a sea-horse, thought a rarity,       
Which Claus of Innsbruck cast in bronze for me!  
 281 
ROBERT BROWNING: An Epistle Containing the Strange Medical 
Experience of Karshish, the Arab Physician 
 
Karshish, the picker-up of learning's crumbs,  
The not-incurious in God's handiwork  
(This man's-flesh he hath admirably made,  
Blown like a bubble, kneaded like a paste,  
To coop up and keep down on earth a space  
That puff of vapour from his mouth, man's soul)  
---To Abib, all-sagacious in our art,  
Breeder in me of what poor skill I boast,  
Like me inquisitive how pricks and cracks  
Befall the flesh through too much stress and strain,     10 
Whereby the wily vapour fain would slip  
Back and rejoin its source before the term,---  
And aptest in contrivance (under God)  
To baffle it by deftly stopping such:---  
The vagrant Scholar to his Sage at home  
Sends greeting (health and knowledge, fame with peace)  
Three samples of true snakestone---rarer still,  
One of the other sort, the melon-shaped,  
(But fitter, pounded fine, for charms than drugs)  
And writeth now the twenty-second time.         20 
 
My journeyings were brought to Jericho:  
Thus I resume. Who studious in our art  282 
Shall count a little labour unrepaid?  
I have shed sweat enough, left flesh and bone  
On many a flinty furlong of this land.  
Also, the country-side is all on fire  
With rumours of a marching hitherward:  
Some say Vespasian cometh, some, his son.  
A black lynx snarled and pricked a tufted ear;  
Lust of my blood inflamed his yellow balls:       30 
I cried and threw my staff and he was gone.  
Twice have the robbers stripped and beaten me,  
And once a town declared me for a spy;  
But at the end, I reach Jerusalem,  
Since this poor covert where I pass the night,  
This Bethany, lies scarce the distance thence  
A man with plague-sores at the third degree  
Runs till he drops down dead. Thou laughest here!  
'Sooth, it elates me, thus reposed and safe,  
To void the stuffing of my travel-scrip         40 
And share with thee whatever Jewry yields.  
 
A viscid choler is observable  
In tertians, I was nearly bold to say;  
And falling-sickness hath a happier cure  
Than our school wots of: there's a spider here  
Weaves no web, watches on the ledge of tombs,  
Sprinkled with mottles on an ash-grey back;  283 
Take five and drop them . . but who knows his mind,  
The Syrian runagate I trust this to?  
His service payeth me a sublimate           50 
Blown up his nose to help the ailing eye.  
Best wait: I reach Jerusalem at morn,  
There set in order my experiences,  
Gather what most deserves, and give thee all---  
Or I might add, Judæa's gum-tragacanth  
Scales off in purer flakes, shines clearer-grained,  
Cracks 'twixt the pestle and the porphyry,  
In fine exceeds our produce. Scalp-disease  
Confounds me, crossing so with leprosy---  
Thou hadst admired one sort I gained at Zoar---      60 
But zeal outruns discretion. Here I end.  
 
Yet stay: my Syrian blinketh gratefully,  
Protesteth his devotion is my price---  
Suppose I write what harms not, though he steal?  
I half resolve to tell thee, yet I blush,  
What set me off a-writing first of all.  
An itch I had, a sting to write, a tang!  
For, be it this town's barrenness---or else  
The Man had something in the look of him---  
His case has struck me far more than 't is worth.     70 
So, pardon if---(lest presently I lose  
In the great press of novelty at hand  284 
The care and pains this somehow stole from me)  
I bid thee take the thing while fresh in mind,  
Almost in sight---for, wilt thou have the truth?  
The very man is gone from me but now,  
Whose ailment is the subject of discourse.  
Thus then, and let thy better wit help all!  
 
'T is but a case of mania---subinduced  
By epilepsy, at the turning-point           80 
Of trance prolonged unduly some three days:  
When, by the exhibition of some drug  
Or spell, exorcization, stroke of art  
Unknown to me and which 't were well to know  
The evil thing out-breaking all at once  
Left the man whole and sound of body indeed,---  
But, flinging (so to speak) life's gates too wide  
Making a clear house of it too suddenly,  
The first conceit that entered might inscribe  
Whatever it was minded on the wall          90 
So plainly at that vantage, as it were  
(First come, first served) that nothing subsequent  
Attaineth to erase those fancy-scrawls  
The just-returned and new-established soul  
Hath gotten now so thoroughly by heart  
That henceforth she will read or these or none.  
And first---the man's own firm conviction rests  285 
That he was dead (in fact they buried him)  
---That he was dead and then restored to life  
By a Nazarene physician of his tribe:         100 
---'Sayeth, the same bade "Rise," and he did rise.  
"Such cases are diurnal," thou wilt cry.  
Not so this figment!---not, that such a fume,  
Instead of giving way to time and health,  
Should eat itself into the life of life,  
As saffron tingeth flesh, blood, bones and all!  
For see, how he takes up the after-life.  
The man---it is one Lazarus a Jew,  
Sanguine, proportioned, fifty years of age,  
The body's habit wholly laudable,           110 
As much, indeed, beyond the common health  
As he were made and put aside to show.  
Think, could we penetrate by any drug  
And bathe the wearied soul and worried flesh,  
And bring it clear and fair, by three days' sleep!  
Whence has the man the balm that brightens all?  
This grown man eyes the world now like a child.  
Some elders of his tribe, I should premise,  
Led in their friend, obedient as a sheep,  
To bear my inquisition. While they spoke,        120 
Now sharply, now with sorrow,---told the case,---  
He listened not except I spoke to him,  
But folded his two hands and let them talk,  286 
Watching the flies that buzzed: and yet no fool.  
And that's a sample how his years must go.  
Look, if a beggar, in fixed middle-life,  
Should find a treasure,---can he use the same  
With straitened habits and with tastes starved small,  
And take at once to his impoverished brain  
The sudden element that changes things,        130 
That sets the undreamed-of rapture at his hand  
And puts the cheap old joy in the scorned dust?  
Is he not such an one as moves to mirth---  
Warily parsimonious, when no need,  
Wasteful as drunkenness at undue times?  
All prudent counsel as to what befits  
The golden mean, is lost on such an one:  
The man's fantastic will is the man's law.  
So here---we call the treasure knowledge, say,  
Increased beyond the fleshly faculty---         140 
Heaven opened to a soul while yet on earth,  
Earth forced on a soul's use while seeing heaven:  
The man is witless of the size, the sum,  
The value in proportion of all things,  
Or whether it be little or be much.  
Discourse to him of prodigious armaments  
Assembled to besiege his city now,  
And of the passing of a mule with gourds---  
'T is one! Then take it on the other side,  287 
Speak of some trifling fact,---he will gaze rapt       150 
With stupor at its very littleness,  
(Far as I see) as if in that indeed  
He caught prodigious import, whole results;  
And so will turn to us the bystanders  
In ever the same stupor (note this point)  
That we too see not with his opened eyes.  
Wonder and doubt come wrongly into play,  
Preposterously, at cross purposes.  
      Should his child sicken unto death,---why, look  
For scarce abatement of his cheerfulness,        160 
Or pretermission of the daily craft!  
While a word, gesture, glance from that same child  
At play or in the school or laid asleep,  
Will startle him to an agony of fear,  
Exasperation, just as like. Demand  
The reason why---"'t is but a word," object---  
"A gesture"---he regards thee as our lord  
Who lived there in the pyramid alone,  
Looked at us (dost thou mind?) when, being young,  
We both would unadvisedly recite           170 
Some charm's beginning, from that book of his,  
Able to bid the sun throb wide and burst  
All into stars, as suns grown old are wont.  
Thou and the child have each a veil alike  
Thrown o'er your heads, from under which ye both  288 
Stretch your blind hands and trifle with a match  
Over a mine of Greek fire, did ye know!  
He holds on firmly to some thread of life---  
(It is the life to lead perforcedly)  
Which runs across some vast distracting orb       180 
Of glory on either side that meagre thread,  
Which, conscious of, he must not enter yet---  
The spiritual life around the earthly life:  
The law of that is known to him as this,  
His heart and brain move there, his feet stay here.  
So is the man perplext with impulses  
Sudden to start off crosswise, not straight on,  
Proclaiming what is right and wrong across,  
And not along, this black thread through the blaze---  
"It should be" baulked by "here it cannot be."       190 
And oft the man's soul springs into his face  
As if he saw again and heard again  
His sage that bade him "Rise" and he did rise.  
Something, a word, a tick o' the blood within  
Admonishes: then back he sinks at once  
To ashes, who was very fire before,  
In sedulous recurrence to his trade  
Whereby he earneth him the daily bread;  
And studiously the humbler for that pride,  
Professedly the faultier that he knows         200 
God's secret, while he holds the thread of life.  289 
Indeed the especial marking of the man  
Is prone submission to the heavenly will---  
Seeing it, what it is, and why it is.  
'Sayeth, he will wait patient to the last  
For that same death which must restore his being  
To equilibrium, body loosening soul  
Divorced even now by premature full growth:  
He will live, nay, it pleaseth him to live  
So long as God please, and just how God please.     210 
He even seeketh not to please God more  
(Which meaneth, otherwise) than as God please.  
Hence, I perceive not he affects to preach  
The doctrine of his sect whate'er it be,  
Make proselytes as madmen thirst to do:  
How can he give his neighbour the real ground,  
His own conviction? Ardent as he is---  
Call his great truth a lie, why, still the old  
"Be it as God please" reassureth him.  
I probed the sore as thy disciple should:         210 
"How, beast," said I, "this stolid carelessness  
"Sufficeth thee, when Rome is on her march  
"To stamp out like a little spark thy town,  
"Thy tribe, thy crazy tale and thee at once?"  
He merely looked with his large eyes on me.  
The man is apathetic, you deduce?  
Contrariwise, he loves both old and young,  290 
Able and weak, affects the very brutes  
And birds---how say I? flowers of the field---  
As a wise workman recognizes tools          230 
In a master's workshop, loving what they make.  
Thus is the man as harmless as a lamb:  
Only impatient, let him do his best,  
At ignorance and carelessness and sin---  
An indignation which is promptly curbed:  
As when in certain travel I have feigned  
To be an ignoramus in our art  
According to some preconceived design,  
And happed to hear the land's practitioners  
Steeped in conceit sublimed by ignorance,      240 
Prattle fantastically on disease,  
Its cause and cure---and I must hold my peace!  
 
Thou wilt object---Why have I not ere this  
Sought out the sage himself, the Nazarene  
Who wrought this cure, inquiring at the source,  
Conferring with the frankness that befits?  
Alas! it grieveth me, the learned leech  
Perished in a tumult many years ago,  
Accused,---our learning's fate,---of wizardry,  
Rebellion, to the setting up a rule           250 
And creed prodigious as described to me.  
His death, which happened when the earthquake fell  291 
(Prefiguring, as soon appeared, the loss  
To occult learning in our lord the sage  
Who lived there in the pyramid alone)  
Was wrought by the mad people---that's their wont!  
On vain recourse, as I conjecture it,  
To his tried virtue, for miraculous help---  
How could he stop the earthquake? That's their way!  
The other imputations must be lies:          260 
But take one, though I loathe to give it thee,  
In mere respect for any good man's fame.  
(And after all, our patient Lazarus  
Is stark mad; should we count on what he says?  
Perhaps not: though in writing to a leech  
'T is well to keep back nothing of a case.)  
This man so cured regards the curer, then,  
As---God forgive me! who but God himself,  
Creator and sustainer of the world,  
That came and dwelt in flesh on it awhile!        270 
---'Sayeth that such an one was born and lived,  
Taught, healed the sick, broke bread at his own house,  
Then died, with Lazarus by, for aught I know,  
And yet was . . . what I said nor choose repeat,  
And must have so avouched himself, in fact,  
In hearing of this very Lazarus  
Who saith---but why all this of what he saith?  
Why write of trivial matters, things of price  292 
Calling at every moment for remark?  
I noticed on the margin of a pool           280 
Blue-flowering borage, the Aleppo sort,  
Aboundeth, very nitrous. It is strange!  
 
Thy pardon for this long and tedious case,  
Which, now that I review it, needs must seem  
Unduly dwelt on, prolixly set forth!  
Nor I myself discern in what is writ  
Good cause for the peculiar interest  
And awe indeed this man has touched me with.  
Perhaps the journey's end, the weariness  
Had wrought upon me first. I met him thus:       290 
I crossed a ridge of short sharp broken hills  
Like an old lion's cheek teeth. Out there came  
A moon made like a face with certain spots  
Multiform, manifold and menacing:  
Then a wind rose behind me. So we met  
In this old sleepy town at unaware,  
The man and I. I send thee what is writ.  
Regard it as a chance, a matter risked  
To this ambiguous Syrian---he may lose,  
Or steal, or give it thee with equal good.         300 
Jerusalem's repose shall make amends  
For time this letter wastes, thy time and mine;  
Till when, once more thy pardon and farewell!  293 
 
The very God! think, Abib; dost thou think?  
So, the All-Great, were the All-Loving too---  
So, through the thunder comes a human voice  
Saying, "O heart I made, a heart beats here!  
"Face, my hands fashioned, see it in myself!  
"Thou hast no power nor mayst conceive of mine,  
"But love I gave thee, with myself to love         310 
"And thou must love me who have died for thee!"  
The madman saith He said so: it is strange. 294 
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